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 Abstract  
The emphasis on the value of time from the knowledge workers and citizens has driven 
governments towards the transformation to the electronic method in offering government 
services to the public. This underpinned the need of launching e-governments worldwide. 
The inter-government integration, information sharing and collaboration is required to 
provide the citizens with well integrated services. The level of trust is one of the key factors 
for the integration and information sharing between the government departments. 
Information security contributes directly to the increased level of trust between the 
government departments by providing an assurance of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of sensitive governmental information.  
 
The research reported in this thesis delivers a new model that can be used as a tool to assess 
the level of security readiness of government departments, a checklist for the required 
security measures, and as a common reference for the security in the government 
departments in Dubai. Based on extensive literature research a new model was developed 
using a qualitative approach to build the overall structure and the number of layers in it. A 
quantitative approach was adopted during the research study to confirm the importance of 
the model layers and sub layers. The applicability of the model was tested and the Dubai e-
government authority was taken as a case study to validate the model and its layers.  
 
The research contributes to the theoretical knowledge of the information security modelling 
concept in four ways. First the literature review of existing security model and their 
coverage of security aspects. Second, the analysis of the security threats related to the e-
services. Third, the construction of a new security model based on the academic research on 
each layer.  Fourth, the applicability of the model was in the validated case study selected.  
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Glossary of terms  
Term Definition 
e-government 
Refers to the use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) to 
change the structures and processes of government organisations (Beynon, 
D. P., 2005). 
e-services 
An online service which has its processes automated and can be accessed 
through the web 
e-government 
Authority 
A government body responsible for the e-government initiative, projects, 
and services. The authority is also responsible for the coordination 
between the other government departments in order to create a synergy 
and strong alignment 
DEG Dubai E-government Authority 
GITEX Gulf IT Exhibition 
Multilevel  
Secure (MLS) 
“A class of system that has system resources (particularly stored 
information) at more than one security level and that permits concurrent 
access by users who differ in security clearance and need to know, but is 
able to prevent each user from accessing resources for which the user lacks 
authorization” (Stallings, W. and Brown, L., 2008) 
COBIT Control Objectives for Information Technology 
ICDL International Computer Driving License 
CISSP Certified Information Security System Professional 
NRL Pump Naval Research Laboratory Pump 
CWM Clark and Wilson 
Chapter one: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction:  
Dubai has been marked in the past decade as the fastest growing city in the knowledge 
economy in the Middle East. The government of Dubai plays a major role in the economic 
development in the United Arab Emirates and was the first to launch the e-government in 
the country and encourage its citizens to use the government e-services in order to enhance 
the efficiency and the standards of life in the city. The city of Dubai was transformed to be 
a modern city providing state of the art city infrastructure, buildings, and all the necessary 
facilities which assist the government to embrace knowledge workers as part of the 
strategic objectives. The e-government initiative was an embodiment of the strategic goals 
and objectives which gave Dubai a head start and valuable experience. This chapter aims to 
give the reader a background on Dubai and provide chronological facts of the launch of the 
e-government. It also addresses the research challenge being conducted in a real world 
scenario. The research objectives, processes, data collection tools, and the structure of the 
document are addressed through the following sections of this chapter.  
 
1.2 Dubai e-government development  
“The land of globalization and modern life in the Middle East”, a description that you will 
hear a lot from many well known public speakers and business leaders describing Dubai as 
a fast growing and a role model city in the region. Dubai as one of the seven emirates 
“States” of United Arab Emirates has become a brand of quality, modernization, and high 
standards of life in the region. “Dubai has achieved a lot in the past 40 years or so. Its 
location has helped and the emirate is ideally located to serve the growing markets in the 
Middle East, India, Pakistan, Iran and East Africa”, (Sampler, J. and Eigner, S., 2003). The 
growth of the GDP of the city is strong economic evidence reflecting the success of the city 
which has been achieved through the past decade. As illustrated in Table 1 the staging 
development of the GDP from 1996 to 2005 (from 7.0 to 13.4) is considered phenomenal 
as the growth in the non-oil GDP continued to rise from 10.9 in 1996 to 15.1 in 2005.  
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Table 1: The GDP growth of Dubai 
 1996 1997* 1998* 1999* 2000* 2005** 
GDP 7.0 5.5 5.3 8.2 7.5 13.4 
Non-Oil GDP 10.9 12.1 5.3 9.2 8.9 15.1 
*: Adjusted 
-: Preliminary 
** Source: www.dubai.ae)  
(From: Sampler, J. and Eigner, S., 2003) 
In 1990s, many governments have launched electronic government projects with a common 
objective; providing electronic information and services to citizens and businesses (Torres, 
L., Pina, V. and Acerete, B., 2005). Based on the foresight of the Dubai government for the 
need of having world class services and efficient life style for its citizens, the Dubai e-
government initiative was announced in 2000. It was the start of a new era of virtual 
government in the country and the region (Sampler, J. and Eigner, S., 2003). "The notion of 
Government has to be re-invented if we want Dubai to become a leading business hub in 
the new economy", H.H Shaikh Mohamed Bin Rashid.  
 
The objectives of the initiative were set from the beginning by the leadership of Dubai; the 
vision was clear from day one. Dubai e-government (DEG) authority’s mission was to 
achieve a digital or virtual government through the provisioning of e-services to the citizens 
and visitors of Dubai. This shall simplify the process of government citizen interaction and 
enhance the efficiency of the government departments.  
Looking back to the year of 2000, many visionary leaders of government departments had 
doubt about the success of this new initiative. It was a key transformational point for the 
government of Dubai. The target of completing the launch of the government portal in 18 
months was considered aggressive but Dubai was always known as achieving things 
rapidly, racing the time, and performing the quantum leaps while managing the change 
effectively.  In 2002, the Dubai leader has announced the launch of the e-government portal 
and the success of completing the project within the planned dead line. Dubai has given a 
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strong example to other cities in the gulf and the region and achieving strategic objectives 
with speed and accuracy has become the known trait and brand of Dubai.  
Dubai e-government (DEG) authority kept encouraging other government departments to 
participate in the e-government initiative and to automate the government processes and 
make them publicly accessible by the citizens as e-services. In 2003 and during one of the 
most prestigious IT exhibition in the region known as “GITEX”, DEG authority was able to 
encourage 21 government departments to exhibit their e-services to all visitors and 
government delegates. Dubai government departments were able to demonstrate different 
e-services offered through the unified government portal (www.dubai.ae). The DEG 
authority continued to sell the concept of e-government to other government departments 
and assist them in the launch of their first e-service.  In the following year, 26 government 
departments participated in GITEX demonstrating new e-services and training citizens on 
how to use them. The immediate participations of the large government departments in 
Dubai was an evidence that the e-government initiative has received good support from the 
government departments which continued in competing for the launch of new, effective, 
and market demanded e-services to the public and private sectors.  The 26 government 
departments are illustrated in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Government departments offering e-Services 
1 Dubai Police 10 Al-Awqaf Department 19 Dubai Municipality 
2 Dubai 
Development 
Board 
11 Dubai Naturalization 
and Residency 
Department  
20 e-TQM College 
3 Land 
Department  
12 Dubai Transport  21 Dubai Real Estate 
Department 
4 Dubai Civil 
Aviation  
13 Dubai Chamber of 
Commerce and 
Industry 
22 Ministry of Labour 
5 Department of 
Economic 
Development  
14 Tanmia  23 Dubai Civil Defence 
6 Dubai Justice 
Department 
15 Dubai Government 
Workshop 
24 Department of Health 
and Medical Services 
(DOHMS) 
7 Department of 
Tourism and 
Commerce 
Marketing 
(DTCM) 
16 Dubai Electricity and 
Water Authority 
(DEWA) 
25 Department of 
Information  
8 Jebel Ali Free 
Zone Authority 
17 Dubai Ports and 
Customs Free Zone 
Corporation  
26 Dubai Airport and Free 
Zone Authority 
9 Dubai Quality 
Group  
18 Mohamed Bin Rashid 
Al Maktoum 
Charitable and 
Humanitarian 
Foundation 
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The DEG authority acted as an active member of the e-government initiative and launched 
some key e-services which can be accessed by citizens and other government departments. 
DEG authority called these services as synergetic e-services. The portfolio of the synergetic 
e-services was including ePay, AskDubai, mDubai, eJob, eEmployee, eLearn and eLibrary 
e-services. The ePay e-service allows registered users to pay for public services through 
eDirham card or credit cards. It is widely used and considered the key transactional e-
service for all the government departments. The author believes that ePay is the spine of the 
government e-services due to its integration with many government e-services offered by 
different departments.  As a facility, the DEG authority has provided the government 
departments an e-service called mDubai which will enable them to send short text messages 
to all the residents of Dubai through the residents database stored in DEG authority’s IT 
infrastructure. mDubai is considered one of the push e-services used as a strong tool for 
propagating mass information in the city.   
The eEmployee service is developed based on the concept of the European Computer 
Driving License Foundation, a recognized standard for computer literacy in over 120 
countries and is endorsed by UNESCO for all Arabic speaking countries. eEmployee is a 
double certification programme that combines ICDL-Start certification with three 
additional courses of instruction selected by e-government to meet the specific needs of 
Dubai Government. This e-service contributes in building of the computer knowledge in 
the government sector. The contribution of the DEG authority in developing knowledge 
workers was reflected in the launch of the eLearn service, a service which provides online 
training services to departments, residents and businesses.  
The launching of different e-services was not bound to any restriction as long as it serves 
the objective of the e-government initiative. The DEG authority has also launched a limited 
interactive service through the call centre entitled as “ASK Dubai”.  
It was observed by the author that the interactive e-services of DEG and its affiliates are not 
real time processes. They are mainly as one way interaction and the rest of the processes 
are performed in the backend offices of the government departments. Due to this 
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disconnection between the interfaced processes by the citizen and the rest of the processes, 
a long time of verification and customer notification is added which has a negative 
implication on the citizens’ satisfaction and usability. This challenge has been recognized 
by the DEG authority and it confirmed the main reason of this challenge is due to the lack 
of backend offices integration and the lack of a seamless mechanism which allows 
information sharing between the government departments. The DEG authority has 
embarked a new project for the government enterprise architecture in alignment of a new 
strategic objective towards the transformation to “i-government”.  
1.3 The new research challenge 
Currently most of the e-services are accessed through different government department 
portals and not through the official e-government portal known as dubai.ae. The 
government portal acts as a catalogue of the government e-services and directs the citizens 
to the respective government portal once the e-service is selected.  A citizen of Dubai will 
have to access multiple portals to complete a cycle of a single e-service. The DEG authority 
is striving to achieve the goal of integration. The reluctance of integration by all the 
government departments has contributing factors including the fear of security failures.   
 
In this thesis document a new security model is developed for the e-government authority 
and its affiliated government departments. It is meant to be used as a reference and a 
standard for assessing the level of security in each department and as an assurance of 
government department’s good security level.  
 
The new security model will also assist in ascertaining the current level of security of each 
department, giving the confidence to other departments and serve as a mitigation action of 
the risks that may exist in the future.  
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1.4  Research objective 
This research focuses on building a new security model for the e-government of Dubai. 
Initially the aim of the research was to build an information security model for any e-
organisation and was then narrowed to address e-government security.   
The objectives of the research were as follows:   
1. Establish the security requirements for Dubai e-government.  
2. Collate state of the art approaches and methods for the e-government security.  
3. Develop model for evaluating the security level for inter-government information 
sharing.  
4. Test the model in the Dubai e-government context 
The research questions assist in understanding the scope of work for this research. There 
are two main research questions:  
1. What are the security concerns and requirements for Dubai e-government? 
2. What are the existing models addressing the different needs of the information security 
and why would a new model be evolved from there?  
 
1.5 Research process/methodology  
The author of this thesis selected a research methodology mixing the quantitative and 
qualitative methods as explained by Creswell (Creswell, J. W., 2003). The questionnaires 
designed for collecting data had open-and-closed ended questions to obtain both 
quantitative and qualitative data for the analysis.  
 
An extensive literature review of existing security models was carried out. Information 
security models addressing information flow and sharing, e-commerce security, Internet 
optimization, e-government services security, human behavioural effect on cybercrimes, 
networking security rating and other aspects of security, were studied and analyzed. The 
reviewed models contributed to the information security field by addressing one or two 
aspects of security. The structure of these models varied from mathematical structure, to 
pure graphical representations. The review of strength and weaknesses of these models 
assisted in building the conceptual design of the new model based. Figure 1 illustrates how 
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the process of review of the existing models led to conceptualizing the new model. This 
shall be further described in chapter 4.  
 
Figure 1: Different models leading to new one 
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The data collection tools 
Two questionnaires were developed for data collection. The first questionnaire (A) 
targeted the government department leaders and executives who have the authority in their 
government departments. The objective of the questionnaire was to identify the type of 
services offered through each department; the security programmes implemented 
addressing the internal/ external threats on the e-services.  
 
The second questionnaire (questionnaire (B)) targeted the information security practitioners 
in the e-government authority and the government departments. In addition it was sent to 
other information security practitioners who are known as strong references in the 
information security field in Dubai. The key objectives of questionnaire B were to identify 
internal/external threats and to build the counter threats model for the governmental 
departments. In addition it was to confirm the need of each layer and sub-layers of the new 
model.  
 
The following diagram illustrates (Figure 2) the objectives of each questionnaire and how 
both sets of objectives lead to the achievement of the final objectives. The refined model 
was then validated with the relevant authorities in Dubai. 
 
  
Figure 2: The questionnaires objectives 
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1.6  Contribution to knowledge  
The model is an advance on existing models in its comprehensive nature to address the 
variety of threats to information security. It has an adaptable structure that can be extended 
as new threats emerge. In addition, the model is easy to understand and used by non-
technical people with management responsibility for the e-government security.  
 
The new model presented in this thesis provides the e-government authority and its 
affiliates a structured methodology to assess the security level in the government 
departments, a checklist of all the security elements required to build a robust security 
programme and architecture, and a mean to align the different views on the needed security 
levels for transparent information sharing. It can also be evolved to be an international 
framework for the government security architecture and a standard used by e-government 
authorities worldwide. The new model addresses some of the main domains of ISO17799 
by addressing policies and operational management, and the people capability maturity 
matrix (PCMM) through addressing the competency layer. 
 
The new model developed through the research work of this thesis has four strong 
characteristics:  
• It can be used for multiple purposes: The new model can be referred as a 
comprehensive security architecture which addresses more than the technological 
aspect. It can also be used as a checklist for what’s implemented and what’s in the 
future plan and can easily be turned into a measurement tool for the security level of 
the government department. Finally, it can be used as a strong awareness tool for 
government executives to give them a holistic view of all the security aspects 
required in their organization.  
• The model is flexible and not biased to any technology, policy or any other 
security aspects: The sub layers presented in the model are academically researched 
independent from any industry or brand bias.  
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• The new model is independent of any theory, threats, sector or architecture and 
it can be placed as part of any Enterprise architecture for any government 
department.  
• Complement the previous models: The new model developed addresses aspects 
complementing other models such as the competency aspect which was not 
addressed by the other models researched, the decision aspect which was missed out 
from most of the security models in the field of information security and the link 
between all the five layers which gives any security model a strength to stand as an 
independent security programme.  
 
1.7 Thesis document structure  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 In chapter 1, an introduction of Dubai government and city was given in order to provide 
the reader a good background of Dubai the area of the case study of this research. The 
chapter addresses the DEG authority initiative, and the type of services the e-government is 
offering.   
Chapter 2: Literature review  
This chapter has two main parts which provide a holistic view for the reader on the threats 
affecting the online services, and how to come up with a model addressing all of them. The 
first part is an introduction on the evolution of the e-world and how the e-governments 
were evolved subsequently. It briefly addresses the DEG authority goals and challenges. 
The second part of this chapter explains the models and theories the author came across 
during the literature review phase of this research study. This section gives the reader a 
good background of the well known security models and theories. It also highlights the 
weaknesses of each model.    
Chapter 3: A structured research methodology 
A background on the research methodologies, knowledge claims, research strategies, and 
data collection was given as the first part of this chapter. The implemented research process 
and methodology for this research study was explained subsequently. The last part of this 
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chapter addressed the validation process and the objectives achieved through the research 
study.   
Chapter 4: The five security layered model using matrix representation 
In the first part of this chapter, the author introduces the conceptual model using a pyramid 
shape representation. The objective is to establish the layers needed in the model. The 
model evolved to a matrix structure to represent all the layers and sub layers. The main part 
of this chapter is the justification of each layer of the new model and establish how they can 
contribute to security evaluation. Each layer and its sub layers were referenced to literature 
reflecting other researchers’ opinions on their importance and criticalities. The final 
structure of the model is presented in the last part of this chapter including all the sub 
layers.   
Chapter 5: Case study of Dubai e-government security requirements 
Dubai e-government was taken as a case study; a survey was developed for the 
management of Dubai government in order to collect the different views of the security 
needs, online threats and challenges from management perspective. The first part of the 
chapter addresses the purpose of the research, target interviewees, format of the 
questionnaire and the method of data collection. The pilot questionnaire and benefit of this 
process are highlighted. In the last part of Chapter 5, the analysis of questionnaire results is 
presented.  
Chapter 6: Dubai e-government security model survey analysis 
Another questionnaire was developed in order to collect the views of the top information 
security practitioners in Dubai who directly or indirectly contributing to government e-
services. The questionnaire structure, design, and objectives were explained in this chapter. 
A pilot questionnaire was also carried out to collect the feedback and depict the areas of 
weaknesses in order to enhance prior to the final questionnaire deployment. The highlight 
analysis of the questionnaire results was reported in this chapter reflecting the correlation 
between the different layers of sub layers in the new model.  
Chapter 7: Validation analysis 
The validation mechanism is explained. Input from key authority in Dubai e-government 
was used to confirm the validity of the model.      
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Chapter 8: Discussion, future research work and conclusion 
This chapter provides a summary of the results and the achievement of the research study. 
It also compares the questionnaires results with the developed model and how the new 
model presented in this thesis document contributes to the knowledge in the security field. 
As a conclusion of this chapter, the author indicates how the presented research study can 
evolve to a further research. The author concludes with addressing the limitation of the 
research study conducted in this thesis.  
 
Appendices 
• Appendix A: The management questionnaire-Questionnaire A 
• Appendix B: The IT security practitioners questionnaire-Questionnaire B 
• Appendix C: Feedback Form for both questionnaire A & B 
• Appendix D: Validation Forms and confirmation emails from e-government 
authority and government departments.  
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Chapter two: Literature review  
2.1 Overview 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Securing information can be referred back to the ancient civilizations when many 
civilizations started to adopt models of secrecy to communicate freely without the risk of 
eavesdropping. The Egyptians started using cryptography in 3000 BC applying 
Hieroglyphics (Schneier, B,. 1996) to conceal writings from unintended recipients. The 
science of Hieroglyphics was born in the Greek civilization and the word Hieroglyphic 
meant sacred carvings. In 400 BC, Spartan military used cryptography in the firm of 
papyrus or parchment wrapped around a wooden rod. This was known as ‘Scytale’ 
(Schneier, B,. 1996). The evolution of developing new security methods to secure valuable 
information to nations, armies, individuals, and organisations continued afterward. Some 
were based on pure cryptographic knowledge while others based on policies, rules, and 
mathematical foundations. In the early 1970’s a new model was developed known as Bell 
and Lapadula model (Bell, D. and Lapadula, L., 1973). The model objective was to ensure 
the confidentiality of the information based on a military-style classification in the early 
1970’s. The model was widely accepted and found to be practical.  In 1985 McLean 
(Mclean, J., 1990) raised an argument about the security of the Bell- LaPadula model and 
the strength of the basic security theorem in proving a secure system or not.  McLean’s 
research introduced a new area of the security field addressing a threat of the covert 
channel which allows a bypass of the security rules.  In 1977 another model was developed 
addressing the integrity of the system known as the Biba model (Bishop, M., Cheung, S. 
and Wee, C., 1997).  A combining model of both BLP and Biba was developed by Lipner 
Information Security is:  
1. The process of identifying events that have the potential to cause harm (or threat 
scenarios) and implementing safeguards to reduce or eliminate this potential.  
2. The safeguard, or countermeasures, created and maintained by the security process 
(Schechter, S., 2004). 
 
15 
in 1982 (Lipner, S., 1982). The development of new models continued and in 1987 a model 
addressing the integrity challenge was developed by Clark and Wilson (CWM) (Bishop, 
M., Cheung, S. and Wee, C., 1997).  CWM imposes integrity controls on data and its 
transactions. It also sets two types of rules; certification rules which are group of 
restrictions on the integrity verification procedures (IVPs) and the transformation 
procedures (TP) (Clark, D. D. and Wilson, D. R., 1987). Issues such as conflict of interest 
led to the development of new models based on security policies such as the Chinese wall 
model (Brewer, D. F. C. and Nash, M. J., 1989) which was derived from the British laws 
addressing the conflict of interest. As the number of models increased, challenges 
continued to increase and researchers continued to search for different solutions through 
new models or enhancements of existing ones.  The foundations of the models were 
different. Security models were developed following different research strategies. Some 
were qualitative while others were based on quantitative approach. A good model reflecting 
the quantitative approach is the scheduler model. The model was built to measure and 
improve the security of an existing application within a computer (Schechter, S., 2004).  
 
The objectives of some models were developed to protect computer system such as the 
“Multilevel Model” (Thuraisingham, B., 1995) while others were developed to provide 
security across boundaries of multiple organisations such as “Multilateral Model” (Sadeqhi, 
A. R. and Stuble, C., 2005).   
 
The spread of the Internet and the evolution of the e-world and e-government have 
increased the power and value of the information for the government organisations. 
Information security science has evolved to be the main factor and the supporting element 
of the Internet spread. This chapter provides a detailed overview on the e-government 
evolution as part of the “e” world evolution, literature review and the classification process 
of threats on the e-services launched by the e-government. The structure of the chapter is as 
follows: 
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The first part discusses the evolution of the e-world and its impact in the Middle East. The 
change in culture and life style is addressed briefly. The second part covers the literature 
reviews conducted for models and theories tackling the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of the information and how threats are handled through these models.  
 
2.2 From the e-world to the e-government 
The growth of the virtual world is inevitable. The concepts of virtualization and 
globalization go hand to hand and the level of acceptance for such new culture is 
increasingly noticeable. The paradigm shift is driven by enterprises, entrepreneurs, 
visionaries, professors, customers, and even legislators and governments. The virtual world 
is the world of no boundaries where governments and business leaders would like to invest 
on. There is no doubt in our minds that our world has changed dramatically in the past 
decade. The new e-world represented by the letter “e” is not only impacting the definitions 
of some of the words which we are used to in our daily life and the technology arena, but 
the style of life, culture, social bonds, and methods of communications. Relyea mentioned 
that the term of ‘e-government’ was introduced by a joint report of the National 
Performance Review and the Government Information Technology Services Board in 1997 
(Relyea, H.C., 2002) entitled as “Access America: Reengineering through Information 
Technology”. Information Technology leaders and security practitioners were always 
emphasising about e-commerce, e-business, and e-governments. Today, we do have more 
e’s than we ever expected. Every conventional society element can have an “e” format of it. 
The e-learning, e-library, e-auctions, e-markets, and e-entertainment for instance represent 
conventional services but in the most automated and efficient way which made 
governments and leaders encourage the launch of more e-services. The shift in the mindsets 
in modern societies is becoming a rolling snow ball accelerating at a faster speed and 
growing with its mass and value.  
 
The adoption of the e-model was performed by many organisations, governments, and 
educational institutions selected different aspects of it. The transactions of commerce 
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evolved to e-commerce, governments’ services to e-governments e-services, business to e-
business and many others.  
 
The evolution of the e-government started in the 1990’s world wide aimed at providing 
online services 24 by 7 to the public (Benabdallah, S., Fatmi, G. E. and Ourdiga, N. B., 
2002). The initial services were all related to information publishing. The development in 
the e-government services continued to be categorized into three based on the purpose of 
the services and the perception of the end users as most literature state (Anonymous, B., 
Mark., Locher, L. J. and Doyle, C., 1998). 
 
The idea behind the establishment of an e-government is to provide public services to the 
public and private sector through a single point of access known as the e-government portal 
(Lambrou, M. A., 2003). According to Glassey (Glassey, O., 2004) the e-government 
services are categorized as informational, communicational, and transactional services.  
The e-government online services vary from providing simple information to full cycles of 
complex online services involving financial transactions (Figure 3).  
 
 
(Wauthers, P., Nijskens, M. and Tiebout, J., 2007) 
Figure 3: E-services Maturity Level 
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Narrowing down the discussion from the world to the Middle East, the e-model has 
received a wide acceptance by many governments in the Middle East where dramatic 
change in the concept of the electronic world, digitization, and e-services has been noticed. 
In 1990’s the culture of having knowledge workers with their laptops in coffee shops, malls 
and public places did not exist. The lack of ubiquitous connectivity was an obstacle for 
those who wanted to work from home, or public places. Nowadays and with the wide 
spread of the Internet, working in public areas or from home is possible in Dubai and many 
cities in the region. The high demand of the knowledge workers for the Internet 
connectivity in Dubai has driven the service providers to respond fast and provide Internet 
connectivity (wired and wireless) everywhere in the society. It also encouraged the 
government to provide e-services in order to reduce the travel needs of the citizens and 
enhance efficiencies. The physical interaction with the governmental departments in order 
to complete a simple process is no longer accepted by the knowledge workers which 
pushed governments to find an alternative to offer their services to the public. Dubai e-
government was the first to launch its government services over its portal and the number 
of services continued to increase to reach around 600 services (Geray, O., Feb 2007).  
 
2.2.1  E-government security challenges  
The spread of the e-services raised another challenge for governments in the Middle East. 
The government information will need a strong protection programme in order to avoid any 
breach which might jeopardize the government operation or disclose the citizens’ private 
data. In Dubai the trust relationship between the e-government authority and the other 
governmental departments is all based on how confident the government departments 
would feel toward the security programme applied in the e-government infrastructure, the 
telecom service providers, and the other government departments. One of the main factors 
to increase the confidence and the trust relationship is to have a high level of security 
awareness. Being well informed about the security policies, architectures, competencies 
supporting the security functions and the operational procedures in the government 
departments will assist in raising the level of confidence and trust. The challenge of 
achieving the security awareness has been there for a while and since the inception of the e-
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government programme. Government departments took the responsibility of protecting 
their e-services but the security programmes implemented in each government department 
is different and varies from network security to application security levels. Their objectives 
were to encourage the public to use the government e-services offered through their 
individual portals or the common portal gateway. These services might be provided directly 
from the e-government authority or any of its affiliated government departments. “The 
milieu of citizens, agencies, and commercial corporations around the e-government 
authority shall raise the security concerns around inter and intra communication” (Conklin, 
A. and White, G., B., 2006), Many researchers presented different models to address the 
security concerns of the e-government and to measure confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability known as the C.I.A triad. “Security issues are conceived to comfort the public 
in using e-government services and government administration and agencies to access, 
share and exchange information security”, (Benabdullah, S., Fatmi, G. E. and Ourdiga, N. 
B., 2002). 
 
Information sharing was always considered a concern but need to exist between the 
governments departments. The requirement of having information sharing between 
government departments in order to complete an e-service process, for example, sharing the 
citizen profile, or authenticating an applicant, started to be stronger with the need of having 
single citizen profile and strong integration in the backend system. Despite the strong need 
of information sharing and the intensive communication between the government authority 
and its affiliates, the flow of information between different government departments always 
raises security concerns (Conklin, A. and White, G., B,. 2006). It is an inevitable challenge 
for the e-government and need to be addressed through the adoption of a security model or 
a change in the method of information sharing.  
 
Moreover, the type of information to be exchanged and the purpose of the information use 
determine the level of risk the government will need to consider. According to Conklin 
(Conklin, A. and White, G., B., 2006) the level of information sharing between the police 
department and the water department is different than the police department and the public. 
20 
The change of information classification is a threat that needs to be addressed by the e-
government authority. The process of information sharing is not performed through 
technology only. The operational procedures, human, policies and decision factors can have 
positive or negative impact on the process.  
 
2.2.2 The threats impact on the e-government services  
Similar to the e-business model, the government e-services depend on the reliability of the 
technological infrastructure and its security, the integrated processes and their security 
checks, and the integrity and competency of the supporting staff. The e-government uses 
ICT to make the interaction with citizens and businesses easier and seamless with the 
government. The threats of lacking any of the key elements required to run or launch an e-
service shall always be a concern for the e-government. The government e-services have a 
larger population of users in comparison to e-business e-services which have specific users. 
The users of government e-services users are the citizens who are the people who live in 
the country, business corporations, visitors or tourists. Having a larger population will 
always increase the probability of having malicious attack on the online service.  
 
The lack of public confidence caused by the threats on the e-services will be noticed by the 
low level of use of any e-service offered by the e-government or any of its affiliates. The 
electronic governance of the e-services is a worldwide topic where many researches were 
conducted to address how possibly it can be supported. As mentioned by Mitra, “the 
serious needs of ensuring security on the website vis-à-vis protection of privacy and the 
prevention of abuse are overwhelming concerns that persuade the use of such models” 
(Mitra, A., 2005). It is a clear indication that the need of security has a direct link to the use 
rate of the e-service. The increase number of threats on authentication, authorization, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation of any e-government e-service has negative impact on 
the proliferation of such service or any associated services (Turban, E., King, D., Lee, J., 
Warkentin, M. and Chung, M. H., 2001). 
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2.2.2.1 An overview on Dubai e-government (DEG) authority 
“Dubai as a leading business hub in the new economy has launched various initiatives to 
adopt a knowledge economy and to utilize information and communication technology 
(ICT) as a key enabler” (Geray, O., Feb 2007). Prior to the launch of the DEG authority, 
the government of Dubai provided its public services through the traditional and 
conventional means which required a direct physical interaction with the citizens/public. A 
repetitive number of physical interactions with government departments were sometimes 
needed for one process causing the applicants loss of time and great level of frustration. 
This indeed pushed the government of Dubai to find an alternative through the e-
government concept and established the DEG authority to be responsible for the 
coordination and collaboration between the government departments in the e-government 
initiative. The objective was to put “e” in front of every government service and digitize the 
manual processes in order to transform its internal and external relationship with the use of 
modern information and communication technology (ICT) (Bertucci, G., 2005). The new 
era of e-government is a paradigm shift in Dubai allowing businesses and individuals to 
apply for government services through a common governmental portal. The government, 
business and individuals (citizens & residents) are the pillars of Dubai’s economy. Having 
a strong interaction between these pillars is imperative and will be the key of Dubai strong 
economy  (Bertucci, G., 2005).   
 
Through the first phase of analysis the DEG authority has identified around 2240 public 
services. The services are provided by the 26 government departments in Dubai 
government.  Today only 75.8% of the public services (1700) are provided electronically.  
The maturity of these services varies from information publishing to full transactional 
services.  DEG has invested a lot to enhance the quality of the websites and the electronic 
services. An annual assessment is performed on the quality and a rate of 62% was given on 
the websites quality.  
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Although most of the e-services are coming from government departments, DEG has 
proactively launched some e-services to the citizens and the government departments. 
There is a significant increase in the usability of the common e-services launched by DEG. 
For instance, calls routed through the DEG authority contact centre for AskDubai service 
increased 23% in 2006 reaching more than 166000 calls. More than 3.1 million text 
messages were sent through DEG’s mDubai unified mobile services.  
 
2.2.3 DEG authority strategy goals 
• To simplify and streamline government services by utilizing technology as a key 
enabler. 
• To achieve a customer centric approach for government services provision by 
increasing effectiveness and efficiency. 
• To come up new government services and join-up existing government services by 
exploiting new potentials arising from Dubai e-government (DEG) authority.  
• To modernize and standardize internal government processes regarding procurement, 
finance and human resources (Bertucci, G., 2005).  
  
The following table (Table 3) illustrates the affiliated departments with the DEG authority 
and the percentage of the e-services launched within the department:  
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Table 3: E-services launched by DEG authority (2006) (Geray, O., Feb 2007), 
NO Department Name 
% of e-
Services 
Launched 
1 Awqaf and Minor Affairs Foundation 100 
2 Department of Health and Medical Services 75 
3 Department of Tourism and Commerce Marketing 81 
4 Dubai Airport Free Zone Authority 100 
5 Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry 100 
6 Dubai Civil Aviation 98 
7 Dubai Civil Defence 100 
8 Dubai Courts 23 
9 Dubai Customs  75 
10  Dubai Development Board 100 
11 Department of Economic Development  100 
12 Dubai Electricity and Water Authority 99 
13 Dubai Government Workshop 60 
14 Dubai Land 100 
15 Dubai Media Corporation 100 
16 Dubai Municipality  100 
17 Dubai Police 79 
18 Dubai Public Prosecution  100 
19 Roads and Transport Authority 100 
20 Dubai Transport Authority 100 
21 Islamic Affairs and Charitable Activities Department 66 
22 Naturalization and Residency Admin  47 
23 Real Estate Department 88 
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An analysis was conducted on the government department e-services and their types based 
on the UN categorization as part of DEG 2006 Strategic Progress Review Report (Dubai e-
government Authority). The results are illustrated in Table 4: 
 
Table 4: Dubai government departments e-services (Geray, O., Feb 2007), 
No Department Informational Interactive Transactional 
  Total 
Services 
e-enabled 
services 
Total 
Services 
e-enabled 
services 
Total 
Services 
e-
enabled 
services 
1 Awqaf and Minor Affairs 
Foundation 
0 0 0 0 30 30 
2 Department of Health and 
Medical Services 
11 11 14 13 56 37 
3 Department of Tourism and 
Commerce marketing 
2 0 3 3 11 0 
4 Dubai Airport Free Zone 
Authority 
2 2 2 2 184 184 
5 Dubai Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry 
5 5 9 9 0 0 
6 Dubai Civil Aviation 0 0 2 0 119 116 
7 Dubai civil Defence 2 0 4 0 27 27 
8 Dubai Courts 9 0 53 52 375 49 
9 Dubai Customs 0 0 11 11 65 45 
10 Dubai Development Board 6 6 19 19 0 0 
11 Department of Economic 
Development 
17 17 17 17 106 106 
12 Dubai Electricity & Water 
Authority 
32 31 23 22 48 47 
13 Dubai Government Workshop 0 0 6 6 4 0 
14 Dubai Land 16 16 3 2 4 4 
15 Dubai Media Corporation 1 0 0 0 6 4 
16 Dubai Municipality 70 70 13 13 417 417 
17 Dubai Police 17 16 2 2 56 41 
18 Dubai Public Prosecution  1 1 7 7 104 104 
19 Roads & Transport Authority 4 2 8 8 26 15 
25 
20 Dubai Transport 2 2 0 0 11 11 
21 Islamic Affairs & Charitable 
Activities Department 
19 14 9 4 4 3 
22 Naturalization & Residency 
Administration 
0 0 0 0 150 71 
23 Real Estate Department 1 1 1 0 14 13 
 
There is a difference between Table 3 and Table 4 as some new departments were added 
while some also were merged or dissolved. Dubai continues to revamp its government 
structure and strive to make the government structure more efficient to serve the public. 
The government departments restructure shall not affect the number of e-services unless the 
business processes supporting the e-services get changed or reengineered. 
 
It was found from the statistical analysis that 83% of the government services were 
identified as transactional services, 7% were identified as interactive services and 10% 
were identified as informational services. Although transactional services were well 
enabled in many government departments, the low percentage of interactive services raises 
concern about the value chain and the processes of the transactional services.  
 
2.2.4 The lack of information sharing in DEG authority 
There is no doubt that automating government functions will help to increase customer 
service levels and decrease costs (Evans, D. and Yen, D., 2005). The automation of the 
government function will require integration in order to achieve the maximum efficiency 
between the different government departments. Many e-governments are moving towards 
the new concept of i-government. A concept which simply means the integration of the 
backend systems of the e-government infrastructure. The integration will assist the e-
government to achieve more correlation of the citizen information and have a single profile 
for the citizen using the e-services provided through the e-government portal.  DEG 
authority is working on integrating the e-services and the backend systems of the various 
government departments in order to transform the e-government to i-government. Many 
challenges are encountered during the integration process of the government departments. 
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One of the key challenges the DEG authority is facing is the lack of common reference for 
a security architecture or assessment. This is a constraint for the integration of the citizens’ 
database between the various departments of Dubai government. An extensive research was 
conducted on various security models which might address the need of information sharing 
and strengthen the trust relationship between the government departments. The following 
section explicitly explains the literature reviewed during the research process.  
 
2.3 Existing information security models and theories 
Many journals and literature were reviewed to analyse the existing models and theories 
developed to evaluate the information security level in an organisation or between group of 
organisations interacting with each other through information sharing or transactional 
services. The focus was on the models and theories researchers and scientists came up with 
or adopted in developing security systems, or models. Reviewing the objectives of these 
models was also part of the literature review process of this research.  
 
The scope and the objective of the research were clear from the initial stage of the literature 
review. Journals addressing information security models, theories of systems and 
enterprises protection, human behavioural theories and the cybercrimes, decision factors in 
the information security, and security frameworks and standards were reviewed, analyzed, 
and categorized based on the area of the research they address.  The review process focused 
on finding supporting arguments for the need of a new model. The strengths of the existing 
models were considered as good characteristics to have in the new model and the 
weaknesses been the supporting factors to justify the existence of some of the layers and 
shape the structure during the development process.  Some of the journals and proceeding 
articles were reviewed to get strong academic support on some of the views related to e-
government or organisations’ information security. The criteria of selection were based on 
the strength of the argument the journals was presenting, the popularity of the publisher in 
the information security field, and the clarity of the concept to reader. The CIA triad; 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, are the concepts which act as the fundamental 
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security objectives for data, information, and computing services (Stallings, W. and Brown, 
L., 2008).   
 
2.3.1 Multilevel and multilateral models  
Multilevel models were developed to protect the confidentiality and the integrity of 
information. These models look at the nature of information flow between entities and how 
security of the flow could be governed by rules. There are four models address the 
multilevel security:  
 
A) Nondeducibility Model. 
B) Non Interference Model.  
C) Bell-Lapadula Model (Confidentiality Model) 
D) Biba (Integrity Model) 
 
2.3.1.1 Non-deducibility model  
The Sutherland’s non deducibility model developed in 1986. The model explicitly explains 
that information can flow from high-level objects to low-level objects if and only if some 
possible assignment of values to low-level objects in the state is inconsistent or conflicting 
with a possible assignment of values to the state’s high level objects (McLean, J., 1990), 
(Figure 4).  
The model can be expressed mathematically as the following:  
Assignments H & L Æ H for high level objects  
            Æ L for low level objects  
No flow of information from high (H) to low (L) unless  
P(H)>0 & P(L)>0Æ P(H|L)>0 (Mclean, J., 1990) 
 
The non deducibility model has been observed with a weakness as it is considered as a 
model for information sharing not information flow. As per the security definition of 
information flow, the information must be allowed to flow from low to high level objects 
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bidirectional. The non-deducibility model fails this definition and therefore, it was 
categorized as a good model for data compartmentation rather an information sharing.   
 
The flow of information security can be presented in the following mathematical 
representation using Bayes’ Theorem with the condition as follow:   
P(H|L)P(L)= P(L|H)P(H) condition (1) 
It follows that:  
P(H)>0 & P(L)>0ÆP(H|L)>0 if and only if P(H)>0&P(L)>0ÆP(L|H)>0   
Knowing that P(H|L) = (P(H|L)P(H))/P(L) & P(L|H) = (P(L|H)P(L))/P(H) 
Replacing P(H|L) and P(L|H) values, the author found that the above condition holds:  
((P(L|H)P(H))/P(L))P(L) = ((P(H|L)(PL))/P(H))P(H) this will lead P(L|H)P(H) = 
P(H|L)P(L) which holding condition (1) 
The mathematical expression represents the need of information flow to be bidirectional. 
The bidirectional concept of information flow is maintained by limiting the objects when 
the system is secure with non-deducibility model.  
 
If P(H)>0 & P(L)>0Æ P(H|L)>0 where H is the assignment sequence to the system’s high 
level input port & L is an assignment sequence to system’s low-level input and output.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: High and low level inputs/non deducibility 
 
Most of system’s high level output can only be generated from low level input (Figure 5) 
Researchers and analysts think that non-deducibility is weak since there is nothing to stop 
low making deduction about high level input with 99% certainty.  
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Figure 5: High level output from low level input 
 
2.3.1.2 Non-interference model  
The non-interference model was developed by Goguen and Mesguer in 1982 (Goguen, J. 
A. and Mesequer, J., 1982). The concept of the model is that high actions have no effect on 
what low can see. “A system is non-interfering if its low-level output was independent of 
its high-level input in the sense that for any system with output function out (U,I), whose 
value is the output generated by input history I to user U, out(U,I) = out(U,I*), where I* is I 
purged of all inputs from users with security levels > U’s” (McLean, J., 1990). This is 
another model which is related to policies within a system which can represent as a node 
for the e-services.  
 
2.3.1.3 Bell-Lapadula model  
Bell-Lapadula or BLP is the most well known model to address confidentiality of 
information. It was developed in 1973 by Bell and Lapadula and became a prominent 
model for the Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and a true implementation of the 
multilevel security policy concept (Lindgreen, E. E. O. R. and Herschberg, I. S., 1994). The 
model is considered as a multilevel security model. The model was implemented in many 
systems which became known as multilevel secure systems (Anderson, R., April 2001).  
 
The Bell-Lapadula model has two main properties (Anderson, R., April 2001):  
1) The property which sets the policy of the read control in the system. The rule of this 
property that a lower level object can’t read a higher level object or what’s known 
as No Read Up (NRU). This property blocks exposure of secured data handled by 
objects with high level of security. 
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2) The *property (Star property) which blocks objects with higher security level to 
write data to objects with lower security level. 
 
In the BLP model, access to the system is classified as: A) The Mandatory Access 
Control (MAC) which is applied when the system enforces a security policy independently 
of users’ actions. B) The Discretionary Access Control (DAC) which is applied when 
users can take their own access decision about their files.  
 
Being the most popular model in data security, a lot of criticisms from researchers in the 
security field have posted critiques on the BLP model pointing out loop holes. The 
scientific argument raised by Mclean illustrated that BLP model rules were not in 
themselves sufficient to provide security. As supporting evidence McLean introduced a 
system called systems “Z“ (McLean, J., 1990)  with BLP rules and policies embedded. The 
system allowed the user to request the system admin to declassify any file from high to 
low. Through this method users with a low classification in the system can read any high 
file without breaking the BLP assumptions. The counter academic argument by Lapadula 
was based on the fact that the breach of security was due to changing labels which is not a 
valid operation in the BLP core model and any system which applies it. McLean’s debate 
was based on his analysis on the BLP model and findings which indicated that checking the 
validation of any system operation is not part of the scope. The scientific argument led to 
an introduction to the tranquillity property; a property which defines two states of security; 
strong and weak. The strong security state has security labels that never change during the 
system operation. The weak security state has security labels that never change in such a 
way as to violate a defined security policy.  
 
2.3.1.4 The Biba model  
The Biba model or as known “Bell-Lapadula upside down” was developed by Ken Biba. 
The model addresses the integrity aspects only and does not address the other two aspects 
of C.I.A (confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) triad. The basic elements of the Biba have 
a similar structure as the BLP model (Stallings, W. and Brown, L., 2008), The Biba model 
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addresses the Low Water Mark Principle which technically means that the integrity of an 
object is the lowest level of all the objects that contributed to its creation (Anderson, R., 
April 2001). The low water mark concept was implemented in the industry as part of a 
system called LOMAC operating system; an extension to Linux Operating System (Fraster, 
T., 2001). The operation of LOMAC OS reflected the embedding of the low water mark. 
The way LOMAC OS was applying the water mark concept is by classifying the file 
systems into network and system files. The operating system has network files and system 
files. The network and system files have different levels of security. The system files are set 
with the highest security level and always protected against low security levels objects. The 
security level of the file system gets downgraded to low integrity if an access from an 
object is required. The downgraded file will not be able to open or write to a system file. A 
system file can be a password file for instance (Anderson, R., April 2001).  
 
2.3.2 Multilateral security  
As discussed in the previous section the multilevel concept represented by BLP and Biba 
models focuses on protecting the information vertically based on a standard data 
classification. Another set of models were developed in the field of the information security 
following a multilateral concept. These models define policies and rules to protect 
information flow horizontally. There are three models that represent the multilateral 
security model concept. 
 The Three Multilateral Models:  
 
• Compartmentation and Lattice Model. 
• Chinese wall. 
• British Medical Association (BMA) 
 
2.3.2.1 Compartmentation and lattice model  
“The compartmentation model is used by the intelligence community. The term 
compartmented security is used in the U.S as a common terminology for the Multilateral 
security as it is called in England and the rest of the world”, (Anderson, R., April 2001). A 
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good compartmentation based model is the lattice model which is a variant of BLP. The 
Lattice model is a mathematical structure in which any two objects A&B can have 
dominance relation A>B or B>A. The model is defined by a tuple with five components 
(SS, OS, CS, *, Æ) where SS stands for set of subjects causing the information flow, OS 
stands for the set of objects capable of storing information, CS stands for set of security 
classes, * is the combining operator and Æis the flow relation (the legal flow)  (Jie, W., 
Fernandez, E. B. and Zhang, R. (July 1992). The relation between the different 
classifications and how a person can have an access to a certain classification but not to 
another is illustrated in Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 6: Lattice labels 
(Anderson, R., April 2001) 
A good application of the Lattice model is the system used for the control of Haj 
(Pilgrimage) entries in Saudi Arabia. The system controls information sharing through 
applying algorithms in systems using least upper bonds in the Lattice Theory. The 
algorithm made all compartments by default as confidential and the combination of data 
from different compartments is secret. 
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2.3.2.2 The Chinese wall  
The Chinese Wall model was developed by Brewer and Nash (Brewer, D. F. C. and Nash, 
M. J., 1989) to prevent any conflict of interest with an organisation or between an 
organisation and its clients. The model is mathematically expressed as shown below:  
Let C= client  
Y(C )= C’s company 
X(C )= C’s competitor  
The Chinese wall model has two main properties which act as the main two rules of the 
model. Both properties have a mathematical representation as illustrated below: 
   
1. The simple security property  
 
“A subject s has access to C if and only if, for all C’s that s can read, either Y(C) ¢ X(C’) or 
Y(C) = Y (C’)”, (Anderson, R., April 2001). 
 
2. The *property  
 
“A subject s can write to C only if s can’t read any C’ with X(C’) ≠ 0 & Y(C) = Y(C’)” 
(Anderson, R., April 2001). 
 
The model addresses a threat which is not related to a technology aspect of the security 
architecture. The conflict of interest threat is a pure human behavioural issue which affects 
the security programme of the organisation.  
 
2.3.2.3 The British medical association (BMA)  
The BMA is a model developed to describe the medical information flow while abiding to 
the medical ethics and standards (Anderson, R., April 2001). The model assists the medical 
institutions to exchange information among them while maintaining the privacy of the 
patients’ records. The content of using technology as a method of transferring patients’ 
records and data securely was raised by many countries and medical organisations. Many 
governments agreed on the methodology of applying the BMA model. The German 
government (Anderson, R., April 2001) was one of the leading countries using the 
smartcard technology promoting the idea reflecting its pros and cons. The government of 
Iceland has initiated a project to build a national medical database that will have medical, 
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genetic and genealogical data”. The BMA model sets the ethics and rules of engagement 
between institutions inter and intra boundaries of the country.  
 
2.3.3 Application of secure systems  
Many products in the industry applied the multilevel security model. The purpose of 
studying these products was to indicate the possibility of building products (military use or 
commercial) which can reflect policies and models.  
 
2.3.3.1  SCOMP (Secure Communications Processor)  
SCOMP was one of the earliest products developed to reflect the multilevel concept and 
policies. The project was a collaboration between Honeywell and the US department of 
defence (DoD)  (Akers, R. L., Krohn, M. D., Lanza-Kaduce, L. and Radosevich, M., 1979). 
The product has four rings of protection and the Operating System is using these rings to 
maintain up to 32 separate components and to allow one way information flows between 
them. The security kernel was kept to minimum in order to allow the computer to perform 
the day to day business operation. This product was used in the military applications such 
as Mail Guards which is a special firewall that allows mail to pass from low to high but not 
vice-versa (what’s known as data diode). SCOMP was the only machine rated as A1 in 
1984 which is the highest security rate a computer system can obtain. The kernel was 
represented in mathematical values in order to get the rating.  
 
2.3.3.2 Blacker  
“Blacker is an example for an encryption device designed to incorporate multi level 
security (MLS) technology”, (Anderson, R., April 2001). The idea of blacker is to separate 
the encryption processors from the clear text processor by assigning colour codes. The 
enciphering processor (Encryption processor) has a colour of black while the clear text one 
has a colour of red.  The device was rated as the highest in security rating. It was given A1 
as the only communication security device with A1 evaluation. Motorola had tried to 
produce the second series or a successor but was not able to obtain the same rate. A rate of 
B2 was given to the new box.   
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2.3.3.3 NRL pump  
The NRL Pump was developed by the Naval Research Laboratory. NRL Pump is one-way 
data transfer device (data diode) using buffering, while limiting the bandwidth of possible 
backward leakage by number of mechanisms such as timing randomization of 
acknowledgement messages. The way the pump works was described in an algorithm 
format by Lanotte and Tini (Lanotte, R., Maggiolo-Schettini, A., Tini, S., Troina, A. and 
Tronci, E., 2004). The operation of the pump can be summarized as follows:  
• A low agent sends a message to some high agent through the pump.  
• The pump stores the message in a buffer and sends an acknowledgement to the low 
agent.  
• The low agent can’t send any new message until the acknowledgement of the 
previous message is received.  
• The pump stores the message until the high agent is able to receive it.  
• The high agent receives the message and then sends an acknowledgement to the 
pump.  
• The high agent does not acknowledge some received message before a fixed 
timeout expires. The pump stops the communication.  
 
The following algorithm represents the operation (Lanotte, R., Maggiolo-Schettini, A., 
Tini, S., Troina, A. and Tronci, E., 2004): 
LS:  represents the low system 
P:     represents the pump 
HS:  represents the high system 
AÆB:  msg represents the message msg sent from A to B 
LsÆP: reqL:  the low system requests to the pump to start a communication with a high 
system.  
PÆLS: validL: the pump checks if the low system is a valid process and, then it 
acknowledges its request.  
PÆHS:  reqH:  the pump requests to the high system to start a communication with the low 
system. 
HSÆ P: valid H: the high system checks if the pump is a valid process, and then it 
acknowledges its request.  
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PÆHS:   grant H: the pump communicates to the high system that the communication can 
start. 
PÆ LS:  grant L: the pump communicates to the low system that the communication can 
start. 
The NRL pump is an implementation of a data transfer methodology based on an 
algorithm. The algorithm sets the rules on how a system can communicate or transfer data 
to another. It was found to be a strong mechanism for transferring data or exchanging 
information but yet has no comprehensive analysis on the other factors which might affect 
the security programme between two different organisations. Although the algorithm can 
be placed and enforced on systems designated for intra organisations communication, the 
policies on these systems and the competencies responsible for supporting these systems 
will have a direct impact. 
 
2.3.4 The Fundamental Approach for Network Security  
Schumacher and Gosh from Arizona State University presented an interesting Network 
Security Rating Model (NRM) (Schumacher, H. J. and Gosh, S., 1998) using a unique 
approach which was found similar to the approach the author is following to develop the 
new model. The network security rating model objective is to set a rating for the network 
security across different sectors. The first step was to identify the characteristics of any 
secure network regardless of the sector and independent of any specific threat. The 
approach was described as orthogonal model approach and was developed in 1996.  
 
Seven perspectives were defined in the new model. These perspectives referred to as 
“pillars” are: 
1. Systemic  
2. Communication  
3. Physical  
4. Personnel  
5. Operational  
6. Application  
7. Performance 
8.  Design correctness 
A list of attributes was defined such as privacy, integrity, accountability, availability, 
reliability, connectivity, recovery from disaster, and uncertainty.   
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The relationship between the attributes and the pillars of the model is what determines a 
good security for an entity. Ideally a 100% security means that each attribute needs to be 
protected in each pillar but in reality this might not be cost effective. Decisions related to 
the network security will be “based on the perceived threat to a particular pillar and/or 
attribute and the level of risk that the security management is willing to assume”. The main 
idea behind the model is that the eight pillars represent the main blocks of security which 
might be under attack. Each block represents an orthogonal conceptual view of the network 
security. In Gosh’s paper, the fuzzy set of Zadeh (Zadeh, L.A. , 2000) was introduced to 
address different aspects of security networks. The dynamism of the complex networks and 
the high level of uncertainty associated with the occurrence of attacks and system errors 
position the analytical modelling as ineffective. Fuzzy sets as far better approach to use for 
the network stability monitoring.  
 
2.3.5 Human elements related theories  
2.3.5.1 The general deterrence theory (GDT)  
Social theories such as the General Deterrence Theory (GDT) state that any illegal or 
criminal act or behaviour can be deterred if the perpetrator is aware of the consequences 
and legal implications of his actions (Smith, D. A. and Garton, P. R., 1989). As stated by 
Lee & Lee, “The theory assumes that individuals make decisions based on maximizing 
their benefits and minimizing their cost” (Lee, J. and Lee, Y., 2002).  A crime can only be 
committed if the benefits from the crime act exceeds the cost of the punishment. If an 
intruder knows that the computer laws and regulations are not strong enough, the 
temptation of conducting unauthorized access to e-business entities will be strong. It can be 
assured that attackers and hackers can even try and use the e-business entity as a virtual lab 
for new exploits since no law or punishment can deter them. This indeed will create 
performance degradation on the e-entity or might even lead to Denial of Services (DoS) 
attack.  
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The equation got to be balanced between the type of intrusion and the loss caused by it with 
the severity of the punishment. Attackers will weigh their chances and such deterrence 
might prevent some if not all attacks on entities.  
A real world case of the deterrence theory was learned from the Chinese hackers security 
case. Two hackers were sent to the death sentence by Yangzhou Intermediate Court of 
Jiangsue in 1998 (Haney, C., 1999). This case was used by many security practitioners as a 
good example of deterrence theory and its effect in reducing cyber crimes.  
 
2.3.5.2 The social bond theory 
The Social Bond (Gottfredon, M. and Hirschi, T., 1990) analysed the social effect in 
computer crimes from a different angle “The theory basically assumes that all people are 
naturally inclined to commit crimes unless a strong control mechanism exist or “social 
bonds”. In the theory, 4-social bonds factors were identified: Attachment, Involvement, 
Commitment, and Beliefs. In 1999, Costello and Vowell discovered a direct relation 
between the four social bounds factors and the reduction of deviant behaviours 
(Anderson.B, Homes., et al., 1999) 
 
2.3.5.3 The social learning theory  
The Social Learning Theory (Akers, R. L., Krohn, M. D., Lanza-Kaduce, L. and 
Radosevich, M., 1979) assumes that a person commits a crime because he or she has come 
to associate with delinquent peers, who transmit delinquent values, reinforce delinquency 
and function as delinquent role model (Lee, J. and Lee, Y., 2002). The theory discussed two 
sources of social learning, Co-workers influence and Senior Influence. “The probability 
that people will engage in criminal and deviant behaviour is increased and the probability 
of their confirming to norm are decreased when they differentially associated with others 
who commit criminal behaviour” (Lee, J. and Lee, Y., 2002). The influence can be 
effective only if a person is not aware of righteousness and wrong or if righteousness is 
misinterpreted by a person. A person can be protected if he is fully aware of what’s right 
and what’s wrong and can stop such influence if he comprehends that such influence will 
lead him to commit wrongful behaviour. Most of the people will not be able to stop or 
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restrain from those who are wrongly affecting them since the friendship relation might 
cause a blur and misguide the judgment of the person. 
  
2.3.5.4 The three social theories (GDT, social bond, social 
learning) 
A good model developed by J.L and Y.L links the General Deterrence Theory (GT), Social 
Bond Theory, and the Social Learning Theory to computer crimes (Lee, J. and Lee, Y., 
2002). The model (Figure 7) used the social theories which were developed in the past to 
derive the three reasons of committing computer crimes or abuse; the Attitude abbreviated 
in the model as (ATT), Subjective Norm (SN), and Perceived Behaviour Control (PBC). 
The three main factors will not lead directly to computer abuse or misconduct. The 
intention will be built up leading to an actual computer crime. The model illustrated that 
each element contributing to the computer crime has different feeders. The ATT element 
gets constructed from the attachment, involvement, commitment, and reliefs. The subject 
norm factor has different reasons to be built. It is directly related to co-workers influence 
and senior influence. The PCB has a direct relation to the main components of any security 
programme; policies, security systems, and awareness programmes.  
 
(Lee, J. and Lee, Y., 2002) 
Figure 7: The three social theories 
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The above diagram shows that computer crimes are not necessarily due to technological 
aspects only. Crimes might be conducted due to inappropriate security policies, light 
punishment of computer (Skinner, W. F. and Fream, A. M., 1997), or discrimination of 
sanction based on the level or privilege of employees (Straub, D. W., 1990).  The 
implementation of non IT related countermeasures could effectively lower threats caused 
by internal errors (Arthur, J. C. and Quey-Jen, Y., 2006). 
 
2.3.6 The e-commerce security model  
Various e-services can be provided from an e-commerce organisation. E-Services are 
offered to different customers from different market sectors. The geographical boundary 
doesn’t exist or act as a constraint for e-commerce organisations market expansion. A 
model was developed to address the e-commerce threats. The objective of the model was to 
identify the recognized threats on the e-commerce e-services. The e-commerce security 
model  developed by Kesh, Ramanujan, and Nerur (Venter, H. S. and Ellof, J. H. P., 2003) 
was analyzed and found to follow the approach of securing e-commerce/e-enabled services 
through technology. This was illustrated through the final model diagram (Figure 8).  
 
The relationship between different threats and techniques is illustrated in Table 5 
(Gottfredon, M. and Hirschi, T., 1990). It aims to address all possible threats for the e-
commerce and the technologies which will be needed to mitigate these threats. The tools 
and the supported technologies which can be used in the e-commerce model were showing 
1-1 or 1-many relationship between threats and security measures. The major components 
of the E-commerce systems were studied by the architects of the model in order to come up 
with a model to address all aspects of E-commerce security. The components analyzed 
were the E-commerce Development Platforms, Database Management Systems, Operating 
Systems, and the Network Infrastructure.  
 
The strength of the final model developed by the researchers was in drawing a good 
relationship between the technologies and the tools used to implement these technologies. 
As illustrated in the final model (Figure 8), there are some technologies which will overlap 
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with each other in terms of functionalities and might be eliminated from the security 
architecture. The different security tools can be selected based on functionality desired and 
the layer of security it needs to protect.  
 
Figure 8: E-commerce security model and framework 
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Table 5: Threats vs. Technologies 
Threats  Technologies  
Code Threat Code Security Measure 
S1.0 Physical access control Locks T1 Gaining Physical 
access to premises S1.1 biometric authentication 
S2.0 Time domain reflectometer 
S2.1 Optical time domain reflectometer 
T2 Wiretaps 
S2.2 Intrusion detection systems 
S3.0 Anti-sniffing tools  
S3.1 Strong authentication 
S3.2 Cryptography  
T3 Packet sniffing 
S3.3 Switched architecture 
S4.0 Password complexity requirements  T4 Impersonating 
S4.1 Kerberos 
S5.0 Firewalls  
S5.1 Symmetric encryption (DES)  
S5.2 Triple DES (3DES) 
S5.3 AES  
S5.4 Pretty good privacy (PGP) 
S5.5 Public key infrastructure (PKI)  
S5.6 IPSec 
T5 Gaining access to 
information  
S5.7 SSL/SET 
S6.0 Error checking/Correcting MD5 
S6.1 Cyclic redundancy check 
S6.2 Forward error correction 
S6.3 Hash functions 
T6 Integrity  
S6.4 Secure hash algorithm (MD4 or MD5) 
T7 Non repudiation  S7.0 Digital signature  
S8.0 Anti-virus software  T8 Viruses 
S8.1 Network segmentation 
S9.0 Quality of service (QoS)  
S9.1 Implementing router filters  
S9.2 Install patches against TCP SYN  
S9.3 Disable unused/unneeded network 
services  
S9.4 Appropriate password policies  
S9.5 Quotas for operating systems  
T9 Denial of service 
attacks  
S9.6 Strong authentication and authorization 
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2.3.7 Lambrinoudakis security framework 
There is no doubt that most of the government e-services are supported by solid technology 
infrastructure. A typical risk assessment covers mostly the technological platform 
supporting the services. The objective of placing these technologies is to protect the 
services from being maliciously altered or blocked known as “Denial of Services”. The 
methodological approach of Lambrinoudakis et al was found very 
illustrative. (Lambrinoudakis, C., Gritzals, S., Dridi, F. and Pernul, G., 2003).  The 
framework was developed to identify and organize the security requirements for the 
information systems supporting the e-services offered by the e-government (Figure 9). A 
risk analysis was conducted on the e-University which represents a suite of services and 
allows remote accessibility. Lambrinoudakis divided the cycle of the e-University service 
launch into 5 steps (setting up the supporting system, authentication, setting up the service, 
offering the service, and after service task). Each step was given a risk level and assigned 
security measures as indicated in Table 6. The framework did not address the human 
aspects of the cycle, competencies requirements, and the need of the enforcement of the 
security policy throughout the cycle. It only addressed the operational and management 
aspects such as logging and storage. Taking into consideration that most of the e-University 
users will be from the age of 16-24 years, matching the same age of most of the hackers in 
the world, there is a strong probability that the e-University service will be a good target to 
cyber attacks. The competency of security staff must be equivalent if not better than the 
attackers’ capabilities and the policies must be developed to block internal and external 
threats. Ignoring these two key security aspects was found as a weakness in 
Lambrinoudakis framework.  
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(Lambrinoudakis, C., Gritzals, S., Dridi, F. and Pernul, G., 2003) 
 
Figure 9: Lambrinoudakis Model 
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Table 6: e-university risk level & security requirements 
Suite of 
Services Service Phase Actor type 
Risk 
level Security requirements
e-University Setting up the system 
(setting up the 
hardware and 
software 
infrastructure required 
for the operation of 
the designed services) 
System 
administrators 
Mediu
m  
- System 
availability  
- Performance  
- Management of 
privileges 
 Authentication  Service 
operators 
Service 
customers 
Mediu
m  
High  
- Authentication 
 Setting up the 
services (course 
organisation and 
material preparation0 
Service 
operators 
Low  - Integrity 
- Logging 
 Offering the service 
(offering on-line 
courses and other 
supporting –
educational-tasks to 
students 
Service 
customers 
High  - Confidentiality 
- Integrity  
- Non-
repudiation 
- Logging 
 After service tasks 
(maintaining 
progress-issuing 
certificates, etc) 
Service 
operators 
Mediu
m 
- Secure storage 
- Logging  
 
(Lambrinoudakis, C., Gritzals, S., Dridi, F. and Pernul, G., 2003) 
 
 
 
2.3.8 The analysis of networked systems security risks (ANSSR) 
The Analysis of Networked Systems Security Risks (ANSSR) follows the approach of 
analyzing threats from one source, the attackers. This has given the model a weak position 
as attackers only take advantages of weaknesses which might be related to technologies, 
policies and other aspects (Bodeau, D. J., 1992). Other possible threat sources such as 
human errors, structural failure, or natural disaster are not considered.  
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The model identified 5 types of deliberate attackers types:  
- Users(including trusted users)  
- Developers  
- Maintainers  
- Customers  
- Outsiders  
The model sets the right measures on the threats scenarios, based on the understanding of 
the two associated measures with any threat: the likelihood of Initiation and the likelihood 
of Impact. The likelihood of initiation depends on the attackers’ expectation while the 
likelihood of impact depends on the capability of the attacker and the system safeguard. 
 
This approach was effective but it doesn’t cover all aspects of the threats analysis, as the 
likelihood of initiation is only linked to attackers only. There are other sources of threats 
which may cause a direct damage or loss to the e-service. These factors can be considered 
as the root cause of any attack attempt.  
 
2.3.9 Models for checking internet commerce  
Many models were developed for enforcing checks for the Internet Commerce. Some of 
them were concentrating on equipment which will perform checks related to scheduling 
with fixed regular time period. A seminal model was developed by Eisen and Lienbwitz for 
the replacement of random deteriorating equipment that remains current and 
relevant (Hansen, J., 2001).  Keller  addressed the issue of optimal checking schedules 
using calculus of variation methods (Keller , J., 1974). Different controls for monitoring the 
Internet were developed by many researchers. A mathematical model was developed by JV 
Hansen (Hansen, J., 2001) for optimization and artificial intelligence methods for 
scheduling the monitoring of related controls of the Internet Commerce (IC).  
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The optimization model has the following key elements and assumptions:  
1. Controls are to be checked at a fixed time interval t.  
2. Number of controls remains constant and immediately after a control check, the cost 
of control failure (CCF) is L0.  
3. The cost of monitoring is constant M.  
4. The cost of control failure increases at a fixed rate r.  
5. After a time t since last check, the CCF is L0+rt.  
The control system is in existence for a total time T and the number of checking 
intervals is N=T/t, therefore; cost (total) (CT) over time is the sum of CCF and the cost 
of checking. The objective is to minimize C (T).  
 
The mathematical model was explicitly explained by Keller (Keller, J., 1974). The 
objective for analyzing such a model was to learn how mathematical models are built to 
reflect an idea related to Internet Commerce or e-business. Expressing controls, cost of 
monitoring and other elements of the Internet commerce in a mathematical formula is a 
new area of learning during the analysis of Keller’s model.  
 
2.3.10 The security standards  
Models alone will not provide comprehensive security programme to the organisation. In 
this section, well known security standards will be addressed to reflect the applicability in 
different types of organisations. Security standards address the minimum mandatory rules 
an organisation is required to follow in order to provide an acceptable security level 
(Karabacak, B. and Sogukpinar, I., 2005). Having a security model that addresses 
technology only and implemented across multiple organisations will be a challenge unless 
the model is complemented by security standards and policies.  
 
2.3.10.1 BS7799  
The British standard was originally launched in 1999 and was named as BS 7799-2:1999 
and was changed to ISO/IEC 17799 in 2005 (Karabacak, B. and Sogukpinar, I., Sept 2006). 
British Standard 7799 covers the management of information security. It has 133 controls 
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in 11 different domains.  The objective of the standard is (Hone, K. and Eloff, J. H. P., 
2002),  “to serve as a single reference point for identifying the range of controls needed for 
most situations where information systems are used”. The standard explains what needs to 
be included as a minimum in the security policy to guarantee the baseline of protection for 
any organisation.  
 
Many software solutions were developed to assist in obtaining the ISO/IEC 17799 
certification. These applications ensure that all domains are covered and all controls are set 
in place. The author explored some of the well known applications used for this purpose 
such as Riskwatch (Riskwatch, 2005) and Corba which was used for the compliance check 
of ISO 17799. (C&A systems security limited, 2000).  
 
2.3.10.2 BSI IT baseline protection manual  
This standard was developed by German Bundesamt Fur Sicherheit. The standard covers 
controls to safeguard organisations. The main goal of the standard is to “achieve a security 
level for IT systems that is reasonable and adequate to satisfy normal protection 
requirements and can also serve as the basis for IT systems and application requiring a high 
degree of protection”.  
 
2.3.10.3 COBIT  
The Control Objectives for Information and related Technology, COBIT, was developed by 
the Information Systems Audit and Control Association and Foundation (ISACAF). The 
standard was released 10 years ago. The last version of COBIT 4.0 was released in 2005 
and it has 34 high-level control objectives or processes are referred to in some journals 
grouped in 4 domains (Hardy, G. (2006):  
• Plan and organize 
• Acquire and implement 
• Deliver and support  
• Maintain and evaluate 
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Each of the 34 processes has a Control Objective (CO) and each CO is divided into a set of 
Detailed Control Objectives (DCO) (Solms, V. B., 2005). There are 316 DCOs defined for 
the 34 control objectives/processes.  
 
COBIT provides management and business process owners with an IT governance model 
to manage risks associated with IT (Hone, K. and Eloff, J. H. P., 2002). The mission of 
COBIT is “To research, develop, public and promote an authoritative, up-to-date, 
international set of generally accepted information technology control objectives for day-
to-day use by business managers and auditors” (Hone, K. and Eloff, J. H. P., 2002). COBIT 
was found as a good model to use not exclusively for information security. The model 
addresses the information technology governance issues and one of them is information 
security.  
 
2.3.10.4 Generally accepted system security principles 
(GASSP)  
GASSP was published by the United States of America’s National Research Council 
(I2SF99). The foundation of the GASSP Committee began in mid 1992 having four main 
objectives (Ozier, W., 1998):  
- Promoting good information security practice  
- Building a focal point of reference and legal reference for security principles, 
practices, and opinions 
- Continuous improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of the IT security 
functions.  
- Having a common body of knowledge for the Information security certification.  
 
This standard is the least known since its U.S centric. The GASSP contains the following 
pervasive principles (Krull, R. A., 1996) : 
• Accountability Principle 
• Awareness Principle  
• Ethics Principle 
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• Multidisciplinary Principle  
• Proportionality Principe  
• Integration Principle  
• Timeliness principle  
• Reassessment Principle  
• Democracy Principle 
 
2.3.11 The  infosec model   
During the research process, a multi layers model was found called “Infosec Model” 
(Figure 10) developed by Ryan & Ryan (Nichols, R. K., Ryan, D. J. and Ryan, J. J. C., 
2000) consists of different layers covering different aspects of security. The model was 
analyzed and reviewed in order to know the purpose of the model, its layers structure and 
how they were constructed together, its academic background, and its validity.  
 
The InfoSec model considers the threat analysis as the foundation of all layers represented 
within the model. The approach to develop the model was based on the need of having 
enough measures to get an insurance policy covering all critical assets. The model was 
derived as part of the need of Information Protection Architecture (Nichols, R. K., Ryan, D. 
J. and Ryan, J. J. C., 2000). Its risk assessment management is base on the protection of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  
 
As it is shown in Figure 10 the R&D section which includes the architectures, design, 
development and evaluation is built on top of the acquisition and operation and 
maintenance.  
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Figure 10: InfoSec model 
The infosec model has the following objectives (Nichols, R. K., Ryan, D. J. and Ryan, J. J. 
C., 2000): 
• Minimizing Vulnerabilities to our information assets and computer systems.  
• Choose appropriate countermeasures to prevent digital espionage. 
• Reduce the likelihood of successful attacks.  
 
The architects of the InfoSec model stated that the above objectives can be met through the 
complement of the layers with each other.  
 
2.3.12 Security models used as marketing tools 
A search for models used by the industry or security vendors was conducted. A model from 
Symantec (Figure 11) was found to be comprehensive where different layers of the 
security programme were covered through products and services offered through the 
Symantec products portfolio. The purpose of the model was to assist Symantec customers 
to implement security architectures, processes, and policies. It was observed that the 
objective of the model is to position Symantec as a service provider not a commodity seller. 
The tool was used as a marketing tool rather than a scientific approach but yet was found as 
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a good reference to technology elements required to complement different functions. 
Symantec has another view of the information integrity which combines information 
security and information availability. The main purpose of information confidentiality or 
security as presented by Symantec is to protect the information from being disclosed to any 
unauthorized person. Information integrity is to protect the data from unauthorized 
malicious or accidental data changes. The information availability is to ensure that data is 
available when it is needed. The combination of both information confidentiality and 
availability will ensure the integrity of data as indicated below: 
 
 
 
 
Although the Symantec model is categorised as a marketing and sales tool, it reflects three 
important layers of any security programme; the technology, knowledge and response, and 
management of risk. The model clearly illustrates that each layer requires different security 
elements which collectively contribute to build the strength of the layer.  
Information Security + Information Availability = Information Integrity 
(Symantec  2002 230) 
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Figure 11: Symantec industrial model 
(Symantec , 2002) 
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2.4 Literature review analysis 
The main objective of security models is to protect the organisation information and 
intellectual property. Government information is classified as the most valuable and 
confidential as it includes the citizens’ private information. Whether it is governmental or 
commercial information, it is usually stored in the local IT infrastructure of the custodian 
organisation. Sharing governmental information between government departments is 
considered the highest risk a government department in Dubai considers. 
 
The literature reported is analysed to discover common characteristics of information 
security. The analysis is reported in four tables according to the nature of the literature. The 
characteristics are distilled from the content of the papers. Each column represents a key 
paper reported. The cell in the table indicates if the paper addresses the characteristics in 
the row.  
 
The definitions of the characteristics:  
Structured in layers: The model was represented in a visual representations with all the 
layers related to it.  
Coverage of security aspects: The main areas of security (technology, policy, operation, 
human aspects, etc) addressed by the model.  
Explicitly explained: The literature explained the models in detail.  
Government or commercially used: The models are used by government and non 
government organisations.  
Applicability to any sector: The model can be applied to any sector or industry. 
Addressing information flow: The model addressed information flow within a system or 
addresses the flow of information across multiple systems/networks.  
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The first table (Table 7) summarises the information security models explained in section 
2.3.1 and 2.3.2. 
  
Table 7: Models in Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 
Models Characteristics 
Non 
Deducibility 
Non 
Interference 
Bell-
Lapadula 
Biba Comp 
& 
Lattice 
Chinese 
wall 
BMA Internet 
ops 
Structured in Layers         
Coverage of Sec Aspects 
Technology         
Policy         
Human behaviour 
and awareness 
        
Ops and Mgmt         
Explicitly explained         
Government or 
commercially used 
        
Applicability to any 
sector 
        
Address Info flow 
Within One System 
or entity 
        
Within Several 
Systems 
        
Table Key:  
Yes No 
  
 
Gap analysis: The majority of the models above are not addressing more than one aspect 
of information security and focus on the security of a single system or node. It has also 
been observed that the above models are not structured in terms of layers and modelling 
principles.  
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The second table (Table 8) summarises the models applied in particular system reported in 
section 2.3.3.  
Table 8: Models with application 
Application of Models Characteristics 
SCOMP Blacker NRL 
Structured in Layers    
Coverage of Sec Aspects 
Technology    
Policy    
Human Behaviour and awareness    
Ops and Mgmt    
Explicitly explained    
Government or commercially used    
Applicability to any sector    
Address Info flow 
Within One System or entity    
Within Several Systems    
Table Key:  
Yes No 
  
 
Gap analysis: The security technologies above are implementation of the security policies 
and models discussed in the first table. Since they are technologies and implementation 
policies from the above models, they cover two aspects (technologies and policies). They 
are not structured as models and their usage is limited to military use. 
Through the literature review, the author learned different models and methods of securing 
the exchange of digital documents over the Internet or public networks. Methods such as 
digital signatures, different cryptographic techniques, setting higher factors of 
authentication (Kaliontzoglou, A., Sklaros, P. and Karantjias, T., 2005) were considered 
during the construction of the new model.  It was clearly observed that there is no 
comprehensive model which addresses all areas or aspects affecting the security of the 
information. The two models found to be partially comprehensive, during the literature 
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reviews, were the Network Rating Model (NRM) (Schumacher, H. J. and Gosh, S., 1998) 
and the InfoSec model (Nichols, R. K., Ryan, D. J. and Ryan, J. J. C., 2000). 
 
The third table summarises the models that have structured representation. 
 
Table 9: Structured models 
Models Characteristics 
NRM 3 Social 
Theories 
E-Commerce Lambrinoudakis InfoSec Symantec 
Structured in Layers       
Coverage of Sec Aspects 
Technology       
Policy       
Human Behaviour and 
awareness 
      
Ops and Mgmt       
Explicitly explained       
Government or commercially 
used 
      
Applicability to any sector       
Address Info flow 
Within One System or entity       
Within Several Systems       
Table Key:  
Yes No 
  
 
 
Gap analysis: All the above models are structured and have good visual representations. 
Some of them were explicitly explained while others were not supported by the academic 
basis, such as the InfoSec model. The majority of the models handle one aspect of the 
information security. Two of the above models handle two aspects of the information 
security and one model handles 4 aspects (InfoSec).  
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The fourth table summarises the security standards reviewed.  
 
Table 10: Security standards 
Security Standards Characteristics 
BS7799 BSI  IT  COBIT GASSP 
Structured in Layers     
Coverage of Sec Aspects 
Technology     
Policy     
Human behaviour and awareness     
Ops and Mgmt     
Explicitly explained     
Government or commercially used     
Applicability to any sector     
Address Info flow 
Within One System or entity     
Within Several Systems     
Table Key:  
Yes No 
  
 
Gap analysis: The security standards illustrated above are cover the majority of all security 
aspects. The only gap that they have is their missing of the competency aspects of the 
security team and the cost of the implementation of the standards. The different standards 
which make it difficult for the management of the organizations to understand and grasp 
which one to use. 
 
From the table, the majority of the analysed models were addressing information security 
from one or two aspects only. There is no doubt that security technologies reduce the 
vulnerabilities and identify attacks and breaches. With the evolution of the security 
technology research more intelligence is embedded within the technologies to allow a fast 
reaction to attacks and breaches (Gupta, M., Rees, J., Chturvedi, A. and Chi, J., 2006). Few 
theories were found discussing the socio-technical impact on the security systems. Security 
researchers defined the e-business security architecture as the combination of technologies, 
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processes, and people which address the security triad; confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. Through practical experience with cybercrimes conducted on various 
businesses and government, it was observed that the human element and behaviour have 
important roles in enhancing the e-business security for organisations and governments.  
Processes and technologies are only tools used to construct security system and the human 
intervention. Another dimension to look at is the internal business processes supporting the 
e-services launched by the organisation. The business processes have a direct effect on the 
efficiency of the organisation (Tanaka, H., Mastuura, K. and Sudoh, O., 2005). Ideally, 
automating them will enable the organisation to launch e-services faster and to interact with 
citizens or customers seamlessly. The practical reality shows that the business processes are 
not always practiced, or even fully automated. Lacking the enforcement and automation of 
the business processes is what blocks an organisation from transforming to the e-business 
model. Considering the business processes of any organisation as the main set of processes, 
the security processes and procedures are a subset of the overall business processes of the 
organisation. Lacking the enforcement of the security processes subset will not block the 
organisation from transforming to the e-business model but definitely it will introduce risks 
which might collapse the model and cause heavy direct and indirect losses. There are many 
reasons for the failure of implementing the security processes. Some might be due to the 
lack of deploying the appropriate technologies, competencies, policies, or operational 
procedures. It can be as a result of inability to take the right business decision by the 
business leaders of the organisation. Adopting “shortcuts” or “Work around” as known in 
the business terminology can be a risk for any organisation implementing the e-business 
model and it can be one of the risk factors.  The driver of the shortcut of any process or 
procedure might be to gain advantage of being the first or for having a differentiator. The 
objective might be correct as per a good marketing effort but the consequence of 
overlooking security processes will lead to major losses and sometimes to a total collapse 
of the organisation.  Reluctance to practice processes is a human relevant issue and can’t be 
solved by the Hard System Methodology (HSM). Studying this factor will need applying 
the Soft System Methodology (SSM) (Smith, D. A. and Garton, P. R., 1989) and other 
qualitative methodologies. A comprehensive model which is simple but constructed to 
60 
include all relevant elements in an architecture shall provide the foundation to build a solid 
security programme for any organisation willing to transform to an e-organisation, whether 
it is a government department of a business corporation. 
 
2.5 Chapter summary   
This chapter has three main parts; the first part addresses the evolution of the e-world and 
how Dubai adopted the concept and embarked the e-government initiative. The second part 
covers the literature review and the objectives of review the existing models.  
In the first part the evolution of the e-world and its influence on many organisations and 
governments to adopt as a concept and as mean of achieving efficiency and higher 
customers and citizens satisfaction has been highlighted. Dubai government was one of the 
early governments in the Middle East adopting this concept in 1999. Through the strong 
support of the leadership, Dubai government departments started to offer their services in 
an online format or as e-services allowing the citizens to interact directly with the 
government beyond the boundary of working hour’s limitation and the physical presence. 
Dubai government established Dubai e-government (DEG) authority and assigned the 
mission of launching the e-services, coordinating with the government departments, and 
promoting the culture and concept of the e-government to it. DEG authority was able to 
influence the launch of 600 online services and came up more e-services which were 
launched directly by DEG authority. The evolution of the e-government continued but the 
information sharing between the departments persisted as a challenge. The lack of the 
backend systems integration and information sharing were linked to low level of trust 
between departments and the misalignment in the security levels across the government 
departments. Indeed this derived the need of developing a new model to address this 
challenge and to be tested in Dubai government for applicability.  
 
Knowing the evolution of the e-government worldwide and the adaptation of the concept in 
Dubai gave the author the ground to build the research case. The challenges faced by DEG 
authority in information sharing and integration were discussed explicitly in the first part of 
the chapter. In the second part, the existing security models were reviewed and analyzed. 
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Many security models were developed in the past addressing different aspects of security 
and were the efforts of in dept researches carried by scholars and security practitioners. 
These models were studied and analyzed in order to highlight the weaknesses and the 
strengths of each one of them. The objective was to come up with a comprehensive model 
that addresses all aspects collectively covered in the existing models and the address new 
aspects considered as gaps in all of them. This process was completed through the literature 
review conducted on the existing models.  
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Chapter three: Research methodology 
3.1. Overview 
This chapter begins with addressing the nature of the research problem. In the second part 
of the chapter, the author explains the implemented research process and its nine steps. The 
author then concludes with the chapter summary highlighting all the key findings of the 
research methodology.  
 
3.2. Nature of research problem 
Conducting research in the real world was a challenge for thesis development due to the 
lack of a central body/authority to provide information for the e-government evolution. 
Many governmental departments initiated e-services as a proactive step towards the citizens 
needs in Dubai.  The e-government concept in Dubai started as a leadership initiative and 
evolved to become a strategy of the twenty seven departments in the city of Dubai.  Every 
government department took the initiative to automate its government services and turn 
them into e-services published to the citizens of Dubai.  Since the launch of the government 
e-services was not initially collaborated with the e-government authority and the 
government departments themselves, it created the challenge of services and business 
processes integration. It also created an inconsistency in the evolution of the e-services as 
some departments were faster than others in reaching the transactional level of the e-
services. The followings are some of the key challenges faced during the research process:   
 
• Lack of transparency: Since the nature of this research is information security and 
the case study is a government authority, this particular challenge was anticipated 
since the beginning of the thesis development process. An attempt was made to 
address some questions through the questionnaires related to the number of security 
incidents encountered, the comfort in exchanging information with other 
government departments, and the perception on the information security in the 
government departments. These questions were either not answered or answered 
with reservations by some government respondents. The author has to extract the 
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information through indirect ways of addressing the questions over the interviews 
conducted with some of the security practitioners or IT managers in person or 
through phone interviews. This indeed increased the time and effort in the data 
collection phase in the research process but was overcome with certain limitations.  
  
• Lack of the holistic view of the subject matter: During some of the brief 
interviews conducted with some of the technology heads of the government 
departments to explain the purpose of the research it was also noticed that the 
holistic view the security concept was lacking. The importance of information 
security to the government departments and to the e-government in Dubai is not 
strongly believed in many government departments. This was noticed through the 
low attention the information security departments were given (if they exist) and the 
weakness/limitation of the security infrastructures within the government 
departments.  
 
• Inadequate references: the author had struggled to find good references or 
documents about the evolution of DEG authority and all the e-services offered 
either through the common portal or the governmental departments’ sites. The lack 
of academic case studies on DEG authority, publications, or white papers was a 
challenge for the extraction of information in the literature review and data analysis.  
 
Despite the above challenges, the objectives of the research as mentioned in Section 1.4 
were the pillars of the research methodology and the research process was implemented to 
achieve them. The literature phase of the research process assisted in finding non- 
technological security measures which can contribute in building the security architecture 
in the government departments. The fact that technology was always assumed to be the 
only element of security which needs to be part of any risk assessment for any organisation 
has directed the author to search for other elements/measures during the research process. 
The research of this thesis proves that other aspects such as the availability of the security 
competencies, security policies, security operational procedures and management, and the 
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support of the right management decisions, are all contributing to the structure of a 
comprehensive security model which can address different threats on online services.  
 
3.3.  The research design 
Research methodologies vary from qualitative to quantitative (Robson, C., 2002). Each 
method assists the researcher to achieve objectives and goals of the research with tools 
which enable the researcher to obtain data, analyze it, and present the outputs. Creswell’s 
(Creswell, J. W., 2003) provided three main elements/questions which will need to be 
addressed in order to come up with a structured and well designed research. The knowledge 
claim, the research strategy, and method of the data collection are the main pillars of a good 
research. As it was noted in Creswell’s book that “researchers make claims about what is 
knowledge (ontology), how we know it (epistemology), what values go into it (axiology), 
how we write about it (rhetoric), and the processes for studying it (methodology)”. In this 
research context, the knowledge is information security and the need of building a new 
model for the e-government intercommunication. The knowledge is obtained from the 
author’s background in the field of information security and from the data collection 
process during the research study. The value of this research will be reflected through the 
new model developed and how it will assist the e-government authority and its affiliates in 
sharing information and ensuring a consistent level of security. The thesis reflects the 
overall research process and all the relevant research steps taken. The author adopted a 
methodological approach in reaching the final security model.  
 
Researchers who follow the quantitative approach use the post-positivism knowledge 
claim. The qualitative approach will reflect the constructivism knowledge claim and it uses 
narrative, phenomenologies, ethnographies, grounded theories and case studies as strategies 
of inquires. The pragmatic approach is a mixed method approach between the quantitative 
and qualitative (Robson, C., 2002).  
 
Personal and professional connection with the Dubai e-government falls into what Creswell 
referred to as “Backyard” research (Creswell, J. W., 2003). This relationship is clarified 
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through the research process and strong demarcation lines are set to avoid researcher bias. 
The data collection and analysis were conducted in methods to avoid any biased, 
incomplete or manipulated data. Due to the background of the research and being a security 
practitioner for more than 10 years, the researcher bias issue was recognized from the 
beginning of the research. To avoid any biased analysis of the research, 16 security 
practitioners from the different background and different organizations were invited to 
participate in the technical questionnaire (questionnaire B) in order to record and analyse 
the different views on the new security model. The practitioners were asked direct 
questions related to the model and its layers were given the chance through the 
questionnaire to rate any layer or sub-layer low in order to drop it from model. In 
questionnaire A, the respondents were given direct and indirect questions related to the 
security of the e-government. The respondents were also given the choice to select other 
threats, areas of the security programme which might be running their organizations, and 
were not directed to give any answer to only support the model. The answers were designed 
to relate to the new model developed but were set in a method that they don’t have to be 
positive supporting all the time.  
 
The field of information security is a convergence of different scientific and social sciences 
such as computer science, engineering, psychology, etc, different parts of the most common 
three knowledge claims (post-positivism, constructivism, and pragmatism) were used. The 
post-positivism was used due to the reason that the theories, hypotheses, background 
knowledge of the researcher can affect and influence of the observations of the research 
(Robson, C., 2002). The author knowledge background in the information security field has 
informed the data collection process and helps to focus the areas which needed more data 
analysis to confirm the need of the comprehensive model and the layers which will 
construct the overall final model. Interviews and questionnaires to learn the different 
perspectives of security follow the constructivism approach of knowledge claim (Figure 
12). This approach as stated above will be qualitative. It can also be argued that since the 
analysis of the data was based on both qualitative and quantitative approaches, the 
pragmatism school of thought was also adopted during the research process.  
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Figure 12: Knowledge claim selected 
Source:  (O'Leary, Z., 2004)   
 
To draw a clear line between the qualitative and quantitative approaches in the data 
analysis, O’Leary’s comparison (Table 11) was found useful to build the knowledge base 
of both approaches (O’Leary, Z., 2004). Qualitative approach was used when scenarios for 
applicability or confirming a layer in the model are required. The thematic analysis was 
practiced and results explained explicitly. The quantitative approach was used where 
numeric analysis is required for the number of security technologies, rate of importance and 
percentages for technologies, policies and competencies, the correlation questions related to 
which technologies, policies, competencies, operational procedures, and decision factors 
are required for the different types of government e-services.  
Table 11: The essential guide to doing research 
 Quantitative Qualitative 
Paradigm/Assumptions Positivism, Empiricism Subjectivism, Interpretivism, onstructivism 
Methodology Scientific method, hypothesis-driven, 
deductive, reliable, valid, 
reproducible, objective, generalized. 
Ethnomethodology, Phenomenology, 
Ethnography, action-research, inductive, 
subjective, idiographic, institutive. 
Methods  Large-scale, generally surveying Small-scale, interviewing, observation, 
document analysis 
Data Type  Quantitative Qualitative  
Analysis  Statistics  Thematic exploration 
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In the data collection process, both questionnaires and interviewing methods were adopted. 
The interview data were analyzed using the immersion approach (Robson, C., 2002) as the 
author used his professional interpretation skills to understand the reasons of selecting 
certain technologies by other security practitioners and some of the threats strongly 
identified by the heads of the government departments. The questionnaires were designed 
to include open ended questions and closed ended questions in order to give the participants 
the flexibility to add more comments and points and not be restricted to the answers 
provided for any question (Creswell, J. W., 2003).  
  
3.4. The implemented research methodology 
 Kumar (Kumar, R., 1996) summarized the steps need to be taken for a good research 
process in a single diagram (Figure 13) which was used as the base for the research process 
of this thesis.  
  
Figure 13: Adapted research methodology from: research methodology, a step by step guide for beginners 
Source: (Kumar, R., 1996) 
 
The research process was divided into nine (9) steps where each steps represented a phase 
in the research methodology for this thesis. The following explains the steps in details:  
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Step 1: Formulate a research problem  
The research problem was formulated in the early stage of the research study for the thesis. 
The main objective of this research was to find a security model which allows any e-
organisation or entity to exchange information with other entities seamlessly considering 
all the elements or factors which will hinder this communication or lower the trust of 
information sharing between these entities. The initial stage of the research problem was to 
address any e-organisation or e-entity and then it was narrowed to address the e-
government departments only in order to find suitable case study. Dubai was selected as a 
case study due to its advancement in the e-government implementation in the region. Being 
the region of the author will assist in the data collection.  The research problem was thought 
of as a security challenge and the author started to analyze what would be the best model or 
architecture developed for such a challenge. The author started to analyze the elements 
which can lower the trust of information sharing between the e-government departments. 
The output of this phase was the identification of the Dubai e-government 26 departments 
as the case study for the research.  
 
Step 2: Conceptualizing and research design  
During this stage, the author studied and reviewed the literature explaining the existing 
security models addressing policies and the security triad (confidentiality, integrity, 
availability) which act as the high level objectives of any security architecture or model. 
Different types of models were analyzed. Models addressing confidentiality or integrity 
only were such as BLP or Biba were analyzed. Social and human behavioural model and 
theories were searched to build the concept of the human aspect in the information security 
field. The author searched for models, theories, journals, and previous research addressing 
the elements and the security threats which may have a direct or indirect effect in blocking 
the inter government information sharing. Literature and models reviewed are explicitly 
explained in Chapter 2. The review of the literature led to different ideas on how to pursue 
constructing the new model. It revealed several key characteristics the new model will need 
to incorporate to be comprehensive such as the link between the security technologies and 
policies and the need of having strong training programmes of the security staff managing 
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the security infrastructure. It was established that the existing models and frameworks 
address one or two aspects of the information security architecture, not all,  needed in any 
organisation. The majority of the literature was addressing technological security solutions 
or approaches to solve issues related to data integrity or confidentiality. These 
technological solutions were presented as architectures required or programmes to be 
installed in the IT infrastructure. The review presented the gap that there is no 
comprehensive model which addresses all the different aspects needed in any security 
programme.   
 
Analysing the strength and weakness of literature models, the structure of the new model 
was designed to address five different aspects of any security programme or architecture; 
security technologies, security policies, security competencies, security operational and 
management, and the decision factors affecting the existence or absence of any of the 
previous security aspects.  
 
The initial structure of the model and its five layers were the output of this phase. The 
model evolved from a pyramid to a matrix and finally to a periodic table shape reflecting 
all the layers and sub layers of it to be used and selected in the questionnaires.  
 
Step 3: Constructing an instrument for data collection 
One questionnaire was initially designed to collect data from the Dubai e-government. 
During the development process of the questionnaire, it became evident that there are two 
main communities which have a direct effect of the e-government operation in Dubai. 
These can be categorized to management and technical teams. This has led to consider the 
two dimensions of the questionnaire, management opinion on threats and security measures 
and technical opinion of the security measures and the layers of the model (Figure 2). Both 
dimensions contribute to build a holistic view of the security programme for the 
government departments and achieve the objective of building a new security model. The 
first questionnaire was titled as questionnaire A and was sent to the heads of the 
government departments or their deputies. The questions of questionnaire A, were 
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addressing the need of information security programmes/architectures, types of e-services 
launched by the government departments, and the recognized internal and external threats. 
The objective of the questionnaire was to get the management perception on information 
security, confirm the need of a security model and identify the top internal and external 
threats recognized by the management of the government departments. The second type of 
questionnaire was titled as questionnaire B and it was targeting the group of recognised 
qualified security practitioners in Dubai. The questionnaire was addressing areas such as 
the internal and external threats recognized by the security practitioners, the rate of 
importance of each layer and its sub layers, the needed security measures in relation to the 
different types of e-services (informational, interactive, and transactional) and finally a 
correlation section which has given the security practitioners the chance to select or drop 
sub layers proposed to be part of the new model.  
 
Figure 14: Position of the Selected Data Collection Method 
Source: (Kumar, R., 1996) 
 
√ Review of secondary resources: 
• Related research papers, journals, industrial white papers, and surveys were 
researched, collected, indexed, and reviewed by the author. The objective of this 
step was to have a good repository of all journals and conference proceeds 
addressing the topic of information security models, e-government security 
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needs, and the different security aspects which other researches discussed in the 
past.  
• During the course of the research, the author had either read or skimmed 
through more than 400 journals, whitepapers, conference proceedings, and 
books. Only 250 references regarded useful to the research were indexed and 
documented.  
√ Observation:  
• Participant: The author participated in the activities of the research such as 
recommending technologies, policies, and competencies which should exist in 
the e-government from his influence as a CIO of the largest conglomerate in the 
country and the region and being the first CISSP in the country. The author’s 
organisation is also a key participant of the e-government initiative and having 
most of the layers of the new model implemented in his organisation will set a 
high threshold of a good security level. 
• Non-Participant: The author acted as a non-participant of the research by 
observing the data collected from other managers and IT and security 
practitioners’. The different decisions on what to select in their organisations 
were recognized and analyzed.  
√ Structured interviews:  
• Two questionnaires (A and B) were sent to the management and the security 
practitioners of the government departments with specific and direct questions 
related to the areas of research interest. A preliminary interview with the 
director of DEG was conducted to explain the purpose of the research and seek 
his opinion on the questionnaires and their objectives. Some of the heads of the 
departments did not have the chance to fill questionnaire and requested the 
author to fill them during their interviews. A total of 19 managers or heads of 
government departments participated in the data collection of questionnaire A 
and 16 top security practitioners participated in the data collection of 
questionnaire B.   
72 
√ Mailed/Online questionnaire  
• Both questionnaires A & B were sent to the appropriate participants. The 
participants were invited based on their management involvement in the e-
government initiative, interaction with the e-government authority and its e-
services, and based on their strong background on the e-government issues. The 
questionnaires were sent via email to them and the feedbacks were received 
through email. Due to the nature of this research and to abide to the research 
ethics by not jeopardizing the accuracy of the data, the questionnaires were sent 
directly to the participants and were not published on a website as it was 
planned to.  
 
Both questionnaires A and B were developed as an output of this phase with different sets 
of questions addressed to the two categories of respondents (management and technical). 
The questionnaires were sent and assistance offered to clarify the questionnaires questions 
if needed.  
 
Step 4: Selecting a sample  
Pilot questionnaires were sent to 7 managers in the government departments and 7 security 
practitioners in Dubai. The pilot questionnaire process will be explained in detail in chapter 
5 and 6. The main objectives of the pilot process were:  
• Test the easiness of the survey process 
• Get a feedback on the clarity of the questions 
• Develop a preliminary overview on the possible answers based on the 
limited sample selected for this process. 
The invited participants were asked to fill in feedback forms (Appendix C) on the 
questionnaires to give an overview on the overall questions asked, the language level, 
length and other aspects which might enhance the questionnaires prior to their deployment 
to the government departments and the larger sample of the security practitioners.  
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Once the pilot questionnaires were collected and the feedback was analyzed, the 
modifications on both questionnaires were made and finalized. The output of this phase 
was the well structured questionnaires ready to be deployed for the respondents.  
 
Step 5: Collecting data 
The questionnaires were sent and all participants were requested kindly to participate in the 
questionnaires through direct emails. After sending the questionnaires, the phase of data 
collection started. During the data collection phase, there has been delay in the response. 
This could not be avoided due to the following reasons:  
• Most of the government departments’ managers or heads who agreed to 
participate in the questionnaires had changed their roles and joined other 
departments and need longer time to confirm their feedbacks in the new 
organisation.  
• The security practitioners had a strong overview of the e-government and the e-
services but some of them were reluctant to answer due to the sensitivity of the 
subject or due to their abidance to the confidentiality agreements and policies 
they have signed with their organisations. This challenge was overcome by 
further direct requests sent to the heads of the government departments and the 
director of DEG to allow the security practitioners to participate in this 
questionnaire. It has been agreed that the data collected will be used only for the 
academic research purpose.  
  
A total of a 4 months delay in the response was encountered and caused the data analysis 
phase to be put on hold.  The final objective was achieved at the end and the maximum 
number of questionnaires were collected from the management participants (19 
questionnaires-A collected, out of maximum possible of 26 government departments) and 
the technical team of e-government (16 questionnaires-B collected). The processing phase 
was all set to start.  
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Step 6: Processing data 
The collected data from both questionnaires A & B was analyzed using Microsoft Excel for 
simple statistical analysis. The data was examined against the model built in order to 
identify areas of support and areas of anomalies where it can be researched further. The 
correlation part was conducted between different sections of the questionnaires in order to 
construct the final conclusion of the questionnaire results. The final analysis of the data was 
analyzed again against the initially proposed security model to confirm the need of the 
layers or to drop the layers or sub-layers which were found not required by the respondents 
of the questionnaires.  
 
Step 7: Developing the final model 
This stage of the research focused on processing the information which was collected from 
the questionnaires, compare the results with the initial conceptual model developed in the 
initial stage of the research, and confirm the layers which are used to construct the final 
model. There was a minor modification of the new model where the Fear, uncertainty, and 
doubt (FUD) sub layer of the decision layer was not found as an effective decision factor 
for the security model in the e-government. This modification was carried out to the 
structure of the model. The rest of the layers and sub layers were confirmed to be part of 
the new model based on the rates scored for each one of them. As a result of this stage, the 
final version of the model is presented in this thesis document.  
 
Step 8: The validation phase 
The three validation actions were carried out in parallel.  
 
Action 1: Observation from the collected data and the analysis results has shown the 
confirmation of the layers initially constructed as part of the conceptual model in the early 
stage of the research. It also showed the strong interest of the government departments 
heads and security practitioners to have a common security model or reference which can 
be used as checklist for the security level and as a recommended comprehensive 
architecture for all the departments. This was observed from the answers of the both the 
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management and technical respondents. The technical respondents confirmed the need of 
most of the sub-layers representing security measures and the management respondents 
confirmed the existence of different types of threats which can only be mitigated through 
different aspects of security other the technological ones.   
 
Action 2: The researcher set seven criteria for the success of the model. The seven criteria 
were extrapolated from Wood’s book (Wood, C., 2005) and the guidelines of modelling 
presented by Lankhorst (Lankhorst, M. ,2005). The success criteria objective was to ensure 
the usability of the model in the future and identify any area which might affect the 
adoption of the model and rectify this through a modification on the layers or the sub-layers 
of the model.  
 
Action 3: The final model was evaluated by the Head of the DEG authority to confirm its 
applicability and the possibility of adopting it in the future. The Head of the DEG is the 
only authorized position to enforce the usability of the model and has all the power to drop 
or modify any layer or sub-layer based on the operational needs of the e-government of 
Dubai. The outcome could be rejecting the whole model or part of it. Requesting an 
authority of the e-government to validate a security model independently from the data 
collected or the practitioners’ professional opinion, is a way to counter researcher bias. The 
Head of DEG was requested to fill two forms (form 1 and 2) in order to confirm the seven 
success criteria set for the success of the model and the layers/sub-layers implemented in 
the new model. This activity has given the research more support and eliminated any 
possibility of the researcher bias. The final confirmation letter of the interest of the DEG in 
the new model is attached in Appendix D. 
 
Step 9: Writing a research document 
The research document was written in parallel to each step of the research process. The 
research document structure is explained in chapter 1 and it covers the literature reviews, 
findings from the data analysis, the structure of the new model, an explanation of each layer 
in the new model and the detailed validation process followed for this research.  
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3.5. Chapter summary  
The main areas covered in the research methodology chapter are the scientific background 
of the research methodology, knowledge claims adopted, the implemented research 
processes, the methods of data collection, and the validation process followed during the 
construction of the thesis for the new security model.  
 
The author used the post-positivism, constructivism, and the pragmatism knowledge 
claims. The research analysis of the data was using both qualitative and the quantitative 
research strategies. A research process adapted from Kumar’s (Kumar, R., 1996) 
methodology was followed to achieve the research objectives. The qualitative and 
quantitative data analyses were applied on the data collected from both questionnaires. The 
qualitative analysis was mostly interpretive using the author’s intuition (Robson, C., 2002) 
and it was mainly for the analysis of the human factors in selecting or rejecting security 
technologies, committing computer crimes (creating of information threats), and 
interactions with security systems which include technologies and policies. On the other 
hand, the quantitative analysis was applied to study security technologies implemented in 
the region, number of security incidents experienced and setting the rate of the importance 
for each layer and sub layer. 
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Chapter four: The five security layered-
model using matrix representation 
 
4.1. Introduction  
Information security presents a lot of challenges and concerns to governmental and 
commercial organisations. Models are used as the best method for illustrating new concepts 
or architectures. Many models were analyzed to find out how comprehensive they are.    
 
The objective of the new security model is to assist in visualizing the combination of 
different layers of security in order to come up with a mechanism of enhancing the security 
level of any e-enabled organisation but specifically in using the e-governments as the 
research case.  
 
During the development process many papers were reviewed and an extensive research was 
conducted to confirm the need of each layer of the model.  A threat analysis method is 
presented as the first part of this chapter. The author presents the concept of multi threats 
for a single e-service, the needs of having a model addressing these threats and an 
application of this concept over the e-university. This multi-threat concept can be 
considered as the foundation of the need of a multi layer model. In the second part of this 
chapter, the author argues why the five selected layers contribute to a good security 
programme. The author continues to explain the different layers and their sub layers. 
Recognizing the five layers necessary for any security programme and the sub layers has 
guided the author to build a graphical representation incorporating all these layers and sub 
layers. The matrix representation of the new model is presented in the last part of this 
chapter.    
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4.2. A multi-layer approach for threats classification and analysis on e-government 
services 
To relate the security technologies proposed by the author with e-government security 
requirements, the organisational model for the security requirements for e-government 
services namely known as “e-gov-OFSR” has been reviewed. A good description was 
given in the literature about the model”. Security requirements for e-government services 
such as e-university and e-voting were found as per Costas’ analysis as (Lambrinoudakis, 
C., Gritzals, S., Dridi, F. and Pernul, G., 2003):  
o System Availability  
o Performance  
o Management of privileges  
o Authentication  
o Integrity  
o Logging  
o Confidentiality  
o Integrity  
o Non-Repudiation  
o Secure Storage 
 
Many cases were studied which are stressing on the need of applying the right technologies 
in order to protect the e-government information resources. The case of “Fluxay” and how 
it was used to intrude the computers using dictionary attack method by scanning for 
standard ports such as port 79 (Finger), 2049 (NFS), 137 (NetBIOS), etc  (Farn, K., Lin, S. 
and Fung, A. R., 2004) indicated the effect of a technical programme on the corporate 
infrastructure. Security technologies will play a major role in protecting and mitigating 
such risks. Though, applying the necessary technologies is not effective enough. The 
selection of the appropriate technology is also crucial to the security architecture of the 
organisation. Security countermeasures protecting infrastructure only ignore the fact that 
most of attacks coming from the application layers through exploits.  
The objective of new approach is to turn the threat auditing and analysis process into a 
detailed 360 degrees analytical process which addresses all the threats related to an e-
service. An effective information security programme must consider both IT and non IT 
related issues (Arthur, J. C. and Quey-Jen, Y., 2006). This analytical process can be part of 
79 
the initial thinking and planning of an e-service. The new threats analysis method can be 
considered as a tool to think about the threats of a new e-service and a method which can 
be used by security officers and practitioners to highlight a risk and manage its effect.  
In the e-services threats section the well known equations of calculating threats and total 
risks are discussed to illustrate the different element affecting the equation.  
 
4.2.1. Threats impact on online services  
An e-service represents a way to allow customers, citizens, and corporations to interact 
with the service provider over the Internet using a backend support infrastructure of 
information assets and resources. The information assets and resources have become a 
source of risk when they are vulnerable to threats as per Rainer and Snyder (Rainer, R. K., 
Jr, Snyder, C. A. and Carr, H. H., 1991). Threats on the e-services are the same threats of 
any IT system and can be categorized as: 
- Natural threats described by terms such as ‘Act of God’ or ‘force majeure’ that include for 
example, unforeseen events like a flood or an earthquake. 
- Accidental threats caused by factors such as missing out in a plan or a procedure.  
- Intentional threats caused directly or indirectly by staff who are involved in operation like 
the deletion of data with intent to transfer funds (Lindup, K. R. A., 1995).  
 
Enterprises tend to solve their Information Systems (IS) security threats with different 
technical solutions only. Ignoring the potential crisis which might be caused by managerial 
controls or any human factors increases the impact level on the online services.  Icove and 
Vanstorch (Icove, D. C. and Vonstorch, K., 1999) have developed a categorization of 
threats to IS based on the type of the involved assets. Seven categories were set for the 
information threats and each category has different attributes: 
1. Software 
2. Hardware 
3. Data 
4. Network 
5. Physical 
6. Personnel 
7. Administration   
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The categorization only simplifies the analysis process of the different facets of the threat. 
Conducting a detailed analysis on the total number of threats of an e-service going through 
different process, a set of threats (T) will need to be considered comprising all seven 
subsets mentioned in Icove paper (Icove, D. C. and Vonstorch, K., 1999) in addition to 
other threats which may be identified during the analysis process.  
 
Analyzing an e-service is not restricted to the types of the subsets of threats which can 
contribute to the risk of the delivery failure. There are other dimensions which can be 
considered for any online service such as the source of threat, the perpetrator types, 
intention, and the consequences. This approach of analysis was developed by Loch et al 
(Loch, k. D., Carr, H. H. and Warkentin, M. E., 1992). 
 
Knowing the source of the threat will assist in developing the appropriate security 
operational strategy and increase the probability of the service availability. Placing the right 
countermeasure will depend on the knowledge of the source of threat and whether it is 
within the organisation or it is an external one. The types of perpetrators can be human or 
non-human. Performing in depth analysis on the type of the perpetrator, background, 
profile, and motives assist in putting the right security system in place. The dimension of 
intention is critical to the operation of information technology and the supporting 
infrastructure to the online service in general. Being able to avoid the accidental errors 
through strict change management procedures and the enablement of audit trails will filter 
the incidents which were caused through malicious actions. This will enable the security 
officers to set the appropriate measures to reduce the likelihood of having an error that can 
breach the whole security programme. The last dimension is the consequences of any 
security attack. Consequences vary from disclosure of classified information to a total 
denial of service to the online service. Each consequence has a cost and a method to 
prevent. The cost of the consequence is determined as a loss to the organisation which can 
be minimized or totally eliminated by placing the appropriate security measure which has a 
cost which must be incurred by the organisation.  
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The e-service is only a product generated out of an IT infrastructure owned by the service 
provider or outsourced through a third party. The e-service includes supporting technology, 
integrated processes, and support staff. The security threats on any of the key elements of 
the online service will have a direct impact on the service and its users.  
 
Each year we get acquainted with different cybercrime threats either through literature or 
reports of incidents. The growth of threats continues (Figure 15) along with the wide 
spread of the Internet. The diagram below highlights some of the threats identified and their 
growth over the coming years. Gartner anticipated that “The threat environment remains 
scary, with new threat types such as Phishing, adware, spyware and identity theft” 
(Schroder, N., 2005). The growth of threats indicates that more dimensions of threats will 
be faced. Dimensions which might need different countermeasures of security to mitigate 
them. The nature of these countermeasures might be technological or non technological.  
 
 
XENO: Extended Enterprise Network Oversees 
(Wheatman, V., 2005),  
Figure 15: Security threats – Gartner 
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Swiderski (Swiderski, F. Snyder, W.C, 2004) argued that threats of a single application can 
vary from malicious attacks to unauthorized access. Considering the fact that e-services are 
generated from business applications and knowing that there are multiple threats for each 
single application, the author agrees with Swiderski’s concept which justifies the need of 
multiple layers security model. The applications threats analyzed by Swiderski (Swiderski, 
F. Snyder, W.C, 2004) are:  
• Malicious SQL Data in User Input 
• Disclosure of Login Information  
• Session ID Theft   
• User Data Disclosure  
• Direct Access to the Database 
• Rate Quote Tampering  
• Unauthorized Use of Insurance Agent Web pages 
• Blocking e-mail Notification  
• User Data Tampering  
• Blocking New Quote Request Notification  
• Account Deletion  
• Crashing the website  
• Accessing the site without valid credentials.  
 
The above threats represent threats on the technological side of application management 
(Swiderski, F. and Snyder, W. C., 2004). An e-service is provided through an end-to-end 
automated process or it is an automation of a process interrupted by a manual procedure 
which needs direct human intervention. The threat of an e-service might be generated by a 
technological flaw, lack of good security, lack of knowledge in a security threat of how to 
handle a threat, no clear and strict operational procedure, or as simple as selecting the 
wrong timing to launch the service. The author’s view is that security threats are built up 
and constructed in different layers or levels for any e-service. It can be agreed that the 
severity of the threat on any e-service will always be higher if the threat occurs as a 
combination of technology, competency, policy, bad operation, and wrong decisions.  
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A threat is a combination of the capability of the perpetrator and the intention of his action 
as indicated in Equation 1 (Table 12).  
Table 12: Threats and capability table 
Threat = Capability + Intent (Equation 1)  
Capability = Access + Skill  (Equation 2) 
 
A capability element is directly related to the level of competency of the IT staff or the 
security officers responsible for the infrastructure. A threat (Tudor, J. K., 2002) is a more 
limited component of risk. As a matter of fact, a threat that has no vulnerability creates no 
risk. Some security analysts define threat as potential danger to information or an 
information system (Nichols, R. K., Ryan, D. J. and Ryan, J. J. C., 2000), (Tiwana, A., 
1999). A threat can be mathematically calculated as illustrated in Table 12 only if you can 
calculate its components. Considering all the possible threats to an e-service in the early 
stage will reduce the effect of the vulnerabilities. In addition, as indicated in Table 12 
having strong security competency will minimize the capability of the attacker (-capability) 
which will reduce the value of the threat in Equation (1). Having both a strong security 
competency and technologies will minimize the capability value further and therefore it 
will reduce the threat value.  
 
The standard method of calculating the level of risk (Tudor, J. K., 2002) is multiplying the 
threat level by vulnerability weight, divided by the level of countermeasures available to 
protect the infrastructure and multiplied by the impact (Equation 3 in Table 13). This 
method depends highly on knowing vulnerabilities and impacts on an asset. It relies on our 
up to date knowledge on these vulnerabilities and our experience in studying different 
levels of impact. The two equations below reflect the standard method of calculating risk.  
  
Table 13: Level of risk and total risk formula 
Level of Risk = ((Threat × Vulnerability)/Countermeasures) × Impact (Equation 3) 
Total Risk = Vulnerability + Threats + Asset Value (Equation 4) (Finne, T., 1996)).  
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4.2.2. Towards a holistic model for e-services security 
Based on the review of academic and industrial literature, a holistic approach that could be 
used to analyse threats of e-services offered by e-governments was not found. Most of the 
literature studied emphasised the challenges of e-government through the infrastructure 
protection alone (Smith, D. A. and Garton, P. R., 1989). There is no doubt that the 
approach of the infrastructure protection will mitigate some of the risks to e-services, but it 
will not be sufficient to counter all threats. E-services are not always supported end to end 
by fully automated processes, nor are offered through a common technological 
infrastructure. The security policies and procedures might not be common for all the e-
services offered and the supporting staff might have different levels of competencies. In 
addition, most of the published approaches considered the impact of threats on different 
types of services safeguards including physical, procedural, and computer/network security. 
The e-services can be provided by a single application or multiple business applications. 
The process of launching an e-service might have a high dependency on the reliability of 
the technology, the need of developing special security policies related to the e-service, and 
the availability of competent support staff and the operational procedures. The following 
are the essential security levels required for e-services as observed from the literatures 
reviewed in chapter two: 
 
• A secure technical infrastructure 
Security technologies have important role in securing the systems and applications 
supporting the e-services. Technologies such as Intrusion Detection, Antivirus 
(Schneier, B., 2004), Cryptography (Schneier, B., 1996), VPN (Carroll ,1996), Digital 
Signature (Schneier, B., 2001) and security protocol (Brewer, D. F. C. and Nash, M. J., 
1989),  contribute to the success of the e-services by providing the users high trust. Not 
having all or some of the security measures will have a negative impact and can be 
considered as a threat on the e-service.  
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• Security policy related to the e-service  
Security policies is a pillar in the security system of any organisation. The security 
policy is the organisation specific law. It allows employees to know what are the 
permitted actions to conduct and what is considered as a misconduct as per the 
organisationrules and regulations (Wood, C. C., 1999). Having a bullet proof security 
policy will assist the e-enabled organisation to mitigate the threat of internal malicious 
acts (Kesh, S., Ramanujan, S. and Nerur, S., 2002), (Siponen, M. T., 2001), (Wood, C. 
C., 1999). Lindup mentioned in his paper that there are several types of security 
policies which can be implemented in any organisation. An organisation can 
implement a system security policy, product security policy, community security 
policy, and a corporate information security policy (Lindup, K. R. A., 1995).  Lacking 
the appropriate security policies or the enforcement of them can be considered as a 
threat on the e-services. Since the security policy document is made up of groups of 
policies related to different functions, missing a sub policy can be considered a threat 
which may compromise the overall security of the e-service.  
 
• Competent security team and officer.  
Competency of the staff is obviously a strong requirement of any security system. 
Having a strong dependency on the staff who are not competent to run the security 
programme or maintain it will put the overall security system at great risk (Kesh, S., 
Ramanujan, S. and Nerur, S., 2002), (Gottfredon, M. and Hirschi, T., 1990).  
 
• Secure operational and management procedures 
The way security operates is what sets the distinction between a successful security 
programme and a failure one. A solid security programme will have incident response 
process, security operational procedure, and all the management tools necessary. The 
operation and management of the security programme must cover the protection, 
detection, and the response (Schneier, B., 2001), (Zadeh, L. A., 2000).  
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• A systematic method of taking a decision  
All aforementioned security levels are essential to the success of launching an e-
service and the enhancement of the usability of the e-services by the citizens. The 
time of the launch, method of launching, and the content of the e-service are all 
factors which need to be considered by the management of the DEG authority. 
Launching an e-service in the wrong time or allowing an e-service to be launched 
while the essential security criteria are not met is a threat on the e-service. Setting 
priorities of the security measures is the key of making the right decision for an e-
service. 
 
Figure 16 simplifies the idea of having groups of threats related to each level 
(technological, security policies, competencies, operational and management procedures, 
decision impact) of the security programme of e-services. Threats can be related to flaws in 
the system or policy or due to a weak security operation procedure and security 
competency. Taking into consideration the impact of the management decision, the threat 
of taking the wrong decision was also considered. The number of threats varies from one e-
service to another and the number of the levels related to the security programme can also 
increase. It is therefore clear that the vertical axis of the model (the Security levels) can 
expand to (n) number and the same applies to the horizontal axis (Threats of each level) 
(Figure 16).  
 
4.2.3. Evaluating the total threat 
Simplistically, the total threat value may be considered as sum of probability of the threat 
in each level for an e-service. Safeguards have to be set in each level in order to reduce the 
threats associated with it.  
From the four equations in Section 4.2.1, then the threat value of each level is: 
T(i)= T1 + T2 + T3 + T4,…Tn. This indeed will have a direct impact on the level of risk 
formula and total Risk formula as mentioned below: 
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Level of Risk =              ((             x Vulnerability)/Countermeasures) x Impact 
Total Risk =           Vulnerability x                x Threats x Asset Value 
 
 
Figure 16: Threats summation matrix 
 
4.2.4. Illustration using e-university Service 
 Since the e-university service was presented in the Lambrinoudakis framework 
(Lambrinoudakis, C., Gritzals, S., Dridi, F. and Pernul, G., 2003) as one of the key e-
services, this is used to illustrate the use of the multi-layer model. Each layer/level needed 
for the e-services security has its requirements whether they are technical or non technical 
(procedural). The approach of analysing the various threats of a single e-service adopted in 
this research is shown in Figure 17 and explained in Table 14. The threats shown in Table 
10 are presented for illustration purpose and not representing all the threats which can be 
found on the e-service. By applying this comprehensive method of looking at all relevant 
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threats, accuracy on the real impact of the e-service threat can be achieved and the 
countermeasure(s) can be applied. The output from this analysis will assist the e-service to 
be launched with confidence and increase the trust and usability of the users whether they 
are government organisations or citizens (Table 10).  
 
 
Figure 17: e-University threats analysis 
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Table 14: Application of multi threats concept on e-university 
Level Requirement Threats 
Technology 
 
(TA) 
• Networking Infrastructure 
• Security Infrastructure  
Special application for e-university 
business requirements such as setting 
curriculum, posting classes, scheduling, 
accepting applications, workflow for 
admission, etc 
• Viruses 
• Denial of Services  
• SYN Flood or Network based attacks 
• Application/OS flaws 
• Wrong Scheduling or admission due to 
intentional or unintentional error. 
Policy 
 
(TB) 
• The IT and security policy on what to post 
and how to use the e-university 
infrastructure by supporting staff or public 
users. A good example is how users can 
post a course through approval workflow, 
how students can apply and how 
applications get approved or rejected 
• Self defeated policies which allow 
intruders to gain access.  
• Inapplicable and undoable policies 
which can’t be used in the organisation. 
The organisation will have the 
perception of having a policy in place 
but at the same time the policy can’t be 
practiced.   
• Disconnected procedures from policies. 
Procedures must spell out the policies 
and if they are in place but not aligned 
to the security policy, they may become 
an indirect threat. Procedures may 
encourage wrong practices violating the 
security policy.   
• Unclear IT policies 
Competency 
 
(TC) 
• Operational Knowledge: for the 
supporting staff.  
• Users Knowledge: for the users of the 
Infrastructure 
• Security Knowledge: How to protect the 
infrastructure 
• Incapable staff managing the sensitive 
infrastructure  
• Relying on third parties in every aspect 
of operational needs.  
• non-unpadded and incapable security 
practitioners 
• having less hacking knowledge than the 
students who are the key users to the 
service.  
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Operational 
 
(TD) 
• Operational Procedures on how to manage 
the infrastructure 
• Security Procedures for how to protect the 
infrastructure and how to respond to a 
threat 
• Unpractical operational procedures.  
• No backup procedures.  
• No change management.  
• No security procedures 
Decision 
 
(TE) 
• When to launch the service 
• How to select the appropriate 
infrastructure 
• When to shut down the service if a threat 
is confirmed 
• Who has higher priority, security or 
business requirements? 
• Launching the service during a peak of 
attacks on the Internet.  
• Selecting a weak application which has 
no security features due to cost 
reduction.  
• Launching the service due to business 
requirements without giving security 
ample time to mitigate any risk.  
 
Since most of the e-services require more than a single step to launch, the approach 
discussed in this section and illustrated in Table 15 can be applicable to government 
authority and its affiliates offering similar e-services.  The method of analysis is not limited 
to e-government services only. A column of numeric threats’ values can be added if a 
quantified analysis is needed to give each e-service a value from threats perspective. The 
threats analysis can be based on what’s available for the e-service and what’s missing in 
order to make it more secure. In addition, the above table can be used as a checklist for 
each e-service and can determine the priority of launch for each e-service.  
 
Adopting the above method in analyzing threats related to e-services will lead to the 
development of a comprehensive risk analysis to address all threats related to all levels and 
aspects. The need for new models was highlighted by many researchers to address all 
aspects of security (Schumacher, H. J. and Gosh, S., 1998). The key part in developing 
different models is to identify the threats of each level and how to set the proper 
countermeasure all linked in one security model.  
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A checklist for planning a launch of any new e-service is illustrated in Table 15 where each 
layer supporting the e-services have some security measures to be placed, a list of threats 
affecting the layer, and a weighting rate on each threat. This table can be used to calculate 
the total value of the threats by the average of all layers threats level.  
  
Table 15: e-services lunching checklists 
 
 
This new approach of identifying the total value of threats and analyzing all threats related 
to the e-service integrates the key concepts from the models reported earlier.  
 
Adding the policies, competencies, operation and management, and the decision levels 
allows the security practitioner to consider a comprehensive range of threats prior to 
launching any e-service. The decision level of the security programme is a major decision 
to launch a service or not. It also affects the other levels or layers by enforcing a security 
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policy, change of a technology, develop a new competency, and modify the security 
operation and management procedure. 
 
4.3. The layers  of new e-government  security model 
Having more than one dimension or layer of any model gives the model a robust structure 
and a better success rate in preventing organisations from various categories of threats 
related to a single or multiple e-services. Each layer will mitigate group of threats related to 
an e-services. The technology layer for example will address all the technological threats 
while the policy and competency layers will address the threats on an e-service related to 
the human aspect. The challenge is how to construct or build the academic support for the 
different layers/dimensions required to be in one model. A literature review and an 
extensive research were conducted in order to prove the necessity of the layers discussed in 
this chapter. The research continued to find out the sub layers of each layer needed in any 
information security system or programme. The purpose of the research is to establish any 
sub layer which may be used in the future in constructing a comprehensive model which 
will consist of multiple layers that complement each other. There are five areas the author 
argues that contribute in building strong security architecture and system (Figure 18).  It 
can be noticed that each area is a broad concept of the information security field and can be 
broken to smaller subsets which collectively contribute to the positive effect of the security 
programme of any organisation. The five layers were selected based on the author’s 
industrial experience and reported in academic literature on their importance as a part of 
any strong security programme. The layers as depicted in Figure 19 are, the technology 
layer, the policy layer, the competency layer, the operational and management layer, and 
the decision layer. The layers were constructed from the bottom to the top based on the 
importance of the layers, the frequency of their implementation in organisations, and how 
they complement each other.  
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Figure 18: The different five layers building the new security model 
 
The idea of the new model is to come up with a comprehensive method in reviewing the 
security needs and requirements for any e-enabled organisation in order to allow or not to 
allow the interchange of information with other e-organisations. This information sharing 
or interchanging can be part of an e-business or an e-government process. To ease the 
visualization from a non technical user point of view, the new conceptual model is 
expressed in a pyramid representation as illustrated in Figure 19.  
 
Figure 19: Multi layers model 
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Since each layer has more than one sub layer and to make the structure coherent and more 
understandable, the model evolved into a matrix oriented structure (Figure 20) where each 
layer was divided into multiple sub layers. The division of these layers into sub layers 
(referred as cells) gives the new model a flexibility to expand into n-number of cells based 
on the need of the organisation.  
Supporting literature address the need of technologies, policies, awareness, and the right 
management decision in order to come up with a strong security programme. The key goal 
of the scope of work of this research is how to position the main security aspects in a single 
model to represent security architecture with multiple layers and cells that complement 
each other in order to reach a better level of security for any organisation. The structure of 
the model with the five main aspects of security (technology, policy, competency, operation 
and management, decision factors) is applicable to any organisation with a possibility of 
changing the sub layers based on the security trends in the market and the 
organisationneeds. Moreover, the number of the layers might change based on other 
researches or literature reviews which will be done in the future. The concept of having x-
number of layers with y-numbers of cells in each layer and the combination of all to come 
up with a better level of security is what the author considers as “new model” and a “new 
approach”. 
 
4.4. Selection criteria of the new model sub layers 
 The following criteria used for the selection of any sub layer in the model:  
 
1. The sub layer must address a security requirement in the government department.  
2. The sub layer must be recognized and implemented by a minimum of five (5) of the 
security vendors and service providers.  
3. The sub layer must be reviewed and approved by a government security committee 
consisting of members representing over 70% of the total number of the government 
departments.  
4. The sub layer must not conflict or be redundant of other sub layers in the new model.  
5. The sub layer must have at least two other sub layers to support it but a security policy 
sub layer must be one of the two.  
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Figure 20: The matrix oriented model 
 
4.5. The security technologies layer 
In many journals and articles, authors tend to define security technologies very well. The 
approach of providing an extensive knowledge on security technologies can be part of the 
awareness strategy but not enough to justify the inclusion of the security technologies in the 
organisation. A brief description is provided on the need of these technologies in any 
organisation and how to use them. As part of the research work conducted for this thesis, 
all security technologies known in the security field were considered as the initial stage. A 
categorization was made to combine the security technologies into groups where each 
group represents a security measure. For example, there are many types of firewalls 
available in the market. Some of them are operating in the application layer while others 
are in the network and transport layers (stateful inspection filtering) of the networking OSI 
seven layers (physical, data link, network, transport, session, presentation, application). 
Regardless of the modus operandi of the firewalls, they all can be categorized as logical 
access control which can represent a single sub layer of the new model. The same analogy 
was performed to the other technologies which led to 12 sub layers required to build a 
strong technology layer. The categorization was derived from the literature reviewed for 
this layer. The main sub layers found out of the review process are: 
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4.5.1. Access Control  
Access control is a mechanism of controlling entry to any perimeter or a boundary. The 
control might be through prevention of unauthorized entries, monitoring authorized entries, 
or limiting entries through predefined rules and roles. As per the latest CSI computer crime 
and security survey, insider abuse network access or email has a deeper impact (59% of the 
survey respondents) more than viruses spread (52% of the survey respondents) 
(Richardson, R., 2007). Organisations will need to place access control where entry can’t 
be provided to public and where assets are categorized to be mission critical to the 
organisation. The assets can be in format of systems, information resources in any 
manifestation or an environment where confidential discussions can be held. All 
organisations will need some level of access control to its offices, computer centres, or 
even staff areas. An e-government model is as an example of an e-enabled organisation and 
will have a strong requirement of access control to the computer centres where 
governmental data are held, offices of the staff handling the e-government services, and 
even cables carrying the data between governmental departments.  
 
4.5.2. Intrusion detection and prevention  
Intrusion detection system (IDS) and prevention system (IPS) are becoming key elements 
of any security infrastructure to ensure the safety of systems and networks (Wheeler, P. and 
Fulp, E., 2007). Intrusion Detection and Prevention are technologies that rely on either 
statistical and signature databases or on the behaviour of the network through Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) agents. Both technologies sent alerts to the authorized staff whenever 
there is an attack symptom. The accuracy of the IDS is measured on how to reduce the false 
positives and false negatives alerts. False positives are legitimate user behaviour that is 
detected by IDS as a malicious act while false negatives are intrusive behaviour interpreted 
by the IDS as normal behaviour (Biermann, E., Cloete, E. and Venter, L. M., 2001). 
Organisations providing external access to information resources or even connected to the 
Internet will find the technology of IDS or IPS imperative in order to be alert on attacks or 
possible attempts of intrusion. Many organisations nowadays realize that having a host 
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based IDS and monitoring activities are imperative. The monitoring procedure is pushed all 
the way to the auditing logs of the system (Cole, E., 2002). 
 
4.5.3. Anti-virus & malicious codes scanners 
Since 1984 viruses were spreading in the internet causing users a great deal of 
inconvenience and lowering the trust on the Internet and the computer systems (Cohen, F. 
B., 1992). On the other hand, antivirus and malicious codes scanners are tools which 
perform a health check of the technical body of the organisation and prevent viruses from 
being transferred through multiple channels and can cause serious harm to the organisation. 
Even if the organisation is well protected through anti viruses systems, the infection might 
still take place through flaws in the operating system, or a service port which a worm is 
scanning for. Viruses are considered the highest threat for organisations nowadays 
(Doughty, K., 2003). Having antivirus systems distributed in the organisation will 
definitely lower the risk of serious damage or loss to the information resources. Completing 
the antivirus solution with users alertness will prevent the spread of computer viruses 
(Qasem, I. R., Yaghi, H. M. and Hubbell, J. N., 1990). Due to the need of exchanging files 
and information between the e-government departments, the lack of having a proper 
antivirus solution with a full synchronization of viruses updates, the probability of having 
an e-government department getting infected with viruses from another department due to 
unsecure file exchange over the Internet is high.  
 
4.5.4. Authentication and passwords  
The demand of protecting the privacy and the integrity of corporate information has been 
increasing recently (Yixin, J., Chuang, L. and Zhangxi, T., 2003). Since information 
systems are the heart of any organisation and the mean of users access to the e-services, 
authenticating the identity of the user is one of the fundamental controls an organisation 
needs to put in place (Zviran, M. and Haqa, W., J., 1990). It was stated by Zviran that 
having simple passwords is a risk as they can easily be guessed. A good mechanism of 
elevating the level of security was referred as the 3-factors security by Kurtz (Kurtz, R. L. 
and Vines, R. D., 2002). The concept of the 3-factors security is simple. Users get 
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authenticated through their identification which can be something that they know and keep 
as a secret (first factor) or something that they have (second factor) or something that is 
part of them (third factor).  The first factor is usually a password which a user will know 
and hide. The second factor is a token that a user will have always. The third factor can be 
part of the user’s body use as a mean of authentication such as eye-iris, retina, fingerprint, 
face geometry, etc. Combination the three factors together the authentication becomes more 
accurate and hard to be breached. “Authentication is the process of positively verifying the 
identity of a user in a computer system” (O'Gorman, L., 2003), It definitely plays a major 
role in elevating the trust of users in the computer system and the services launched over 
the Internet and it needs to be part of the government departments  security architecture or 
model.  
 
4.5.5. Files integrity checks  
Securing information resources from external or internal attacks doesn’t stop at preventing 
unauthorized access or exposure to information. Most of the time security breaches happen 
with motive of a cyber crime.  The motive might be stealing information, destroying data, 
or hiding facts which we know as unauthorized alteration of data. Data modification of a 
government department or any organisation might result a great loss for organisations relay 
on data storage (Tomonori, F. and Masanori, O., 2003). The perpetrators can be internal 
such as storage device admin staff or external attackers as Tomonori stated. The attack 
tactics can be direct attempts of intrusion or planting undetected viruses to achieve the 
objective. The mission of the viruses or the malicious codes is to copy information and 
send it directly to the attacker. Some viruses can be embedded deeply in the system and 
remain undetected for a long time (Cohen, F. B., 1992). Having undetected viruses 
jeopardize the integrity of the government information stored data in a standard format 
within files in systems (Mckosky, R. A., 1990). These files are kept in either one system or 
distributed among group of systems. Providing availability and confidentiality for these 
files can be achieved through well known and standard security measures. The challenge 
really gets raised when integrity is one of the main security factors required in any 
organisation. Integrity check is not commonly used and sometimes is overlooked by 
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security practitioners due to the lack of good tools and mechanism in the organisation. 
Different tools can be used to ensure the data integrity such as digital signatures, 
certificates or hashing mechanism (Jaeger, T. and Rubin, A. D., 1996).  E-governments rely 
on transacting data with high integrity. A breach in the integrity of the citizens’ data can 
cause a direct disaster if the data is related to medical, personal, or application to 
governmental service.  
 
4.5.6. Cryptography  
Cryptography is the art of hiding information from those who are not authorized to view it 
(McClure, S., Scambray, J. and Kurtz, G., 2002). The need of cryptography got raised 
when the world discovered the man-in-middle attack from hackers and cyber-terrorist. 
Transacting data over the Internet in clear text is becoming a source of fear for many 
individuals, companies, and countries. The art of cryptography doesn’t provide only with 
confidentiality but also with authentication when public key cryptography systems are 
applied. E-commerce which is a main pillar in any e-government relies heavily on 
cryptography. It is known in the security field that cryptography solves problems that 
involve secrecy, authentication and integrity by using it in different methods (Schneier, B., 
1996). 
 
In today’s virtual world, most of the e-services involve financial transactions, business and 
private information sharing, and high level of trust between data exchange participants. 
Cryptography contributes highly in the elevation of trust of any e-service operation. 
  
4.5.7. Virtual private network (VPN)  
The acronym of VPN is becoming very popular in the business world. Executives require it 
in their laptops and during their business trips. They understand the need of it since it adds 
more convenience to them through direct and secure connection to the corporate 
information resources. “Global accesses, marketing research, selling, data collecting and 
supporting customers are but a few of the requests placed upon ISPs by their business 
customers” (Brown, S., 2001). VPN will play a major role in providing the staff working in 
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supporting the e-government a mean of extending support to the infrastructure virtually, 
extend the work environment to the homes, and make the government information 
resources accessible to authorized users.  
 
4.5.8. Vulnerability scanning tools  
Vulnerability scanners are becoming a must have in any security department trying to be in 
the proactive arena. Knowing the vulnerabilities in any system, network, or application can 
add value to the security programme for the organisation. Scanning the vulnerability needs 
to happen from two directions; the internal and the external (Richardson, R., 2007). E-
governments will need to have scanners and tools for scanning the vulnerabilities and a 
team to analyze the output of these scanners. Having ethical hackers within the organisation 
can be considered as a form of having human based vulnerability scanners. 
  
4.5.9. Digital signature and digital certificates  
“A signature or multiple signatures on the paper guarantee its authenticity” (Atreya, M., 
Hammond, B., Paine, S., Starrett, P. and Wu, S., 2002). The digital signature is a 
mechanism to provide an authentication on a transaction to provide its legality and 
authentication. It may be used for payment authorization, acknowledgment of receiving a 
service or for any verification of information related to the customer. E-governments and 
with no doubt will need the digital signature to obtain authenticity, verification, or 
authorization from the customers. Digital Certificates on the other hand are mechanisms 
and are issued by trusted third parties known as Certificate Authorities (CAs) (Tiwana, A., 
1999).  A lot of technologist use the two terms interchangeably while they both have 
different meaning and purpose of usage.  The main purpose of this technology is to become 
a main method of use in the electronic transactions in e-government services without being 
forgeable (King, C. M., Dalton, C. E. and Osmanoglu, T. E., 2001).  
 
4.5.10. Biometrics  
Biometrics is the most sophisticated tools providing logical and physical access control to 
information resources. Biometrics contribution to the science of security was invaluable. 
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The evolution of biometrics made it stable, solid and almost hard to be penetrated. It uses 
biological traits of the human being where no duplicate can appear. It prevents 
impersonation by matching the database of traits to the traits owners. The usage of 
biometrics in e-governments can vary from accessing critical systems to accessing physical 
restricted areas such as computer centres. Biometrics are used in payment systems to 
prevent fraudulent claims (Tipton, H. F. and Krause, M., 2000). 
 
4.5.11. Logical access control (Firewalls)  
From the ancient world, the term firewalls meant tough to penetrate and high security. It 
meant setting the toughest blockage before attackers so no by bypassing can occur, no 
direct penetration, and only those who are allowed can pass through. This analogy led to 
the invention of a technology using strong policies to block traffic into the network. Only 
allowed traffic goes through and traffic can be in the form of web access, applications 
direct access, applications to database exchange of data, or even simple email exchange to 
an external site. Having an organisation connected to the Internet without a firewall can be 
a challenge to find nowadays (Goncalves, M., Nov 18, 1999). The need of firewalls is now 
taught in professional course, academic course, or practical hands on sessions. 
Organisations sometimes fall in the misperception of considering firewalls are the only 
devices required to secure information resources. The introduction of applications and 
network layers firewalls confused organisations on the concept of firewalls usage. Firewalls 
are logical access control mechanism allowing and blocking entries to the organisation 
network by setting policies. Firewalls using IP and Ports to control the entry are considered 
in the network and transport layer of the OSI while firewalls using proxies to block or 
allow services are categorized as applications layer. Which one an organisation requires is a 
long debate which is out of the scope of this thesis. The comparison is between 
performance verses high level security. It is also between boundary and applications 
firewalls. An e-government with multiple applications will need applications layers 
firewalls to protect the systems infrastructure and boundary firewalls to protect the access 
of users from the different government departments and the Internet. 
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4.5.12. Security protocols  
Security protocols can be categorizes as either network layer or application layer ones  
(Huth, M. R. A., 2001).  Protocols such as IPSec and SSL act as a proactive mechanism in 
providing security to information. Security protocols play an imperative task in encrypting 
data during its transaction from a point to another.  
 
The technologies proposed to construct the sub layers of the technologies layer are shown 
in Table 16. These technologies were selected based on literature review, industrial 
practices, and a direct derivation of the author and others experience in the field. 
  
Table 16: Technology layer 
 
 
Venter presented in his paper a good table indicating the all resources covering the 
information security technologies. Some technologies mentioned were not covered by the 
above matrix and may be added to support the technologies layer (Venter, H. S. and Ellof, 
J. H. P., 2003).   
 
There are some technologies mentioned under different names which the author group into 
the model based on the real function used in practice. The access control referred to in the 
table shown in Table 17 is the physical security access control while firewalls are referred 
as logical access control.   
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4.6.  Security policies layer 
Why any organisation needs a security policy? This question was answered long time ago 
when many businesses realized that technologies along can’t serve the purpose of having a 
well structured security programme. Hare stated that “Policy is essential for the people in 
the organisation to know what they are to do” (Hare, R. M., 1952). Some of the reasons 
mentioned by Hare for having a security policy are compliance, maintaining shareholder 
confidence, and demonstrating the capability of the organisation on both establishing and 
maintaining objectives.  
 
Many security experts believe that system security, product security, community security, 
and corporate information security policies are always the main concern of most of the 
security policies developers. Security policies can vary from a few policies to thousands of 
policies and sub policies covering all detailed aspect of protection, prevention, 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. Arguments between security policies developers 
were always raised on how detailed the policy should be.  Wood stated that security 
policies are methods for building blocks of every successful information programme 
(Wood, C. C., 1999). Wood described a two-dimensional model of checking the level of 
coverage of all policies mentioned in the policy document. One of the pillars of the model 
is audience and the other one is control category or “Policy” (Moeller, R. R., 1981). The 
policy pillar can vary from one to as many policies are required for the organisation. The 
audience pillar is usually limited to five or six categories. Using this analogy, the author 
determined limited number of policies required for e-governments. These policies might 
increase due to new needs from e-governments or an occurrence to a new threat. The 
school of thought Wood is leading is to have different sizes of security policies based on 
the needs of the organisation. Another school of thought on developing security policies 
suggested that policies should not exceed ten pages maximum (Pelitier, T. R., 1998).  
 
The number of security policies can vary based on the needs of the organisation and the 
area security is meant to guard against a well defined threat. In this layer the author selected 
a few policies to construct the sub layer. These policies can increase and has no limit.  The 
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model will still hold as the idea is to have the right combination of policies with the other 
layers in the model and can hold irrespective of the number of the policies’ cells in the 
layer.  
 
The policies selected to form the cells of the layer are password management, log-in 
process, logs handling, computer viruses, intellectual property rights, data privacy, 
privilege control, data confidentiality, data integrity, Internet connectivity, administrative 
policies, encryption policies, HR security policies, third party policies, physical security 
policies, and operation security policies. The policies selected for the model are shown in 
Table 17. 
Table 17: Policy layer 
 
 
4.7. Security competencies layer  
Due to the proliferation of the Internet and the usage of the citizens of the government wide 
e-services, government departments must invest on the human capital of the information 
security departments. Having a competent security team within the organisation will 
solidify the security infrastructure. Other researchers in the field of information security 
argued that the security competency must also be extended to the users of the e-services 
and not be restricted to the IT or information security departments. Siponen (Siponen, M. 
T., 2001) stated, ”The Internet seems to make the fundamental dilemma of computer 
security. The dilemma arises from the fact that security-unaware users have a need for 
security but no expertise in such matters”. In his paper, Siponen defined five dimensions 
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for the information security awareness. Only one dimension was related to the 
organisational while the other four were externals (Siponen, M. T., 2001). Whether the 
organisation decides to extend the awareness programme to the users or to limit it to its 
staff, the information security awareness programme should cover the baseline topics of the 
security knowledge such as  (Al-Hamdani, W., A., 2007) security operation and 
management, security architecture and development, ethical hacking, security policies 
development, computer forensics, cryptography, security programming, law and 
regulations, security implementation and configuration, and security analysis. The author 
recommends other competencies for the security practitioners such as analytical thinking 
and complex problems solving, network troubleshooting, and cybercriminals psychology 
analysis which can be part of the computer forensic or security analysis competency. The 
competencies listed below (Table 18) will assist the government department enhancing the 
control of security and narrow the gap of the knowledge between the different government 
security departments. It will contribute in elevating the trust on the security programmes 
between the government departments and will increase the usability of the e-services by the 
citizens due to the strong confidence in the security level of the government departments.   
Table 18: Competency layer 
 
 
Education and training are the tools of building the required knowledge base for security to 
all staff working in providing e-government services, internal users, and public users. 
Barnett stated in his report, ”people must get training and education foundations to enable 
them to work effectively in a variety of situations and stay current with both information 
systems technology and computer security threat, tools, techniques, solutions and risk 
containment” (Barnett, F., 1996). The focus in Barnet’s paper was on the essence of 
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providing security education to students. He argued that knowledge on designing, building, 
testing and operating computer security countermeasures will assist students to understand 
the security field in depth and will prepare them with the appropriate knowledge required in 
the industry. Considering students are a subset of the e-government services users, similar 
knowledge will be applied to the set of users defined S(users)= ((employees, security 
practitioners, users in the country, users out of the country, perpetrators).  
 
The knowledge of how to protect the e-government services will be the sole responsibility 
of the security practitioners involved directly with the e-government security department as 
direct employees or suppliers, consultants, or third parties to the e-government. The e-
government authority must allow their security staff to get the maximum knowledge on 
various security areas such as hacking, computer forensics, etc. These competencies can be 
acquainted through attending conferences and training courses. It is recommended that the 
e-government authorities allow their security staff to get updated on the security knowledge 
through freeing 10-15% of their time. This excess time will be utilized on attending 
conferences or higher educational courses (Barnett, F., 1996). Not considering the security 
awareness as a core element of the overall security programme is one of the 10 deadly sins 
noted by Von  (Von, S., B. and Von, S., R., 2004). 
 
Perry stated in his article that having low skills, low training, low integrity, and insufficient 
people is considered as a high risk on the competency of people continuum (Perry, W. E., 
1982).  
 
4.8. Security operations and management layer 
Having the appropriate security technologies, policies, and knowledge will not provide the 
organisation solid and comprehensive security architecture. The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) categorized the security controls into three categories; 
technical, operational, and management: technical controls as the security products and 
processes an organisation is placing to protect the IT infrastructure. The operational 
controls are the mechanisms which will ensure the proper security operation and prevent 
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any operational misconduct. The management controls are related to the usage policies 
management and the disaster recovery tasks management (Baker, W. H. and Wallace, L., 
2007). Security is about vigilant monitoring and management of critical assets and 
information resources. Management and operational tools are a must to have in order to 
enable the security practitioner to perform the task and achieve the best objectives.  
 
The most important aspect of this layer is how the organisation runs its operation. The 
operational policies and procedures are the rules and regulations where the security 
operational staff will follow in performing the tasks expected from them. Not considering 
the internal best practices for operational and management procedures is considered a 
deadly sin an organisation will commit (Von, S., B. and Von, S., R., 2004). These 
operational policies and procedures will spell out the security policy approved in the 
organisation and shall have strong reference to it.  
 
Running security operation with primitive management tools is a tedious and daunting task. 
Having the appropriate tools such as the management agents, correlation engine, data 
warehouse and data mining will ease the process and will allow the operational staff to 
contribute better in the analysis and response to attacks. The concept of security operation 
and monitoring got more popular in the security field after the Microsoft incident in 2000 
when a hacker penetrated its corporate network. The system administrators reviewed the 
logs after they discovered many accounts created in the system. The concept of protection 
alone will not serve the organisation to reach the accepted security level. It has to be 
protection, detection and response together in order to reach the maximum security benefits 
(Schneier, B., 2001). The sub layers indicated in Table 19 are the proposed tools and 
functions needed to accomplish the security monitoring and management. The author 
believes that having this layer complements the other layers in the security model and 
makes them more tied in the inter-functional requirements and processes.  
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Table 19: Operations and management layer 
 
 
4.9. Decision 
Reaching the right decision for launching or not launching an e-service will have a direct 
impact on the success or failure of the e-service. Taking one direction or another can affect 
the overall model in selecting policies, technologies and hiring the right staff to run the 
security programme. Schneier stated that the top five reported problems were 
viruses/worms, employee misconduct, denial-of-service attacks, loss of customer data, and 
amateur hackers. This made many organisations to consider putting the position of security 
in the top level of their organisational hierarchy (Schneier, B., 2004). Schneier also 
illustrated that it is easy to calculate the security expenditures while calculating the ROI is 
quite hard. From the author’s industrial experience, failing in presenting the ROI or the 
quantified values of information security made many organisations reluctant from selecting 
the appropriate programme, or hiring the right person for the right job. Network and 
security administrators use fear, uncertainty and denial (FUD) to justify the need of 
security. This approach usually works in Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) but not in 
big enterprises where the chief officers are well educated on security and the needs of the 
organisation.  
 
“Insufficient budget is the number-one obstacle to effective information security, followed 
closely by “resources priorities” according to a new survey of information security 
representatives at 1400 organisations in 66 countries (Risk Advisory Services Group, 2006) 
The numbers indicated in Table 20 reflect the direction of information security 
expenditures in most organisation as per the 2006 survey:  
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Table 20: Security expenditures 
Area Of Expenditure Percentage of 
Expenditure 
Security Technology 83% 
Business Continuity 68% 
Processes 48% 
Consultants 34% 
Staffs 33% 
Employee Awareness 15% 
Training  13% 
Other 2% 
 
As shown in the above table awareness, technologies and having the appropriate staff are 
what construct the right combination of the security programme of any organisation. The 
author presented other factors listed in Table 21 from his experience in the field of 
information security. These factors play major role on whether a security programme can 
be successful or not. The cost verses the need of security; the awareness of technologies 
verses the availability of these technologies and above all, the physiological effect of FUD 
over the decision. Each factor has a direct or indirect effect the other sub factors in the 
same layer as well as the other sub factors in other layers of the model. The cost of security 
technologies is a good illustrative point to the impact of the decision layer on other layers 
of the security programme. Considering the cost constraints of any organisation, having the 
best technology, right competency, end-to-end operation and management infrastructure, 
and the right security policies will be evaluated thoroughly. Having the combination of all 
or some is also related to the cost limitation which derives the decision of the management 
of the organisation.  Awareness is another factor which derives the decision. Having the 
right awareness on technologies to select, policies to apply, required competencies, and the 
right level of management and monitoring will have an impact on which direction the 
organisation can take.  
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Table 21: Decision layer 
 
  
 
The model evolution 
Figure 21 depicts the evolution of the model to a matrix format having sub layers and 
giving a description of each sub layer. The author found many literature on building 
security model to evaluate the network security based on a structure of security pillars and 
attributes such as the one proposed by Gosh called the NRM model (Schumacher, H. J. and 
Gosh, S. ,1998). Other models were presented for illustrative purposes only. Since the 
layers of the multi layered model are connected and complement each other in terms of 
functionalities and objectives, the author has evolved the model to a form where each cell 
has a value and a need of integration with the other cells of the model. The model the 
author is proposing will be used for further research for calculating the combinations of all 
possibilities the matrix can have to score the highest security rate. Having all combinations 
will not be possible due to the interference of the decision factors which are placed to 
reflect the real world scenario in many if not all organisations. Placing the layers in the 
model in the order reflected was not based on consecutive reasons, nor was it based on 
importance of each layer. The author placed the layers based on the industrial experience as 
security technologies are more common and accepted than the security policies. The other 
layers can be in any other order with no effect on the overall Model (Figure 22). 
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Figure 21: The evolution of the new model 
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Figure 22: The matrix orientation of the model 
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This model derived from literature analysis is to be tested in the case study of the DEG 
authority. The new model will be used as a reference to identify the security layers 
applicable to the different e-services categories. In addition, a rating process will be applied 
on the different layers and sub layers by a group of selected security practitioners in order 
to confirm the applicability of the layers/sub layers proposed in the new model.  
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Chapter five: Case study of Dubai e-
government security requirements 
 
5.1. Introduction  
This chapter aims to provide the reader the questionnaire (A) results analysis and the key 
findings from the answers provided by 19 participants who are IT decision makers and hold 
senior positions in the government or semi-government departments. This is out of a total 
of 26 government departments and represented 73% of possible organisation participants in 
Dubai. The questionnaire had 3 main sections as described in section 5.1.3; the first section 
was about general questions related to the e-government different types of services, the 
second section was about the internal threats, and the third section was about the external 
threats on the online services. The questionnaire established the Dubai perception of 
relationship, internal and external threats with the technological, human aspects, lack of 
policies, weak security competencies, or wrong decisions. The analysis will show how the 
scope of the model which addresses the different types of threats appropriate for Dubai 
government.  
 
5.2. Questionnaire design 
A high level questionnaire was designed for the management of the e-government authority 
and the government departments which are providing e-services to the public, interacting 
with the e-government authority and sharing information with other government 
departments. The questionnaire was designed in a way to assist the management of the 
government departments or those who are in charge of the e-government initiative within 
the department to identify threats, needs, and risks related to the online/e-services’ 
implication to allow inter department information sharing. A copy of the questionnaire is in 
Appendix A. 
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5.2.1. Purpose of the research  
The questionnaire starts with general questions related to the e-government e-services. The 
general questions address the types of services the government department offers such as 
information publishing, interactive services (one way or two ways), or transactional e-
services. A government department may offer all types of e-services which will make it 
susceptible to more threats. The second section of the questionnaire addresses the internal 
threats which are related to the e-government authority or any government department 
affiliating with it. A list of well known threats is listed for the management to select from in 
order to get focused answers related to the thesis presented in this document. The third 
section of this questionnaire is related to the expectations, threats, and needs raised by an e-
government authority or government department from trading/exchanging information with 
other government departments. The purpose of the research is to validate the needs of the e-
government authority and government departments’ management of information security in 
order to exchange or share information with the public or other departments.  
 
5.2.2. Target interviewee 
The e-government initiative is run by two main teams; the management of the e-
government initiative and the technical team supporting the online services. Taking the 
opinion of one team rather than the other will not give a holistic view on the need of a new 
security model for the e-government. The technical team will cover the technical aspects 
only and the management team will only focus on the management aspects. It was found 
from a practical perspective that two questionnaires are needed for the two groups of 
audiences; the management and the technical. The types of threats on the online services 
will be identified by the management of the e-government and its affiliates. In this chapter, 
the survey results for the management questionnaire (questionnaire-A) are presented and 
analyzed. The participants of this questionnaire were either in the management level or 
hold a decision making role when it comes to launching online services or setting a strategy 
for them.   
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5.2.3. Different sections  
There are three main sections of the management questionnaire:  
• The first section addresses general questions related to the e-government types of 
services which they are classified as per the UN as:  
o Information Publishing  
o One way Interactive Services  
o Two ways Interactive Services  
A question related to the current information security programme offered within the e-
government or the government department was addressed in the questionnaire. Different 
possible practices offered the security programme were covered as part of section one of 
the questionnaire. The idea of highlighting the different practices was to correlate the types 
of threats (external or internal) with the different practices of the security covered by the 
security programme.  
• The second section covers the internal threats related to the online services. A list of 
all twelve threats which might be caused internally was listed to ease the selection for 
the management of the government department. Some of the threats listed might be 
caused by technological flaws while others can be related to human factors.  
Questions were related to the reason of the level of threats severity, the areas of the 
security assessment must cover, and to the frequency of the security programme 
review.  
• The third section was related to the external threats of the e-government and its 
affiliates. A list of twelve threats was put for selection.  
All questions were inserted into a spreadsheet to record the results of the questionnaire. 
This method assisted in conducting the analysis faster. 
 
5.2.4. Format of questions in questionnaire A 
The format of the questions was mixed between close-ended and open-ended questions. 
Having the mixture in the format allows the participants to select the appropriate answers 
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faster and to add new points and answers if it is needed. It gave the questionnaire a great 
level of flexibility.  
5.2.5. Questionnaire pilot 
A sample of seven different respondents was selected based on the diversity of their roles 
within their organisations. The objective of having a pilot questionnaire was to test the 
easiness of the survey process, clarity of the questions, and to get an overview on the 
different possible answers which may occur in the larger population.  
A preliminary analysis was conducted using the pilot survey results to get a sense of the 
direction of the results. Unfortunately, the pilot survey results were not giving a clear 
indication of any direction yet the following points were noticed:  
• Some questions were not answered due to lack of clarity or to the sensitivity of the 
answers.  
• Some respondents limited their answers to their experience without taking the effort 
of thinking about the other scenarios which they may have not encountered. 
 
5.2.6. Selection of pilot interviewees 
The interviewees of the pilot survey were selected based on the following criteria:  
• The involvement of the interviewee in the security programme of their 
governmental department.  
• The involvement of the interviewee with some or all the e-government online 
services.  
• The strong background in the field of information security.  
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Table 22: Pilot interviewees 
 
 
5.2.7. Feedback  
A feedback form was designed for questionnaire A and was sent to the interviewees to fill 
in order to capture all observations and apply the necessary changes prior to the final 
questionnaire circulation. This approach was agreed on during the design process of the 
questionnaire and the objective was to discover loopholes or major flaws in the 
questionnaire in order to make it stronger and more effective.  
 
Most of the feedback was related to the questions being in academic format and to the 
length of the questionnaire. There was no negative feedback on the strength of the 
questions or their clarity. Some minor observations were given about the list of answers 
given being limited.  
 
5.2.8. Changes done to incorporate pilot feedback 
Some minor changes were incorporated to the questionnaire which was related to the list of 
answers given. In addition, some corrections of spelling, grammatical and logical flow were 
applied.  
 
 
 
Role Frequency Percent 
IT security Manager/Specialist 3 42.85 
Director of Venture Development and Alliance 1 14.28 
Director of Information Security 1 14.28 
Manager of e-services/e-government 1 14.28 
Professor of MIS/American University of Sharjah (expert of the e-
commerce field) 
1 14.28 
Total 7 100% 
120 
121 
 
5.3. Main questionnaire survey 
A total of 19 managers and leaders of the government departments affiliated with DEG 
authority participated in the “Security Management” survey. As the title states the survey 
was on the decision makers and management of the government departments. In addition, it 
highlighted the issues the management of a government department will concern.  
 
5.3.1. The main questionnaire participants 
The following table indicates the roles of the participants who answered the main 
questionnaire. Most of the participants moved to higher positions and to different roles in 
different semi government or government departments but still hold decision making roles 
when it comes to the e-government.  
Table 23: Participants types to questionnaire A 
 
Role 
No. of 
Participants 
Percent 
IT security Manager/Specialist 3 15.8% 
Director of Venture Development and Alliance 1 5.3% 
Director of Information Security 1 5.3% 
Manager of e-services/e-government 1 5.3% 
Professor of MIS/American University of Sharjah (expert of the e-commerce 
field) 
1 5.3% 
COO of RTA 1 5.3% 
CIO of Dubai Civil Aviation 1 5.3% 
CIO of Dubai Municipality 1 5.3% 
High Rank in Dubai Police 1 5.3% 
Director of DEG Authority 1 5.3% 
High position of Immigration 3 15.8% 
Director level of different government departments 4 21.1% 
122 
 
5.3.2. When questionnaires were collected 
The collection process of the questionnaires was not time stamped as some questionnaires 
arrived much before others. The reason of the delay was due to the time required to 
understand the organisation structure of some of the government departments and find the 
appropriate participant to the questionnaire. There were many cases when questionnaires 
floated from a department to another in order to find the right person who can answer the 
questions based on the interaction with DEG authority.  
 
5.3.3. Who collected data? 
All questionnaires were sent to the author of this document directly through email in order 
to ensure their validity and to check whether all questions are properly answered or not.  
 
5.3.4. Process of collection 
The process of collection was based on using the email as agreed by all participants. The 
questionnaire was sent to each participant on the official email address with a request to fill 
the questionnaire stating the purpose of the research and committing that the data will only 
be used for research purpose only. The participants confirmed back through email and 
responses were received subsequently.  
 
5.4. Analysis 
5.4.1. The spread of government e-services:  
The e-government e-services analysis indicates a low spread of the four categorizations. A 
total of 4 respondents (21%) stated that they use information publishing type of e-services. 
Only 5% of the respondents are either using one or two way interactive services. A total of 
3 respondents (16%) are using transactional services and 11 respondents (58%) stated that 
they use a combination of all e-services. 
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5.4.2. Status of Security services 
In the existing or planned security practices in the e-government, the results indicated a 
strong need of human related policies and the need of strong encryption mechanism to 
protect the confidentiality of information.  
The results of the survey (Figure 23) identified that 17 respondents (89%) indicated that 
information classification policies and procedures are existing in most of the government 
departments affiliated to the e-government authority. Only 11 respondents (58%) stressed 
on the need of encryption of classified information related to the government departments, 
12 respondents (63%) indicated an existence of access control to enforce the concepts of 
separation of duties and need to know is in place, Also 12 respondents(63%) highlighted 
that the current security programme covers security operation management and monitoring, 
11 respondents (58%) indicated the existing of network security measures such as firewalls, 
IDS/IPS, VPN, etc, while only 10 respondents (53%) indicated the need of strong 
authentication for the staff of the e-government authority.  
 
Figure 23: Future security practices in DEG authority 
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5.4.3. Internal Threats on e-government Infrastructure:  
The survey results indicate that human related threats, failure of classified data and the lack 
of appropriate security operational management are considered the highest the respondents 
consider (Figure 24).  
 
The 16 respondents (84%) considered having disgruntled employees with access to non-
authorized information resources is the highest internal threat their organisation might 
have.  The second highest threat was related as indicated by 11 respondents (58%) is the 
lack of security and operational competency due to the introduction of new e-services or 
new technologies supporting these new services. A total of 9 respondents (47%) stated that 
the exposure of classified data to unauthorized staff due to a failure of encryption system 
can be considered as a strong internal threat.  On the contrary, the threats related to the use 
of classified data by either industrial spies or information dealers were indicated to be low 
as only 7 respondents (37%) stated leakage of information or espionage related to the 
privacy of the citizen or public users is threat, 4 respondents (21%) highlighted the threat of 
industrial spies and 8 respondents (42%) indicated the threat of information dealers looking 
for classified and sensitive information of public citizens. This might be related to the lack 
of correlation of the respondents between the failure of encryption system which represents 
failure information confidentiality and the easiness of accessing unprotected classified 
information by industrial spies of information dealers.  
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Figure 24: Internal Threats on e-government Infrastructure 
 
5.4.4. Reasons for severe impact of threats:  
 
A total of 12 respondents (63%) stated that the reasons for the severe impact of threats are 
related to the following (Figure 25):  
• Lack of security knowledge in how to handle an incident (competency related threat). 
• Lack of proactive security systems which can reduce the impact and contain the risk 
(operational and technological threats) 
• Lack of a strong security operational and management systems which assist in the 
vigilant monitoring of the infrastructure (operation related threat). 
A total of 11 respondents (58%) stated a severe impact threats might be due to weak 
security and IT infrastructure which is vulnerable to any level of attacks or security threats.  
Only 9 respondents (47%) stated that the severe impact of the threats might be due to the 
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high dependency on the security systems in running the business operation.  The direct link 
between the internal e-government infrastructures to the external parties interacting with it 
was not found as a possible cause of a severe impact for threats as it was stated only by 4 
respondents (21%). 
  
 
Figure 25: Reasons for severe impact of threats 
 
5.4.5. Area of security assessment for the e-government:  
The survey (Figure 26) identified that the majority of the respondents strongly believe on 
the need of assessment for the e-government on:  
• Technologies used as stated by 14 respondents (74%) 
• Policies applied as stated by 15 respondents (79%) 
• Security operational procedures; 14 respondents (74%) 
 
Only 11 respondents (58%) identified the need of assessment on the security and IT 
competencies available in the e-government whilst 10 respondents (53%) stated that an 
assessment will need to be conducted on the decision factors.  
127 
 
Figure 26: E-government areas of security assessment 
 
5.4.6. Frequency for the security programme:  
The survey results (Figure 27) indicate that the security programme of the e-government 
authority is not consistently reviewed by the affiliated government departments which 
might be the cause of the low trust in sharing the information. A total of 3 respondents 
(16%) only stated that the security programme of the e-government authority is monthly 
reviewed whilst 3 respondents (16%) stated that it is annually reviewed. On the contrary 3 
respondents (16%) indicated that the programme is never reviewed. Only 1 respondent 
(5%) stated that a semi-annual review is conducted while 2 respondents stated it is 
quarterly reviewed.  
 
The inconsistent answers indicate that the security programme of the e-government 
authority might be reviewed by some but not all affiliated government departments which 
will cause low level trust and will have a direct impact on the information sharing 
objective. It also leads to the need of having a common security programme between all 
interacting government departments in order to maintain a consistent assessment across all 
of them. 
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Figure 27: Frequency of security programme review 
 
5.4.7. Security knowledge in e-government 
The survey results (Figure 28) highlight that only 7 respondents (37%) confirmed the 
knowledge of the security staff on the security programme while 9 respondents (47%) 
negated that. Three respondents didn’t answer this question (16%).  
 
 
Figure 28:  Knowledge of security staff 
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5.4.8. Security programme and business processes 
Is the security programme linked directly to the business processes of the e-government 
authority and integrated with the services launching processes?  
 
32% of the respondents confirmed with yes while only 26% negated that. A good 
percentage of 21% indicated that it might be in the future. A high percentage of 
respondents (21%) didn’t answer the question (Figure 29).  
 
 
Figure 29: Security programme with business processes 
 
5.4.9. Analysis of the external security related questions:  
The definition of the e-government authority:  
The purpose of this question was to draw a correlation between the perception on the e-
government authority and the need of information sharing by the affiliated government 
departments. From the survey conducted (Figure 30), 10 respondents (53%) confirmed that 
the e-government authority acts as a common gateway for all governmental services.  Only 
4 respondents (21%) stated that it is a relay and a workflow engine of governmental e-
services offered by different government departments. The 5 respondents (26%) stated that 
it is an e-catalogue to all e-services offered by different governmental departments. Another 
5 respondents (26%) stated that the e-government authority acts as a point of consolidation 
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for shared services of all e-government departments. Only 3 respondents (16%) indicated 
that the e-government authority is nothing but a portal while another group of 3 
respondents (16%) stated that the authority is only part of an e-initiative for all the 
government departments.  
The different definitions and perceptions of the e-government authority by the respondents 
of the survey might be the root cause of the low level of information sharing; integration of 
e-services or backend systems, and enforcement common security policies, programmes 
and assessment models. 
 
Figure 30: E-government definition 
 
A total of 8 respondents (42%) indicated that the number of users of the e-services their 
organisations offer is 1000 to 10000. Only 3 respondents (16%) indicated that the number 
of their users vary from 10,000 to 100,000. An indication of only 21% (4 respondents) has 
shown that the number of their e-services users will exceed 100,000 whilst 3 respondents 
(16%) stated that the exact number can’t be determined (Figure 31).  
 
The number of e-services users will be directly related to the type of online service the e-
government department’s offer and to the interest of the public users of these services. The 
categorization of the e-services the respondents’ government departments has shown that 
21% of the services are information publishing and 58% is a combination of all online 
131 
services categories (information publishing, one or two ways interactive, or transactional). 
The purpose of this question was to draw a correlation to the number of public users of the 
e-services and the high probability of external threats. 
 
Figure 31:  Number of users per e-service 
 
5.4.10. Integrated services:  
The survey results (Figure 32) show that only 7 respondents (37%) confirmed that they 
have integrated e-services or processes. A single respondent stated (5%) that more than 10 
services are integrated. The 6 respondents (32%) stated that all the e-services offered by 
their department are integrated. Only 3 respondents (16%) indicated that none of the e-
services are integrated. Only 10% of the respondents didn’t answer the question.  
 
The purpose of this question is to reflect the level of integration between the e-services 
which will lead to the need of having a common security programme for the integrated 
services.  
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Figure 32: Number of integrated e-services 
The majority of the e-government online services are mixed of public and corporate users 
as stated by 13 respondents (68%). Only two groups of 3 respondents (16%) indicated that 
the users are either public/residents of the country or corporate users.  
 
A total of 9 respondents (47%) stated as there is no need of any computer literacy for the 
users of the e-services as long as the knowledge of using the web is there. Only 4 
respondents (21%) highlighted that there is a need of computer literacy whilst another 
group of 4 respondents (21%) indicated that the computer literacy will be required to 
acquaint users with how to use the e-services at the beginning only. The 2 respondents 
(11%) highlighted that this need can’t be determined at this stage.  
 
The purpose of the above question was to draw a correlation between the need of awareness 
and computer literacy and the threats which might be raised by misconducts from 
uneducated users.  
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5.4.11. Number of e-services offered:  
A total of 7 respondents (37%) stated that their government departments offer less than 10 
e-services. The 5 respondents (26%) stated that their departments offer from 10 to 100 e-
services whist another group of 5 respondents (26%) highlighted that between 100 to 1000 
e-services are offered (Figure 33). 
 
 
 
Figure 33: Number of e-services offered 
 
5.4.12. External threats analysis:  
The table below (Table 24) illustrates the related external threats and fear factors from 
dealing with the external customers (government or individuals related to the e-services 
offered as identified by the respondents of the survey:  
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Table 24: External threats 
Threat No. Of Respdn % 
Category of 
the Threat 
Declassification and mishandling of information flowed 
between e-government authority and other departments or 
individual customers 
11 58% (C) 
Man in the Middle attacks and interception with may 
expose the classified information from the e-government 
to the other departments or individual customer 
6 32% (T) 
Denial of Services due to intentional actions (attacks) or 
unintentional actions (operational problem) 13 68% (T) 
Attacks generated from e-government external users 
whether from other departments or citizens interacting, 
transacting, or exchanging information with the e-
government authority 
7 37% (T) 
Viruses coming from the government departments which 
are not having good anti-virus infrastructure 12 63% (T) 
Rerouted attacks through penetrated e-government 
departments by external hackers or attackers 9 47% (T) 
Financial frauds due to impersonations of authorized 
users, systems flaws, or non repudiation 6 32% (T) &( C ) 
Mis-configuration of any IT infrastructure element which 
may lead to leakage of information, wrong assignment of 
e-services, fraud, or corruption of data 
13 68% (C ) 
Disruption of complete cycle of an e-service due to 
latency of the network, low bandwidth, or bad integration 8 42% (T) l 
Information Alternation or unauthorized modification 9 47% (T) & (C ) 
Physical Security breach which may cause of a total 
destruction of the IT infrastructure 6 32% (P) 
Other reasons 3 16% Combination of All 
 
T: Technological   C: Competency  P: Policies    
 
As indicated in the table above, the majority of the respondents selected threats and fear 
factors which can be classified as technological in nature. 6 respondents (32%) selected 
man in the middle attacks as an external threat, 13 respondents (68%) selected denial of 
service attacks, 7 respondents (37%) stated that attacks might come from external users 
who may be part of other government departments and 12 respondents (63%) selected 
viruses coming from other departments are considered as a high external threat. The 9 
respondents (47%) stated that rerouted attacks through another penetrated e-government 
departments are external attacks. In addition, financial frauds was considered by 6 
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respondents (32%) only, disruption of complete cycle of an e-service due to network 
latency or bad integration was selected by 8 respondents (42%) and the breach of data 
integrity was stated by 9 respondents (47%).  
 
Competencies related threats scored high percentages as 11 respondents (58%) stated that 
declassification and mishandling of information flowed between e-government authority 
and other departments or individual customers is a high external threat. In addition, 13 
respondents (68%) selected miscofiguration of any IT infrastructure element which may 
lead to leakage of information, wrong assignment of e-services, fraud, or corruption of data 
as a strong external threat.  
 
A total of 6 respondents (32%) stated that a breach of the physical security which may 
cause a total destruction of the IT infrastructure is considered an external threat.  
Only 3 respondents felt that there might be other external threats to the e-services (Figure 
34).  
 
Figure 34: External threats 
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5.4.13. High probability of Threats 
The survey results identified (Figure 35) a total of 13 respondents (68%) stated that the 
high probability of threats coming from external government department is due to the lack 
of auditing of government security. A total of 10 respondents (53%) related that to the lack 
of rules and regulations. Only 5 respondents (26%) linked that to the different perception of 
how security systems/programmes must be built with any governmental department or e-
government authority.  Six respondents (32%) indicated that the high probability of having 
external threats coming from another government department is due to security being a low 
concern by government department or the e-government authority. A total of 13 
respondents (68%) confirmed that it is related to the lack of security model or model which 
can be applied on the e-government and its affiliated government departments and citizens.  
 
It is clearly observed that the majority of the respondents stated that the high probability of 
external threats coming from another government department is due to either lack of 
auditing on the government security level and systems or to the lack of a common model 
and model which can be applied across the government departments in Dubai who adopted 
the e-government initiative.  
 
Figure 35: Reasons of external threats 
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5.4.14. Key security problems: 
A total of 15 respondents (79%) (Figure 36) stated that lacking strong security policies is a 
key security problem faced by most if not all government departments. Only 8 respondents 
(42%) stated that security issues related to the information and security technologies 
implemented in the government departments are common problems across the government 
departments. The 12 respondents (63%) stated that lacking competent and security 
practitioners is a key security problem, whilst another group of 12 respondents (63%) 
indicated that the lack of vigilant monitoring a common problem. Taking the wrong 
decision regarding implementation of security technologies, enforcement of security 
policies, and hiring the right staff for the right security jobs was identified by only 3 
respondents (16%). A good percentage of 58% (11 respondents) was voted for security not 
being carefully studied carefully and deeply. A single respondent (5%) selected other 
reasons but didn’t specify.  
The highest key security problems identified were related to the lack of policies, 
competencies, and good operational management and procedures. 
 
Figure 36: Key security problems in government departments 
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5.4.15. Requirements of government department:  
A total of 11 respondents (58%) (Figure 37) indicated that a review of applied security 
policy is expected before sharing information. The review of the security architecture and 
infrastructure implemented with the governmental department was selected by 11 
respondents (58%). Only 8 respondents (42%) highlighted that the list of security 
practitioners and their qualifications will need to be reviewed before sharing information 
between departments. This is directly related to the competencies category. The 10 
respondents (53%) stated that a proof of strong security operational procedures within the 
government department will need to be demonstrated for any information sharing. Only 8 
respondents (16%) required the security certification to be in place such as ISO 17799 
whilst 3 respondents (16%) required a copy of the business continuity plan and the disaster 
recovery plan (BCP/DRP) for any information sharing. 
  
 
Figure 37: Requirement for information sharing 
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5.4.16. Security programme awareness:  
A total of 13 respondents (68%) (Figure 38) stated that they won’t feel comfortable dealing 
with other government departments or citizens without knowing the security level applied 
in their infrastructure. Only 3 respondents (16%) stated yes while 2 respondents (11%) 
stated that such knowledge is not necessary to conduct any interaction with government 
departments or citizens. Only 5% of the respondents didn’t answer this question.   
 
 
Figure 38: Other Departments Security Level 
 
5.4.17. Ways for implementing security measures:  
A total of 15 respondents (79%) (Figure 39) stated that developing awareness programmes 
for the public users is the best approach. Only 2 respondents (11%) suggested installing 
security programmes in the citizen PCs. A group of 4 respondents (21%) suggested 
restricting access of e-government authority or any governmental department except from 
special terminals and kiosks. Another 4 respondents (21%) stated that running manual 
authentication in parallel to all e-services authentication might a good security measure for 
the citizens accessing e-government services. Applying biometrics was suggested by 5 
respondents (26%) and a single respondent (5%) suggested implementing the security 
policies will be a good security measure for citizens.  
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Figure 39: Methods of enhancing security level 
 
5.5. Summary of key findings:   
• The majority of the respondents to the survey provided the combination of e-
services (58%) and only 21% provided the information publishing e-services. 
  
• Disgruntled employees having access to unauthorized information resources were 
identified as the highest internal threat (84%). This threat might have a strong 
impact only if a weak security policy is practiced. Other security threats related to 
the exposure of classified data to unauthorized staff (47%). The lack of security 
operational competency was also highlighted as a high internal security threat 
(58%). This indeed was found in line with the high percentage given to the strong 
need of information security policies and procedures in the government departments 
(89%) and to the requirement of having access control to enforce the concepts of 
separation of duties and need to know (63%). The security operation management 
and monitoring was also identified as must to have (53%). 
• It has been noticed that there is a direct link between the low percentage of the 
number of information publishing e-service and the fear of internal threats related to 
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exposure of classified data due to failure of encryption (47%) and the threat of 
information dealers looking for sensitive information (42%). Although these threats 
were internal threats they might be key factors blocking the organisation to publish 
any information over the Internet or forcing the organisation to be more contained. 
The low percentage of the interactive (one or two ways) and the transactional e-
services 5% and 16% respectively can be related to the high percentage of fear of 
disgruntled employees (84%) and the lack of security operational competency due 
to the launch of new services (58%). This indeed cause a delay in launching 
services as developing competencies might require time, cost, and resources. 
  
• Comparing the external threats with the spread of government e-service, it was 
observed that the top three external threats were having denial of services attack 
(68%), viruses spread from the government departments (63%), or mis-
configuration of any IT infrastructure element (68%). The top external threats 
selected will have an impact of the spread of the e-government services in general 
and might be the reason behind the low percentage of the spread of the one way and 
two way interactive services. 
  
• The top three reasons for the internal threats severe impact were identified as the 
lack of security knowledge (63%), lack of proactive security systems (63%), lack of 
strong security operational and management (63%). On the other hand, the lack of 
security competencies was rated as the third most demanded area for the security 
assessment (58%) while the security operation and technologies were equally rated 
the second (74%). 
  
• The interactive and transactional e-services will require heavy integration of the 
business processes as applicants will need to apply, interact, and follow up the e-
services from the time of application to the closure of the process. The majority of 
the respondents (32%) indicated that the security programme will need to be linked 
directly to the business processes and must be integrated with the services launching 
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processes. This highlights that if the security programme is not linked to the 
business processes, the services launching process will be affected and therefore, 
less interactive and transactional e-services will be launched by the authority. The 
results of the interactive and transactional e-services (5-16%) confirmed this point 
and showed that more integration of the security programme and the business 
processes of the e-services are required. 
  
• Respondents indicated clearly that the areas which will need to be assessed as part 
of the security programme for the e-government and its affiliates are technologies 
(74%), policies (79%), competencies (58%), security operational procedures (74%), 
and decision factors (53%). 
  
• Respondents indicated that integrated services and processes exist between the e-
government authority and its affiliates which will increase the probability of risk 
and raise the need of having a common security assessment model which will tackle 
different types of threats related to any e-services. 
  
• The highest percentage of identified external threat was given to miscofiguration of 
any IT infrastructure element which may lead to leakage of information, wrong 
assignment of e-services, fraud, or corruption of data.  
 
• Online services are having different types of internal and external threats. Most 
respondents confirmed that a high probability of having a threat coming from 
another government department will be due to the lack of auditing of government 
departments and the lack of a common and comprehensive security model. This 
confirms the need of having a commonly accepted model for the e-government 
authority and its affiliates. 
  
• A high percentage (79%) was given to the lack of strong security policies as a key 
issue which might be faced by most if not all security departments, followed by the 
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lack of competent security practitioners (63%) and the lack of vigilant monitoring 
(63%). 
  
• There are key activities which will need to be conducted prior to information 
sharing. These activities are:  
o The review of the applied security policies in the other government 
department before sharing information (58%).  
o A comprehensive review of the security architecture and infrastructure 
implemented within the other government department (58%).  
o A proof of strong security operational procedures with the government 
department (53%) 
 
5.6. Chapter summary 
From the analysis conducted on the results of the survey, it can be conclude that 
online services or e-services have internal and external threats. These threats can be 
categorized as technological, competencies related, policies related, or operational. 
Taking the combination of the internal and external threats with the different 
categories of them, it can be derived that an online service will have a set of threats 
(external and internal) and a set of different categories of threats (technological, 
competencies, policies, and operation). This will lead into a need of a 
comprehensive model to tackle all types of threats. (Figure 40) 
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Figure 40: The drivers of the multi layer model 
 
The nineteen participants of the Dubai government departments represent the 
majority of the government departments (73%) participating in the e-government 
initiative. Most of the respondents are currently holding executive levels positions 
in their organisations which make them the right population for this type of 
questionnaire. The responses were fair reflection of the reality of the situation and 
avoiding exaggerations for most of the questions addressed. The decentralized e-
government strategy has caused the lack of synergetic security programmes which 
could have been shared and implemented across the 26 government department in 
Dubai.
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The major threats (external or internal) selected by the participants of questionnaire 
A were:   
 
Table 25: Top threats selected by participations 
Internal Threats 
Threat 
No. 
Threat Type Description/Analysis 
1 Disgruntled employee 
This threat will definitely cause a low trust 
between the government departments as having 
the possibility of a disgruntled employee will 
cause threat 4 and 5 
2 
Lack of Security 
and operational 
competency 
This threat will weaken the security 
infrastructure of the government department 
3 Viruses  Viruses are a major threat in Dubai organisations in general  
4 
Attacks from 
within the 
government 
departments 
Will have a serious effect if threat no. 1 exists 
5 Exposure of classified data Related to Threat no. 1 
External Threat 
1 Denial of service This will affect the availability of the government e-services 
2 
Mis-configuration 
of any IT 
infrastructure 
devices 
This will be affecting the operation of the 
government department 
3 Viruses  A major threat in Dubai in general 
4 
Rerouted attacks 
from other 
government 
departments 
Will be a strong threat if the internal threat of 
the disgruntled employee 
5 
Information 
alteration or 
unauthorized 
modified of 
information 
Can exist from external perpetrator or internal 
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Chapter six: Dubai e-government security 
model 
 
6.1. Introduction  
This chapter aims to address the objectives of developing questionnaire B and the steps 
followed to distribute the survey, collect the data, and analysis the data.  The questionnaire 
was developed for security professionals and practitioners to solicit their industrial 
experience in building the detail of the new model. In addition, a comparison between the 
initial proposed model and the new one based on the findings and results of the survey is 
addressed.   
 
6.2. Questionnaire design 
Questionnaire B was developed to target security professionals and practitioners and to be 
used as a tool for capturing and analyzing their views. The objective of the questionnaire 
was to highlight the internal and external threats on different e-services categories 
(information publishing, one way interactive, and two way interactive and transactional e-
services) and to identify the reasons which might cause a severe impact of these threats. 
Prior to distributing the survey, a thorough analysis was conducted on what might cause 
negative impacts of threats (internal or external), different types of threats which can be 
listed for the participants to select from, the sections of the survey which will need to cover 
different aspects of security related to e-government online services, and the correlation 
which can be drawn between different answers of the questionnaire’s sections. The 
incorporated threats list in the questionnaires were derived from the literature review 
conducted. Some are from the author’s industrial experience in the field of information 
security.  
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6.2.1. Questionnaire aim 
The aim of the questionnaire was to get confirmation from the top security practitioners in 
Dubai on all the layers proposed in the model, sub layers suggested, and the level of their 
importance for the e-government authority. This technical survey included a correlation 
part for all the layers/sub layers with the different categories of the e-government e-
services. The correlation questions assist the author to derive the final model representation 
and confirm the sub layers suggested in it.  
 
6.2.2. Target interviewee 
Since there is a limited number of highly qualified security practitioners who have strong 
background of the security field and known with their credibility in building bullet proof 
security programmes and architectures, the 16 participants for this type of a survey give a 
strong confidence that the number set a credible population. The participants for the survey 
were highly recognized security practitioners in Dubai and in charge of the security/IT 
infrastructure of a government department affiliated with the e-government authority or 
indirectly in contact with it. The qualifications of the participants varies from being 
certified in the information security or having a long experience in the field of IT or 
information security.  
 
6.2.3. Questionnaire content 
Questionnaire B contained around 69 closed questions in 7 sections:  
 
Section 1: e-government questions:  
The objective of this section was to identify the challenges the e-government authority and 
its affiliates are facing. This section has 3 sub sections which are addressing the following:  
 
• e-government portfolio of services:  
Diverse questions were included in this section to identify the challenges an e-government 
department is facing, the contribution of a new model might add in the information sharing, 
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needs of a new model, and the categorizes/maturity level of the e-services the participant e-
government department offers (information publishing, one way interactive, two way 
interactive, and transactional e-services). 
  
• Internal threats list:  
A list of the general internal threats were listed for the participants to select from and an 
option for them to add other threats which may have not been covered in the list. The 
threats mentioned in the list were derived for both the literature reviews conducted through 
the research and the experience of the author. In addition, a table which draws the relation 
between the e-services with the threats associated was constructed and presented in this 
section in order to assist the participant to correlate threats with different e-services 
categories.  
 
• External threats list: 
Similar to the internal threats, a list of all external threats was presented for the participant 
to select from with an option to list other. The process of coming with this list is similar to 
the internal threats. A table of external threats associated with different e-services 
categories was constructed. In addition, a key question was presented in the end of this 
section asking about the causes of the severe impact of any threat (external or internal). The 
objective was to discover different reasons which may be technological, policies related, 
competencies deficiencies, or operational issues.  
 
Section 2: Information security technology:  
Information security technologies play a major role in comprehensive security model or 
system. Unfortunately, the lack of the hybrid security technologies force organisations to 
implement different ones and try to integrate them. Since all technologies can’t be 
implemented in the organisation due to cost related issues and other reasons, a list of the 
most popular technologies was presented to the participants to select from. The selection 
was based on:  
- The current technologies implemented in the organisation architecture. 
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- The importance and being sufficient to provide protection to the organisation.  
The participants were asked to assign percentages on the technologies presented in this 
section in order to know which technologies are rated high and can be part of the first layer 
of the model. In addition the challenges related to the security technologies faced in the 
participants’ organisations were listed for selection.  
 
A key question was asked in this section which is related to the possibility of having all 
security technologies in one layer or not. The objective of this question is to gather a 
consensus on having all the technologies in one layer by group of security practitioners and 
professionals.  
 
Section 3: Information security policies:  
The objective of this section is to identify the key security policies required for a 
comprehensive security system or model and to assign a percentage on each policy based 
on its importance. The participants were asked whether having a second layer for security 
policies in any security model will assist in enhancing the security level of any 
organisation. The objective was to establish the need of the second layer in the new model 
presented in this thesis by the security practitioners who are from the region and have 
interacted with the e-government online services in Dubai.  
 
Two key questions were asked in this section related to the need of applying security 
policies between organisations willing to share information and having a checklist of all 
policies need to be implemented is a good method of assessment of the level of security.  
 
Section 4: Competencies:  
Security competencies are key success factors of any security programme in the 
organisation. The importance of security competencies will be noticed when security 
projects are managed effectively during the implementation. The operational security 
competency will be required after the implementation of any security infrastructure to 
maintain the security procedures. The participants/practitioners were asked to select from a 
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list of security competencies in order to draw a clear picture on the type of competencies 
required for the e-government authority and its affiliates. In addition, the security 
practitioners were asked about their professional opinion on the importance of the 
competency layer in the new model.   
 
Section 5: Information security management and monitoring:  
Information security management and monitoring is a frequently discussed subject in the 
security conferences and seminars such as RSA, NetSec, Blackhat and ISC2 security 
workshops and seminars. Many experts and practitioners emphasise the importance of 
security management and monitoring as a key success factor of any security 
programme/system implemented in the organisation. A survey was taken on the following 
key points in order to confirm the alignment of thoughts when it comes to this area:  
 
¾ The level of importance for the information security management and 
monitoring.  
¾ The link between the strength of security management and monitoring and 
the level of the security in any organisation.  
¾ The area of coverage for the security management and monitoring and 
whether all technologies need management and monitoring or not.  
The strength of security management and monitoring is measured based on:  
¾ Number of incidents handled 
¾ Existence of the standard security operational procedures 
¾ Infrastructure supporting this function 
¾ Response time to incidents  
¾ Correlation of data collected from all security devices 
 
Participants of this questionnaire were asked to select from the above in order to identify 
the most common areas for measuring security management and monitoring.  
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The following list presents the common areas which build a good security management and 
monitoring programme which the participants were asked to select from:   
¾ Operational policies and procedures  
¾ Management tools  
¾ Correlation and data management  
¾ Reporting and response 
¾ Analysis and human intervention 
 
By completing this section, the security management and monitoring layer will be defined 
as part of the model and the sub layer cells will be selected by industrial practitioners of the 
field.  
 
Section 6: Decision factor:  
The decision factor of any security programme plays a major role in determining the 
technologies, policies, competencies, and the level of security monitoring and management. 
How the e-government authority and its affiliates reach decisions related to the security 
programme is what this section is designed to discover. Direct questions were addressed to 
the participants in order to determining how the decision is reached for any security 
technology, policy, competency, and operational procedure. The list below highlights some 
of the elements which will contribute in building the decision for any security programme:  
• Cost factor 
• Background on the security subject 
• Need or want  
• Availability of competencies/technologies and ease of implementation 
• Any other reason the participant might feel to be valid  
 
There are some factors which may change the decision of any security technology, policy, 
or implementation such as:  
¾ Not having enough information on the subject 
¾ Failure to justify the ROI 
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¾ Lack of competencies required for new technologies implemented 
¾ The high cost of implementation, training, and transition from the old security 
infrastructure to new security infrastructure 
¾ Major and core business processes change which will be introduced by the new 
security programme  
These factors were addressed in this section for the participants to identify and select from. 
In addition, the impact of any decision on the technologies and policies implemented was 
checked by addressing direct questions to the participants to analyze their feedback.  
 
To emphasise on the decision factor in any security model, this section of the survey 
checked whether the participants are aware of any model or methodology which addresses 
the importance of the decision in any security programme. The objective was to identify 
any new model or methodology in order to examine and analyze. 
 
 Section 7: Correlation questions:  
A correlation table was set for all the five categories of e-services and the different layers 
of the new security model. The participants were asked to select from the list of 
technologies, policies, competencies, operational and management practices, and decision 
factors abbreviated as A(x), B(x), C(x), D(x), and E(x). Based on this selection, a 
percentage is calculated for each category of e-service and a correlation analysis will be 
done as part of the finding and analysis section. The participants were asked to select based 
on their industrial experience with the different categories of the e-services in Dubai e-
government.  
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The selections were as the followings:  
 
Security technologies (A):  
Table 26: Selected security technologies 
A1 
Access control 
A2 
Intrusion 
Detection and 
prevention 
A3 
Anti-virus & 
malicious and 
prevention 
A4 
Authentication & 
passwords 
A5 
Files integrity & 
checks 
A6 
Cryptography 
A7 
VPN 
A8 
Vulnerability 
scanning tools 
A9 
Digital signature 
and certificates  
A10 
Biometrics 
A11 
Logical Access Control (firewalls) 
A12 
Security protocols 
  
Security policies (B):  
Table 27: Selected security policies 
B1  
Password Management  
B2 
Log-in Process 
B3 
Logs Handling 
B4 
Computer viruses 
B5 
Intellectual Property Rights 
B6 
Data Privacy 
B7 
Privilege Control 
B8 
Data 
confidentiality 
B9 
Data integrity 
B10 
Internet Connectivity 
B11 
Administrative Policies 
B12 
Encryption 
Policies 
B13 
HR Security Policies 
B14 
Third Party Polices 
B15 
Physical Security 
Policies 
B16 
Operation Security 
Policies 
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Security competencies (C ):  
Table 28: Selected security competencies 
C1 
Security Operation and 
Management  
C2 
Security Architecture and 
development  
C3 
Ethical Hacking  
C4 
Security Policies and 
development  
C5 
Computer Forensics 
C6 
Cryptography 
C7 
Security 
Programming 
C8 
Laws and Regulations 
C9 
Security Implementation and Configuration  
C10 
Security Analysis 
 
Security operations and management (D):  
Table 29: Selected security ops and mgmt 
D1 
Operational Policies 
and Procedures 
D2 
Management 
Tools 
D3 
Correlation and data 
mining 
D4 
Reporting and 
Response 
D5 
Analysis and 
human intervention 
 
 
Decision Factors (E):  
Table 30: Selected decision factor 
E1 
Cost 
E2 
Awareness 
E3 
Need  
E4 
Technologies Availability 
E5 
FUD 
 
6.2.3.1. Survey questions:  
The survey contained closed ended questions which were designed to give the participants 
a selection from lists presented for each section and key questions. The lists items as 
aforementioned were selected based on research and literature reviews conducted and based 
on the industrial experience of the author. In addition, the participants were given an option 
to add other ideas, factors, or security hints by filling the field “others” which was 
presented in each list.  
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6.3. Questionnaire pilot 
A pilot questionnaire was designed for questionnaire B to test the length of the questions, 
style, and level of technicality. The pilot questionnaire was sent to seven (7) security 
practitioners and the feedbacks which came from the pilot didn’t indicate any issues related 
to the length or the structure of the questions. However, during the analysis of the actual 
questionnaire, many questions were not answered somehow in the expected way which 
might be due to the way the questions were presented. This was noticed in the technology 
and security policies where participants were asked to put percentages right next to each 
items in each layer. Some participants have put low percentages thinking that all the 
numbers shall be accumulated to a 100% while others understood the question in the right 
way and assigned each item an percentage from 0-100% independently from the others.  
 
6.3.1. Pilot interviewees 
The selection of interviewees of this questionnaire was based on the need of having 
qualified security practitioners who agreed to participate in the pilot and give the 
preliminary feedback on questionnaire.  The criteria of selection for the security 
practitioners was based on the direct and or indirect involvement in the e-government 
initiation, the strong background of the practitioner in the e-government security topic, and 
the number of years, certification, and background level of the security practitioners. Most 
of the security participants who participated in this process have had direct or indirect 
experience with the e-government, governmental departments, or online services offered in 
the country.  
 
6.3.2. Feedback  
The feedback forms came back after the pilot with some corrective comments summarized 
in the following points:  
• The language of some of the questions was weak or didn’t reflect the right objective 
of the question 
• Some questions were vague and didn’t make sense 
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• The questions were relevant and good but sometimes are missing the government 
department context.  
Some of the positive comments are summarized as follows:  
 
• The questions are contributing to the knowledge body of the information security 
field.  
• Length of the questions is suitable for information security practitioners and IT 
executives.  
• To test the value of the questionnaire from research and scientific view, five 
questions were asked addressing the following areas:   
o Coverage of the information security domain: Average of 80% 
o Analytical thinking behind each question: Average of 80% 
o Knowledge contribution in each question: Average of 80% 
o Raising or highlighting issues which are related to the security of 
government: Average of 85% 
o Scientific quality of each question: Average of 90% 
The above areas indicate that the questionnaire was well designed and also was used as a 
tool to address security issues and assisted in giving better view of the different aspect of 
information security.  
 
6.3.3. Changes done to incorporate pilot feedback 
All comments were considered and changes were made to the questionnaire language, 
clearance of the questions, length, and the analytical part of them. The questionnaires were 
given to some colleagues who are well known of having strong critique and a thorough 
review was conducted on every question. The amended questionnaire was then sent to the 
other participants who didn’t comment on the length, clearance, or the scientific value of 
the questions. 
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6.4. Main questionnaire survey 
A total of 16 security practitioners and IT managers/executives, participated in 
“Questionnaire B” survey which was designed to be technical and more related to the 
information security industrial experience. The questionnaire was sent as an attachment 
over email. The role and profiles of the security practitioners who participated were 
changed as some of them took new roles within their organisations while others left their 
organisations and moved other governmental departments. From a research perspective, 
their contribution was still considered valuable to the research as they are considered the 
most knowledgeable of the information security field in the city of Dubai and the ones who 
interacted with the e-government online services.  
 
6.4.1. When questionnaires were collected 
Each participant was given a period of 3 weeks to send his response. Extensive follow up 
was conducted through phone calls, emails, text message, and personal interactions just to 
get the questionnaires on time. Some of the questionnaires came after 2 months from the 
sent date while others came in less than 3 weeks. The long time span for the collection 
process affected the analysis phase and created some data errors which could not be sent 
back to the participant to correct. Most of the participants are so busy and they are 
contributing in a way or another in the transformation of their departments/organisations 
which created a challenge for the research and data collection process.  
 
6.4.2. Who collected them?  
All questionnaires were sent to the author of this document directly through email in order 
to ensure their validity and to check whether all questions are properly answered or not.  
 
6.4.3. Process of collection 
The process of collection was based on using the email as agreed by all participants. There 
was no iterative process of collection as the participants took a long time for answering the 
questions except for those who answered less than 50% of the questions. Only two 
questionnaires were returned for incompletion. 
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6.5. Analysis 
Challenge an e-government is facing in terms of information flow: 
As per the survey results (Figure 41) 8 respondents (50%) stated that the challenges an e-
government is facing in terms of information flow are related to the trust between the e-
government body and the government departments. The 11 respondents (69%) indicated 
that it might be due to no common rule and or standard which control this flow of 
information. Technical challenges were identified by 8 respondents (50%) while 7 
respondents (44%) stated that it is due to the absence of direct relation between the 
government departments and the e-government except on the services the e-government 
offers. Only 5 respondents (31%) stated that it is due to no assurance in data classification 
or declassification. 
  
 
Figure 41: Challenges for e-government information sharing 
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Regarding the opinion of having a standard assessment model for the e-government in 
order to synchronize the level of security for intra or inter communication:  
The results of the survey (Figure 42) identified 14 respondents (87.5%) confirming the 
need and only 2 respondents (112.5%) negating any need of standard assessment.  
 
 
Figure 42: The need of standard assessment 
The impact of the standard security assessment should be positive on the government 
departments and will encourage them to freely exchange information between themselves 
and the e-government authority:  
A total of 14 respondents (87%) stated yes and only 2 respondents (13%) stated no.  
 
Will the cybercrimes which already occurred for the e-government force the 
implementation of the standard security assessment model across the government 
departments?  
A total of 14 respondents (88%) stated yes and a single respondent (6%) stated no.  
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Types of e-services the respondents’ government departments offer:  
The results of the survey (Figure 43) identified that 4 respondents (25%) stated that their 
organisations provide information publishing online service. This service is meant to assist 
the citizen to start the procedure and obtain an e-service or a catalogue of other e-services 
offered by the e-government. The 3 respondents (19%) selected the one way interactive e-
service which is a downloadable from the government department portal. A transactional e-
service where users can perform functional transactions through the government 
department portal was selected by only 3 respondents (19%). Only 7 respondents (44%) 
selected the combination of all e-services. 
  
 
Figure 43: E-services offered government departments 
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6.5.1. Internal threats: 
The following table indicates the internal threats identified by the survey participants: 
 
Table 31: Internal threats 
Threat Resp Perc 
Disgruntled employees having access to non-authorized information 
resources. 
14 88% 
Viruses spread intentionally or unintentionally by e-government staff 11 69% 
Loss or corruption of data caused to applications/OS malfunctions, 
database issues, etc. 
8 50% 
Failure of restoration after a major unplanned shutdown due to weak 
operational and recovery procedures. 
6 38% 
Exposure of classified data to unauthorized staff due to a failure of 
encryption system. 
8 50% 
Lack of security and operational competency due to the introduction of 
new e-services or new technologies supporting the new services. 
14 88% 
High mobility of the e-government staff which will increase the threat of 
accessibility 
3 19% 
Leakage of information or espionage related to the privacy of the citizen 
or public users through electronic transfer, physical leakage through 
medium handing over, or oral information exchange. 
10 63% 
Data and records alteration related to public users or governmental 
departments. 
8 50% 
Attacks on all mission critical systems, and processes from within the 
governmental departments. 
6 38% 
Industrial spies and governmental espionage conducted by internal 
terrorist and spies working within the governmental departments. 
4 25% 
Information dealers looking for classified and sensitive information of 
public users/citizens, or other governmental departments. 
7 44% 
Others 0 0 
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Figure 44: Internal threats 
The following section discusses the internal threats related to different types of e-services 
offered by the e-government:  
 
6.5.1.1. Internal threats on information publishing e-services:  
 
Figure 45: Internal threats-information publishing e-services 
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6.5.1.2. Internal threats on one way interactive e-services:  
 
Figure 46: Internal threats-one way interactive e-services 
 
6.5.1.3. Internal threats on two way interactive e-services: 
 
Figure 47: Internal threats-two way interactive e-services 
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6.5.1.4. Internal threats on transactional e-services:  
 
Figure 48: Internal threats-transactional e-services 
 
6.5.2. External threats:  
The following diagram indicates the external threats identified by the survey participants 
External threats 
 
Figure 49: External threats 
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6.5.2.1. External threats on information publishing e-services: 
 
Figure 50: External threats-information publishing e-services 
 
6.5.2.2. External Threats on One Way Interactive e-Services: 
 
Figure 51: External threats- one way interactive e-services 
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6.5.2.3. External threats on two way interactive e-services: 
 
Figure 52: External threats-two-way interactive e-services 
 
6.5.2.4. External threats on transactional e-services: 
 
Figure 53: External threats-transactional e-services 
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6.5.3. External and internal threats:  
The results of the survey (Figure 54) identified that 16 respondents (10%) stated that the 
severe impact of any threat whether it is external or internal will be due to the lack of 
security knowledge in how to handle an incident. Twelve (12) respondents (75%) selected 
the lack of proactive security systems which can reduce the impact and contain the risk, 
whilst 11 respondents (69%) selected the lack of strong security operational and 
management systems which assist in the vigilant monitoring of the infrastructure.  Another 
12 respondents (75%) stated that weak security and IT infrastructure which is vulnerable to 
any level of attacks or security threats will cause a severe impact of any threat. Only 4 
respondents stated that it might be related to the high dependency on the security systems 
in running the business operation whilst only 2 respondents (13%) stated that it is due to the 
direct link between the internal e-government infrastructures to the external parties 
interacting with it. 
  
 
Figure 54: Severe impact of threats 
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6.5.4. Analysis on information security technology:  
The results of the survey (Figure 55) identified 8 respondents (50%) confirming that all 
necessary security technologies are implemented in their organisation whilst 7 respondents 
(44%) are negating that. Only 2 respondents (13%) stated that some security technologies 
are implemented.  
 
The implementation of the security architecture in the government departments (Figure 
55):  
• Access control (A1) and logical access control (firewalls) (A11) were rated the 
highest implemented security technologies in most organisations as it got a 100% 
selection of the survey respondents. 
• Intrusion Detection and Prevention (A2), Anti-Virus and Malicious codes scanners 
(A3), Authentication and passwords (A4) were the second highest with 88% of the 
survey respondents’ selection.  
• 12 Respondents (75%) selected VPN whilst 7 respondents (44%) selected 
vulnerability scanning tools (A8), digital signature and digital certificates (A9).  
• Only 6 respondents (38%) selected cryptography whilst 2 respondents (13%) 
selected file integrity checks.  
 
Figure 55: Security technologies implemented in government department 
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6.5.4.1. Cybercrime security counter measures   
• It is strange that when it came to rate the sufficient technologies for the organisation 
which will provide enough protection the rates were different. Access control (A1) 
and logical access control (firewalls) (A11) which were selected as the highest 
technologies implemented in government departments dropped from 100% to 94%.  
• Intrusion detection and prevention (A2), Anti-virus and malicious codes scanners 
(A3), and authentication and passwords (A4) dropped from 88% as implementation 
rate to 63% -75%.  
• File integrity was having a low rate of implementation (13%) yet was given a higher 
rate as a sufficient security technology which will provide good protection (31%).  
• In general most technologies were given good rate when selected as sufficient to 
provide protection. The key observation that there was no technology out of the list 
which was found insufficient.  
 
 
Figure 56: Sufficient security technologies 
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6.5.4.2.  The unnecessary technologies for building a security system:  
The results of the survey (Figure 57) identified 6 respondents (38%) stated that biometrics 
technology is not necessary, 4 respondents selected files integrity and checks, 2 
respondents (13%) selected anti-virus, cryptography, vulnerability scanning and digital 
signature as unnecessary to build a security system. The selection might be based on the 
industrial experience of the respondents yet it does not show high rates as most of the 
technologies were found essential for building a security system. 
  
 
Figure 57: Security technologies 
 
6.5.4.3. The coexistence of all security  
• The results showed that 14 respondents (88%) stated that it is not necessary to have 
all technologies in one layer of a model whilst 2 respondents (13%) answered with 
yes.  
• Rating the technological security level by the number of security technologies 
available in any organisation:  
• A total of 7 respondents (44%) stated yes while 8 respondents (50%) answered with 
no.  
 
171 
6.5.4.4. Technologies importance:  
Access Control (A1):  
• 5 respondents (31%) have given the technology between 0–19% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated it between 20–39 %  
• 1 respondent (6%) rated it between 40-59% 
• 9 respondents (56%) rated it between 80-100% 
 
Intrusion Detection & Prevention (A2):  
• 4 respondents (25%) rated the technology between 0-19% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated it between 20-39% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated it between 40-59% 
• 3 respondents (19%) rated between 60-79% 
• 6 respondents (38%) rated between 80-100% 
 
Anti-Virus & Malicious Codes Scanners (A3): 
• 6 respondents (38%) rated the technology between 0-19% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated it between 20-39% 
• 1 respondents (6%) rated between 60-79% 
• 8 respondents (50%) rated between 80-100% 
 
Authentication & Passwords (A4): 
• 6 respondents (25%) rated the technology between 0-19% 
• 1 respondents (6%) rated it between 20-39% 
• 9 respondents (56%) rated between 80-100% 
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Files Integrity Checks (A5):  
• 8 respondents (50%) rated the technology between 0-19% 
• 3 respondents (19%) rated it between 20-39% 
• 2 respondent (13%) rated it between 40-59% 
• 4 respondents (25%) rated between 80-100% 
 
Cryptography (A6): 
• 7 respondents (44%) rated the technology between 0-19% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated it between 20-39% 
• 3 respondent (19%) rated it between 40-59% 
• 3 respondents (19%) rated between 60-79% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated between 80-100% 
 
VPN (A7): 
• 7 respondents (44%) rated the technology between 0-19% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated it between 20-39% 
• 4 respondent (25%) rated it between 40-59% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated between 60-79% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated between 80-100% 
 
Vulnerability Scanning Tools (A8):  
• 5 respondents (31%) rated the technology between 0-19% 
• 1 respondents (6%) rated it between 20-39% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated it between 40-59% 
• 6 respondents (38%) rated between 60-79% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated between 80-100% 
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Digital Signature and Digital Certificates (A9):  
• 7 respondents (44%) rated the technology between 0-19% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated it between 20-39% 
• 4 respondent (25%) rated it between 40-59% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated between 60-79% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated between 80-100% 
 
Biometrics (A10):  
• 6 respondents (38%) rated the technology between 0-19% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated it between 20-39% 
• 7 respondent (44%) rated it between 40-59% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated between 60-79% 
 
Logical Access Control (Firewalls) (A11):  
• 5 respondents (31%) rated the technology between 0-19% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated it between 20-39% 
• 2 respondent (13%) rated it between 40-59% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated between 60-79% 
• 6 respondents (38%) rated between 80-100% 
 
Security Protocols (A12):  
• 6 respondents (38%) rated the technology between 0-19% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated it between 20-39% 
• 5 respondent (31%) rated it between 40-59% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated between 60-79% 
• 1 respondents (6%) rated between 80-100% 
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6.5.4.5.  Security level between A and B  
Let’s assume the scenario of organisations a and b exchanging business information over 
the internet on a frequent basis, do you feel both organisations must have the same level of 
security technology:  
 
The results of the survey (Figure 58) identified 6 respondents (38%) stated yes while 5 
respondents (31%) stated no. Only 2 respondents (13%) were not sure while 3 respondents 
(19%) selected to a certain level.  
 
 
Figure 58: Security alignment between government departments 
 
6.5.4.6.  Having multiple security measures in a single layer 
• A total of 13 respondents (81%) stated no while only 3 respondents (19%) stated 
yes.  
• This highlights the importance of having other aspects than technologies in the 
security system. Technology layer can’t be the only layer which will resolve all 
security issues.  
 
 
6.5.4.7.  Technology challenges:  
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The results of the survey (Figure 59) identified 8 respondents (50%) stated that it is due to 
the lack of competencies related to the technology applied. The 11 respondents (69%) 
selected the lack of the lack of security policies as the main reason, 10 respondents (63%) 
selected the lack of in-depth threat analysis done prior to any technology implementation, 
10 respondents (63%) stated that it is due to the lack of management and monitoring, 9 
respondents (56%) stated it is due to decision is always based on commercial aspects not 
technical/security requirements, 8 respondents (50%) selected the integration with other 
technologies, 5 respondents (31%) said it is due to placing the right technology in the 
wrong place and a single respondent highlighted that it might be due to other reasons.  
 
 
Figure 59: Challenges with Technologies 
 
 
 
6.5.4.8.  Information flow security condition:  
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• A total of 8 Respondents (50%) agreed while 8 respondents did not agree. This is a split 
in the professional opinions from the security practitioners.  
 
6.5.4.9.  Security model existence:  
• A total of 3 respondents (19%) stated that they have come across a model while 5 
respondents (31%) stated that they have not seen any model.  
 
6.5.4.10. Security assessment requirement  
• A total of 15 respondents (94%) (Figure 60) confirmed that such a model is required and 
only a single respondent negated.  
 
Figure 60:  The need of a comprehensive security model 
 
6.5.4.11.  Factors of security breaches  
• A total of 9 respondents (56%) (Figure 61) stated that it is due to the lack of security 
level matching (org A might be higher than org B in the security level). The reason of not 
having enough protection measures applied was selected by 13 respondents (81%) whilst 
6 respondents (38%) stated it is due to the declassification of information from one side. 
The 12 respondents (75%) stated that it is due to technical security breaches or flaws. 
Over trusting the Internet by sending information or allowing communication in clear text 
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was selected by 13 respondents (81%) whilst 8 respondents (50%) stated that the reason 
will be due to no common security model/system applied in both organisations.  
 
 
Figure 61: Reasons for Security Breaches 
 
6.5.5. Analysis of information security policies 
The importance of the security policy in relations to the full security system in any 
organisation was rated as:  
• A total of 5 respondents (31%) stated that security policies are important while 6 
respondents (38%) stated it is very important.  
• 14 respondents (88%) stated that the degree of relation between the information security 
policy and the information security technology is complementary while 3 
respondents (19%) stated that they are related.  
• A total of 15 respondents (94%) agreed that the coexistence of both the technology layer 
and the policy layer in one model will assist the security system to be more effective. A 
single respondent didn’t agree. 
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Importance rating for the security policies: 
 
Password management (B1) 
• 5 respondents (31%) rated this policy between 0-19% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated the policy between 20-39% 
• 3 respondents (19%) rated the policy between 60-79% 
• 7 respondents (44%) rated the policy between 80-100% 
Login process (B2) 
• 9 respondents (31%) rated this policy between 0-19% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated the policy between 40-59% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated the policy between 60-79% 
• 3 respondents (19%) rated the policy between 80-100% 
Logs handling (B3) 
• 4 respondents (25%) rated this policy between 0-19% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated the policy between 20-39% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated the policy between 40-59% 
• 4 respondents (25%) rated the policy between 60-79% 
• 5 respondents (31%) rated the policy between 80-100% 
Computer viruses (B4) 
• 6 respondents (38%) rated this policy between 0-19% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated the policy between 40-59% 
• 8 respondents (50%) rated the policy between 80-100% 
Intellectual property rights (B5) 
• 11 respondents (69%) rated this policy between 0-19% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated the policy between 60-79% 
• 3 respondents (19%) rated the policy between 80-100% 
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Data privacy (B6) 
• 5 respondents (31%) rated this policy between 0-19% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated the policy between 40-59% 
• 3 respondents (19%) rated the policy between 60-79% 
• 6 respondents (38%) rated the policy between 80-100% 
Privilege control (B7) 
• 6 respondents (38%) rated this policy between 0-19% 
• 1 respondents (6%) rated the policy between 40-59% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated the policy between 60-79% 
• 7 respondents (44%) rated the policy between 80-100% 
Data confidentiality (B8) 
• 7 respondents (44%) rated this policy between 0-19% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated the policy between 60-79% 
• 7 respondents (44%) rated the policy between 80-100% 
Data integrity (B9) 
• 8 respondents (50%) rated this policy between 0-19% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated the policy between 20-39% 
• 1 respondents (6%) rated the policy between 40-59% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated the policy between 60-79% 
• 4 respondents (25%) rated the policy between 80-100% 
Internet connectivity (B10) 
• 7 respondents (44%) rated this policy between 0-19% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated the policy between 20-39% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated the policy between 40-59% 
• 4 respondents (25%) rated the policy between 60-79% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated the policy between 80-100% 
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Administrative policies (B11) 
• 6 respondents (38%) rated this policy between 0-19% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated the policy between 20-39% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated the policy between 40-59% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated the policy between 60-79% 
• 5 respondents (31%) rated the policy between 80-100% 
Encryption policies (B12) 
• 8 respondents (50%) rated this policy between 0-19% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated the policy between 20-39% 
• 3 respondents (19%) rated the policy between 40-59% 
• 3 respondents (19%) rated the policy between 60-79% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated the policy between 80-100% 
HR security policies (B13) 
• 6 respondents (38%) rated this policy between 0-19% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated the policy between 20-39% 
• 3 respondents (19%) rated the policy between 40-59% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated the policy between 60-79% 
• 5 respondents (31%) rated the policy between 80-100% 
Third party policies (B14) 
• 7 respondents (44%) rated this policy between 0-19% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated the policy between 20-39% 
• 3 respondents (19%) rated the policy between 40-59% 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated the policy between 60-79% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated the policy between 80-100% 
Physical security policies (B15) 
• 5 respondents (31%) rated this policy between 0-19% 
• 1 respondent (6%) rated the policy between 20-39% 
• 4 respondents (25%) rated the policy between 60-79% 
• 6 respondents (38%) rated the policy between 80-100% 
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Operation security policies (B16) 
• 2 respondents (13%) rated this policy between 0-19% 
• 2 respondent (13%) rated the policy between 20-39% 
• 3 respondents (19%) rated the policy between 40-59% 
• 4 respondents (25%) rated the policy between 60-79% 
• 6 respondents (38%) rated the policy between 80-100% 
 
6.5.5.1. Security breaches and violation of security policies:  
• A total of 13 respondents (81%) agreed that violation to the security policies will 
lead to security breaches whilst only 3 respondents (19%) didn’t agree.  
 
• A total of 16 respondents (100%) agreed that if two organisations are interacting 
with each other over the Internet, they must have enough assurance that they have 
applied the appropriate security policies in order to maintain the confidentiality,  
integrity and availability of the information.  
 
• A total of 16 respondents (100%) agreed that having a checklist for the security 
policy implemented is a good method to assess the level of security for any 
organisation prior the exchange over the Internet is a good model to adopt. 
  
6.5.6. Analysis of security competencies 
• A total of 2 respondents (13%) stated that security competency is more important 
than the technical competency in the organisation, 6 respondents (38%) stated that 
security is as important as IT, and 8 respondents (50%) stated it is more important 
than IT.  
 
• A total of 13 respondents (81%) confirmed that the lack of security competencies in 
the organisation will be the root cause of security breaches. Only 3 respondents 
(19%) stated that it is not linked.  
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• Having a standard or a method to assist the organisation to maintain a high level of 
security competencies was agreed by 9 respondents (56%) and disagreed by 9 
respondents (56%).  
 
• A total of 13 respondents (81%) confirmed that they have experienced a security 
incident due to the lack of the security competency whilst 3 respondents (19%) 
negated that.  
 
• A total of 8 respondents (50%) confirmed that the outsourcing of security function 
in their organisation is due to the lack of competency while 8 respondents (50%) 
denied that.  
 
6.5.6.1. Method of competency assessment:  
• A total of 14 respondents (88%) stated that it is based on the total number of 
experience in the security field, 7 respondents (44%) stated that it is related to the 
number of security certifications in the department of security, 7 respondents (44%) 
stated it is related to the number of security trainings attended, and 9 respondents 
(56%) believed that it is the total number years in the IT field.  
 
• Assessing the security competency in an organisation is a good method for 
identifying the level of security of an organisation. This method was agreed on 
(Figure 62) by 13 respondents (81%) whilst disagreed with by only 3 respondents 
(19%).  
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Figure 62: Security competencies as an assessment method 
 
6.5.6.2.  The mandatory security competencies required in any organisation  
• A total of 16 respondents (100%) (Figure 63) agreed that security operation and 
management (C1) is a mandatory competency to have in any organisation. The 12 
respondents (75%) stated that security architecture and development (C2) is a must 
to have whilst another 12 respondents (75%) stated its security policies 
development (C4). The security implementation and configuration (C9) competency 
was selected as the second highest competency required by 14 respondents (88%), 9 
respondents (56%) stated that security analysis (C10) is important, 6 respondents 
(C8) stated it is laws and regulations, 5 respondents (C3) stated ethical hacking. 
Computer Forensics (C5) and cryptography (C6) competencies were selected by 4 
respondents (25%) and only 3 respondents (19%) selected security programming.  
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Figure 63: Mandatory security competencies 
• Having a security competency layer as a part of a security model will enhance the 
security level of an organisation as a complement to other important layers also was 
agreed by 16 respondents (100%).  
• A total of 15 respondents (94%) confirmed that there is a direct link between 
security competencies and security technologies implemented in any organisation.  
 
6.5.7. Analysis of information security management and monitoring  
• A total of 8 respondents (50%) stated that information security management and 
monitoring is very important, 7 respondents (44%) stated that it is important but not 
essential, whilst a single respondent stated it is not important.  
• Information security and management must be there for all security technologies 
implemented as per the opinion of 12 respondents (75%) while it is not necessary to 
have by 4 respondents (25%).  
• A total of 14 respondents (88%) stated that there is a direct link between strength of 
the security programme/system in any organisation and the strength of the security. 
Only a single respondent stated that there is no direct link between the two.  
• Having a good level of security management and monitoring can give a good 
indication of the strength of the security competency, policies, and technologies in 
the organisation was agreed by 14 respondents (88%) whilst not agreed by 2 
respondents (13%).  
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6.5.7.1.  Strength of the security management and monitoring:  
• 6 respondents (38%) (Figure 64) identified that the strength of the security 
management and monitoring is measure based on the number of incidents handled, 
13 respondents (81%) stated it is based on the existence of the standard security 
operation procedure, 10 respondents (63%) stated it is based on infrastructure 
supporting this function, 13 respondents (81%) stated it is based on response time to 
incidents, and 11 respondents (69%) stated it is based on correlation of data 
collected from all security devices.  
 
 
Figure 64: Strength measurement of security management 
• A total of 11 respondents (69%) stated that having organisation A and B 
exchanging information over the Internet will stress the need of security 
management and monitoring. Only 5 respondents (31%) disagreed with this 
statement.  
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6.5.7.2.  Components of the security management and monitoring layer:  
• The results of the survey (Figure 65) identified 16 respondents (100%) selected 
operational policies and procedures (D1), 10 respondents (63%) selected 
management tools (D2), 14 respondents selected correlation and data management 
(D3), 13 respondents (81%) selected reporting and responses (D4), and 10 
respondents (63%) stated it is analysis and human intervention (D5).  
 
 
Figure 65: Components of security management and monitoring 
• A total of 14 respondents (88%) confirmed that having security operation and 
management as part of the risk assessment model is the right thing to do. Only 1 
respondent (6%) didn’t agree with that.  
• Security operation and management was given an importance rate between 50-70% 
by 6 respondents (38%) and a rate of 70-100% by 10 respondents (63%).  
• A total of 5 respondents (31%) stated that they have experienced security incidents 
which were due to lack of security operations and management, 5 respondents 
(31%) stated no, while 3 respondents (19%) could not answer this question.  
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• Having a security operation and management as a local competency in the 
organisation was confirmed by 10 respondents (63%) and only 7 respondents (44%) 
stated that it is outsourced.  
 
6.5.8. Analysis of decision factor:  
Factors will assist in reaching the decision for selecting or considering a security 
technology, policy, operational procedure, or hiring a resource with certain 
security competency:  
• A total of 10 respondents (63%) stated that it is based on the cost factor, 9 
respondents (56%) stated that it is based on the background of the security subject, 
11 respondents stated that it is based on being a need or a want, and 12 respondents 
relied on the availability of competencies/technologies and ease of implementation 
(Figure 66). 
 
Figure 66: Decision factors 
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6.5.8.1. Decision Factors  
• Not having enough information on the subject was identified by 9 respondents 
(56%) (Figure 67) as a factor which may affect the decision process. The 8 
respondents (50%) stated that not having an ROI justification will affect the 
decision, 6 respondents (38%) selected the lack of competencies on the technology 
within the organisation, 9 respondents (56%) selected high cost of implementation, 
training, and transition, and 9 respondents (56%) selected major and core business 
processes change.  
 
Figure 67: Factors affect the security decision 
 
• A total of 9 respondents (56%) stated that decision on the technology layer of any 
security system for an organisation will have a deep impact on the competencies, 
policies, and operations. Only 7 respondents (44%) stated that no impact will be 
there if the decision was carefully studied.  
• A total of 10 respondents (63%) stated that taking a decision to adopt some policies 
and leave others in any organisation might defeat the security programme whilst 6 
respondents (38%) saw no effect will be there if the security technologies were well 
architected.  
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• The decision on the security programme of any organisation will have an effect on 
the method of communication and interaction the organisation has with others as 
confirmed by 9 respondents (56%) and disagreed with by 7 respondents (44%).  
• A total of 14 respondents (88%) confirmed that the decision factor can be one of the 
factors an organisation must be assessed on as part of any security assessment 
programme while a single respondent didn’t believe so.  
• Ten (10) respondents (63%) confirmed that there is no method of having the 
security decision layered on technologies, policies, and competencies so it does not 
create a severe impact on the overall security programme in the organisation. Only 
5 respondents (31%) confirmed that there is a method but didn’t mention it.  
• The objective of limiting and synchronizing the decision making process between 
two organisations A and B communicating/exchanging information with each other 
can be achieved as stated by 9 respondents (56%) while 3 respondents (19%) stated 
that this can’t be achieved.  
• A total of 7 respondents (44%) confirmed that they have experienced a security 
breach in their organisation which was directly or indirectly related to a wrong 
decision made on the security programme/system of the organisation, 9 respondents 
(56%) stated that this was not experienced.  
 
6.6. Analysis of the correlation questions related to different services:  
6.6.1. Reasons for low usability of e-services  
• The number of participants answered this section of the questionnaire was 10 out of 
the total of 16 participants (63%).  This might be due to the low frequency of the 
information publish e-service use which might be indirectly due to the low quality 
of the content of the portals.  
• The percentage of each sub layer was taken by dividing over the number 
participants participated in this section (10) not the total number of the survey 
participants (16).  
• Achieving a 40% of an applicability rate will give a strong support to implement the 
security measure in the organization. The rate of 40% was determined to be the 
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lowest acceptable level for any security measure applicability rate/percentage. This 
will be applied on all e-services surveyed and it is based on the industrial 
experience. The rate might be changed from a security practitioner to another. The 
observation of having some sub layers lower than others will remain the same as 
security practitioners select based on their perception of how a security measure 
will mitigate a security threat.  
 
6.6.2. Information publishing e-services: 
  
Table 32: Information publishing e-services 
Layer  Sub layers/Cells 
A1  A2  A3  A4  A5  A6  A7  A8  A9  A10  A11  A12         
Technology  
50%  80%  50%  20%  40%  20%  10%  60%  30%  10%  100%  10%         
B1  B2  B3  B4  B5  B6  B7  B8  B9  B10  B11  B12  B13  B14  B15  B16 
Policies 
50%  30%  70%  40%  20%  30%  20%  30%  60%  40%  60%  30%  20%  40%  70%  80% 
C1  C2  C3  C4  C5  C6  C7  C8  C9  C10             
Competencies 
80%  70%  60%  50%  30%  20%  20%  50%  90%  50%             
D1  D2  D3  D4  D5                       Operational 
Mgmnt 
80%  70%  60%  80%  50%                       
E1  E2  E3  E4  E5                       Decision 
Factor 
70%  60%  70%  60%  0%                       
 
• The applicability survey results show the following:  
• In the technology layer the following security technological measures were rated 
low:  
o Authentication and Passwords (A4) (20%)  
o Cryptography (A6) (20%) 
o VPN (A7) (10%) 
o Digital Signature and certificates (A9) (30%) 
o Biometrics (A10) (10%) 
o Security Protocol (A12) (10%) 
 
191 
• In the policy layer the following policies were rated low:  
o Login Process (B2) (30%) 
o Intellectual Property Rights (B5) (20%) 
o Data Privacy (B6) (30%) 
o Privilege Control (B7) (20%) 
o Data Confidentiality (B8) (30%) 
o Encryption Policies (B12) (30%) 
o HR Security Policies (B13) (20%) 
• In the competency layer the following competencies were found unnecessary:  
o Computer Forensics (C5) (30%) 
o Cryptography (C6) (20%) 
o Security Programming (C7) (20%) 
• In the decision factors layer, the following factor was found unnecessary:  
o FUD (E5) (0%) 
 
The security measures given a low percentage were justified as they were unrelated to an 
information publishing e-service. Some of the security measures given low percentages 
might be found needed if the information publishing online service is designed for selected 
partners and key customers and contains sensitive information which is meant to be 
accessed only by authorized users. Such security measures like the security programming, 
computer forensics, encryption, authentication and passwords, and intellectual property 
protection policies will be required to provide strong protection and add to the reliability of 
the e-service. The Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt (FUD) can’t be a strong decision factor 
affecting the other security measures since the information publishing e-service is well 
known to most IT executives and management.  
 
 
 
 
 
192 
6.6.3. One way interactive e-services: 
Table 33: One-way interactive e-services 
 
• In the technology layer the following security technological measures were rated 
low:  
o Cryptography (A6) (30%) 
o VPN (A7) (20%) 
o Biometrics (A10) (20%) 
o Security Protocol (A12) (20%) 
• In the policy layer the following policies were rated low:  
o Intellectual Property Rights (B5) (20%) 
o Data Privacy (B6) (20%) 
o Privilege Control (B7) (20%) 
o Encryption Policies (B12) (30%) 
o HR Security Policies (B13) (20%) 
• In the competency layer the following competencies were found unnecessary:  
o Computer Forensics (C5) (30%) 
o Cryptography (C6) (20%) 
o Security Programming (C7) (20%) 
 
 
 
Layer  Sub layers/Cells 
A1  A2  A3  A4  A5  A6  A7  A8  A9  A10  A11  A12         
Technology  
70%  100%  50%  80%  50%  30%  20%  70%  40%  20%  90%  20%         
B1  B2  B3  B4  B5  B6  B7  B8  B9  B10  B11  B12  B13  B14  B15  B16 
Policies 
70%  90%  70%  40%  20%  30%  20%  30%  60%  40%  60%  30%  20%  40%  70%  80% 
C1  C2  C3  C4  C5  C6  C7  C8  C9  C10             
Competencies 
80%  70%  60%  50%  30%  20%  20%  50%  90%  50%             
D1  D2  D3  D4  D5                       Operational 
Mgmnt  80%  70%  60%  80%  50%                       
E1  E2  E3  E4  E5                       Decision 
Factor  70%  60%  70%  60%  0%                       
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• In the decision factors layer, the following factor was found unnecessary:  
o FUD (E5) (0%) 
The one way interactive e-service is an online service which allows forms to be 
downloadable to the users’ computers in order to apply for a government service. All 
security measures rated low made sense from security practice point of view. The Fear, 
Uncertainty, and Doubt (FUD) have no effect on the other layers and sub layers as the 
services is well known to IT executives and management.  
 
6.6.4. Two way interactive e-services:  
Table 34: Two way interactive e-services 
Layer  Sub layers/Cells 
A1  A2  A3  A4  A5  A6  A7  A8  A9  A10  A11  A12         
Technology  
80%  70%  60%  70%  70%  30%  20%  60%  60%  20%  80%  50%         
B1  B2  B3  B4  B5  B6  B7  B8  B9  B10  B11  B12  B13  B14  B15  B16 
Policies 
80%  80%  60%  70%  50%  60%  60%  70%  70%  60%  40%  50%  40%  50%  60%  80% 
C1  C2  C3  C4  C5  C6  C7  C8  C9  C10             
Competencies 
90%  80%  80%  60%  60%  60%  50%  50%  90%  50%             
D1  D2  D3  D4  D5                       Operational 
Mgmnt  90%  90%  60%  80%  70%                       
E1  E2  E3  E4  E5                       
Decision Factor 
70%  70%  90%  70%  10%                       
 
• In the technology layer the following security technological measures were rated 
low:  
o Cryptography (A6) (30%) 
o VPN (A7) (20%) 
o Biometrics (A10) (20%) 
• In the decision factors layer, the following factor was found unnecessary:  
o FUD (E5) (10%) 
It can be noticed that the more interactive the e-service will be, the more security measures 
it will require. The technological security measures rated low can be argued as 
cryptography and VPN might be needed if the forms are classified and the information 
filled is private to the citizen. 
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6.6.5.  Transactional e-services: 
  
Table 35: Transactional e-services 
 
 The only security measure rated low in the transactional e-service survey was the 
biometrics (A10) (30%) which might be due to the lack of implementation of such 
technology in the region. The author can argue that such a technology can be useful for 
enhancing the accessibility control to terminals or laptops used for online transactions. In 
addition, since most of the online transactions are conducted over the Internet using SSL 
and applications layer security, the biometrics technology was not found popular in Dubai. 
It is mainly used for physical security access control which is a narrowed implementation 
of its broaden capabilities. 
Layer  Sub layers/Cells 
A1  A2  A3  A4  A5  A6  A7  A8  A9  A10  A11  A12         
Technology 
80%  70%  60%  90%  90%  60%  40%  70%  80%  30%  80%  60%         
B1  B2  B3  B4  B5  B6  B7  B8  B9  B10  B11  B12  B13  B14  B15  B16 
Policies 
80%  90%  90%  80%  60%  70%  80%  80%  80%  60%  80%  80%  40%  50%  50%  80% 
C1  C2  C3  C4  C5  C6  C7  C8  C9  C10             
Competencies 
100%  90%  60%  60%  60%  60%  50%  80%  90%  60%             
D1  D2  D3  D4  D5                       Operational 
Mgmnt  70%  80%  80%  80%  70%                       
E1  E2  E3  E4  E5                       Decision 
Factor  70%  60%  90%  80%  60%                       
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6.6.6. Combination of all services: 
Table 36: Combination of all services 
Layer  Sub layers/Cells 
A1  A2  A3  A4  A5  A6  A7  A8  A9  A1
0  A11 
A1
2         
Technology  
100
%  70%  80%  90% 
100
% 
80
% 
50
%  70%  90% 
30
% 
100
% 
70
%         
B1  B2  B3  B4  B5  B6  B7  B8  B9  B1
0  B11 
B1
2 
B1
3 
B1
4 
B1
5  B16 
Policies 
90%  90%  90%  70%  80%  80
% 
90
%  90% 
100
% 
80
%  90% 
80
% 
60
% 
70
% 
90
% 
100
% 
C1  C2  C3  C4  C5  C6  C7  C8  C9  C1
0             Competenci
es  100
% 
100
%  90%  80%  80% 
70
% 
60
% 
100
% 
100
% 
60
%             
D1  D2  D3  D4  D5                       
Operational 
Mgmnt  90%  90%  100
%  70%  80%                       
E1  E2  E3  E4  E5                       
Decision 
Factor  80%  70%  100
% 
100
%  10%                       
 
The only security technology was found low in the applicability is the Biometrics. 
Although there is a strong campaign to promote Biometrics in Dubai, it was observed that 
the security practitioners participated in the survey strongly believe that the technology is 
not needed for the government online services. This might be due to the lack of 
implementations or by being a complementary measure if all measures are put in place. 
Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt (FUD) was the only sub layer and security factor found 
unnecessary in the survey conducted for all types of e-services or the combination of all of 
them. This depicts that the security factors which can affect the other layers or aspects of 
the security programme are cost, need, awareness, and technological availability. 
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Table 37: The model key 
Category Category 
Access Control  A1 Intrusion Detection and Prevention A2 
Anti Virus and Malicious Code A3 Authentication and Passwords A4 
Files and Integrity Check A5 Cryptography A6 
VPN A7 Vulnerability Scanning Tools A8 
Digital Signatures and Certificates A9 Biometrics A10 
T
e
ch
n
o
lo
g
y
 
Logical Access Control (Firewalls) A11 Security Protocol A12 
Password Management  B1 Log-in Process B2 
Logs Handling  B3 Computer Viruses B4 
Intellectual Property Rights B5 Data Privacy B6 
Privilege Control  B7 Data Confidentiality B8 
Data Integrity B9 Internet Connectivity B10 
Administrative Policies B11 Encryption Policies B12 
HR Security Policies B13 Third Party Policies B14 
P
o
li
ci
e
s 
Physical Security Policies B15 Operation Security Policies B16 
Security Operation and management  C1 Security Architecture and development C2 
Ethical Hacking  C3 Security Policies and development  C4 
Computer Forensics C5 Cryptography C6 
Security Programming  C7 Laws and regulation  C8 
C
o
m
p
e
te
n
ci
e
s 
Security Implementation and Configuration  C9 Security Analysis C10 
Operational Policies and Procedures D1 Management Tools D2 
Correlation and data mining D3 Reporting and Response D4 
O
PS
 m
g
m
t 
Analysis and Human intervention  D5 
Cost  E1 Awareness E2 
Need E3 Technologies Availability E4 
D
ec
is
io
n
 
FUD   E5       
 
 
6.7. Results/Observations  
¾ A total of 50% of the participants of questionnaire B confirmed that the challenges 
an e-government is facing in terms of information flow and sharing are related to 
the low trust between the e-government body and government departments.  
¾  A total of 69% of the participants indicated that it might be due to the lack of 
common rules or standards which control the flow of information.  
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¾ A high percentage of participants (88%) confirmed the need of a standard 
assessment model for the e-government in order to synchronize the level of the 
security for intra and inter communication. This confirms that the new model will 
find a good level of acceptance among the security practitioners. The positive 
impact of the standard security assessment on the government department in 
encouraging them to exchange information between themselves and the government 
authority was confirmed by 88% of the participants.  
¾ The majority of the respondents (47%) indicated that the combination of all e-
services is what the e-government departments offer.  
¾ A further analysis was conducted based on the top internal and external threats 
occurred in the survey conducted for the 5 areas (general, information publishing, 
one or two ways interactive, and transactional). A frequency rate of at least 4 times 
was chosen to selected the most frequent threats out of the top 7 threats appearing in 
all the five areas. 
¾ The top 7 internal threats for an organisation offering information publishing 
online services are disgruntled employees, viruses, leakage of information, failure 
of restoration, lack of security competency, information dealers looking for 
classified and sensitive information, and loss or corruption of data. 
¾ The  top 7 internal threats for an e-government organisation offering a one way 
interactive e-service were viruses, failure of restoration, lack of security 
competency, leakage of information,  the high mobility of the government staff 
from their roles, disgruntled employees, and mission critical attacks.  
¾ The top 7 internal threats for an e-government organisation offering a two way 
interactive e-services are lack of security competency, exposure of classified data, 
leakage of information, disgruntled employees, viruses, information dealers, and 
failure of restoration. 
¾ The 7 top internal threats of an e-government organisation offering a 
transactional e-service are lack of security competency, disgruntled employees, 
exposure of classified data, leakage of information, data and records alteration, 
information dealers, and failure of restoration.   
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¾ Out of the internal threats selected by the participants the internal threats repeated at 
least 4 times in the five surveyed areas are listed in the table blow with their types.  
Table 38: Internal threats identified 
Threat 
Frequency of 
Occurrence in the 5 
areas Surveyed 
Type 
Disgruntled employees 5 P 
Lack of security competency 5 C 
Viruses 4 T 
Leakage of information 5 P 
Failure of restoration 4 O 
 
¾ From the table of the types of internal threats, it can be noticed from the above table 
that the internal threats having a frequency of at least 4 times are mixed from 
different types and not only related to technologies or policies. These threats can 
only be mitigated through applying the counter security measures related to the 
types of threats identified.  
 
6.7.1.  External threats 
¾ The highest 7 general threats identified are the mis-configuration of any IT 
infrastructure element, financial frauds, rerouted attacks, viruses, denial of service, 
man in the middle attacks, and declassification and mishandling of information. 
¾ The top 7 external threats for organisations offering information publishing services 
are rerouted attacks, denial of services, physical security breaches, viruses, attacks 
generated from e-government external users, declassification and mishandling of 
information and miscofiguration of any IT infrastructure element.  
¾ The  top 7 external threats on organisations offering a one way interactive e-services 
are attacks coming from other government departments, man in the middle attacks, 
denial of services attacks, viruses, mis-configuration of any IT infrastructure element, 
financial frauds, and declassification and mishandling of information. 
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¾ The  top 7 external threats on organisations offering two way interactive e-services 
are rerouted attacks, attacks generated from e-government external users, denial of 
services, man in the middle attacks, mis-configuration of any IT infrastructure 
element, information alteration, and physical security breaches.  
¾ The highest 7 threats for an organisation offering transactional online services are 
mis-configuration of any IT infrastructure element, attacks generated from e-
government external users, rerouted attacks, denial of services, and man in the 
middle attacks.  
¾ A further analysis was conducted on the top 7 external threats occurred for the 5 
areas surveyed. Threats occurred 4 times or higher in the five surveyed areas are 
listed in the table below.  
  
Table 39: External threats identified 
Threat 
Frequency of 
Occurrence in the 5 
areas Surveyed 
Type 
Mis-configuration of any IT infrastructure 
element 
5 T 
Rerouted Attacks 4 T 
Viruses 4 T 
Denial of Services 5 T 
Man in the middle attacks 5 T 
Attacks generated from  e-government 
external users 
4 T 
 
6.8. The correlation section analysis: 
• The list of security measures rated with low percentages was the same for both 
information publishing and one way interactive forms and started to be less in the 
two way interactive e-services.  
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• In the information publishing e-services 6 security technologies were rated between 
10-30%, 7 security policies were rated either 20% or 30%, 3 security competencies 
were rated either 20% or 30% and one decision factor was rated 0%. 
• The one way interactive e-service has 4 security technologies rated either 20% or 
30%, 6 security policies were rated either 20% or 30%, 3 competencies were rated 
20% or 30% and one decision factor was rated 0%. 
• In the two way interactive e-services only 3 technologies were rated either 20% or 
30% while one decision factor was rated 10%. 
• There are 3 security technologies which were rated low (10%-30%) in information 
publishing, one interactive and two interactive e-services. These security 
technologies are (Figure 68): 
o Cryptography (A6)  
o VPN (A7)  
o Biometrics (A10) 
  
 
Figure 68: The model evolution 
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• The percentage rates went higher for all the sub layers when it was assessed against 
the combination of all services. The assessment rates were varying from 70%-100% 
except for the following:  
o VPN technology scored 60% 
o Biometrics technology scored 30% 
o Laws and Regulations scored 60% 
o Third party policies scored 60%  
o FUD scored 10% 
 
6.9. Chapter summary:  
The objective of this chapter was to discuss the survey results of the questionnaire B 
deployed to 16 highly recognized security practitioners in Dubai. The results of the analysis 
confirmed the need of all the sub layers proposed by the new model and the removal of the 
FUD sub layer due to the low selection rate scored.  Based on the analysis of the external 
and internal threats, different types of threats were raised by the respondents which will 
need different types of security measures to mitigate.  
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Chapter seven: Validation 
The validation process was part of the research methodology used. Since this research is a 
life case scenario the validation process was crucial to confirm model applicability. The 
process of validation caused a slight modification of the new model by omitting a cell from 
the decision layer. The validation process was the eighth step of the overall research 
methodology as illustrated in Figure 69.  
 
 
Figure 69: Validation process as part of the research cycle 
 
7.1. Questionnaire analysis:  
After the analysis of the survey and the correlation questions related to the layers of the 
model, it has been observed that all the layers were required and selected by both the 
security practitioners and the government departments management surveyed. The 
selection was based on understanding the needs of different aspects of protection and 
correlation between the threats and the security measures required in any government 
departments.  As discussed in Chapter 6, all categories of services required all layers and 
sub layers of the proposed model. The only sub layer which was will be dropped from the 
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model is the Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt (FUD) (E5). The modified model is shown in 
Table 40 and the key of the cells is illustrated in Table 41. 
Table 40: The Modified model 
Layer Sub layers/Cells 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12     
Techn
ology  100
% 
70
% 
80
% 
90
% 
10
0
% 
80
% 
50
% 
70
% 
90
% 
30
% 
100
% 70%     
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12 B13 B14 B15 B16 Policie
s 90% 90% 
90
% 
70
% 
80
% 
80
% 
90
% 
90
% 
100
% 
80
% 
90
% 80% 60% 70% 90% 
100
% 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10       Compe
tencies 100
% 
100
% 
90
% 
80
% 
80
% 
70
% 
60
% 
100
% 
100
% 
60
%       
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5            Operat
ional 
Mgmn
t 
90% 90% 
100
% 
70
% 
80
%            
E1 E2 E3 E4            Decisio
n 
Factor 80% 
70
% 
100
% 
100
%            
 
 
Table 41: Model key 
Category Category 
Access Control  A1 Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention 
A2 
Anti Virus and Malicious Code A3 Authentication and Passwords A4 
Files and Integrity Check A5 Cryptography A6 
VPN A7 Vulnerability Scanning Tools A8 
Digital Signatures and Certificates A9 Biometrics A10
T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
Logical Access Control (Firewalls) A11 Security Protocol A12
Password Management  B1 Log-in Process B2 
Logs Handling  B3 Computer Viruses B4 
Intellectual Property Rights B5 Data Privacy B6 
Privilege Control  B7 Data Confidentiality B8 
Data Integrity B9 Internet Connectivity B10
Administrative Policies B11 Encryption Policies B12
HR Security Policies B13 Third Party Policies B14
Po
lic
ie
s 
Physical Security Policies B15 Operation Security Policies B16
Security Operation and 
management  
C1 Security Architecture and 
development 
C2 
C
om
pe
te
n
ci
es
 
Ethical Hacking  C3 Security Policies and 
development  
C4 
204 
Computer Forensics C5 Cryptography C6 
Security Programming  C7 Laws and regulation  C8 
Security Implementation and 
Configuration  
C9 Security Analysis C10
Operational Policies and 
Procedures 
D1 Management Tools D2 
Correlation and data mining D3 Reporting and Response D4 
O
PS
 m
gm
t 
Analysis and Human intervention  D5 
Cost  E1 Awareness E2 
D
ec
is
io
n 
Need E3 Technologies Availability E4 
 
 
7.2. The criteria of success 
The proposed model was derived from the extensive research and literature review, 
industrial experience, and results of the survey and analysis. The development of the layers 
was done based on a scientific approach and the each sub layer was justified and backed up 
with either an academic literature or an industrial white paper. The followings are the 
critical success factors ( Wood, C., 2005) , (Lankhorst, M., 2005)  which were considered 
during the development of the model:  
• Simplicity of the model: The model must be clear to the intended users (government 
departments or individuals). The layers of the model must be explicit and should 
make sense to a non security or IT expert.  
• Applicability: The model must be applicable to any organisation which intends to 
use it for its internal or external communication or information sharing.  
• Standards compliant: The model must comply with the security standards in terms 
of acronyms, references, objectives. 
• Doable: The model must be doable for the e-government authority and its 
government affiliates.  
• Flexible: The model must be flexible and can be implemented in phases.  
• Open standards: The model must address general technologies, policies, 
competencies, and operational procedures. It should not be biased to any brand, 
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proprietary solution, or special procedures applicable only to specific vendor or 
forum. 
• Renewable and expandable: the model must be easy to update with the introduction 
of new trends in the security field and it also can allow merge group of security 
technologies, policies, procedures, or competencies.  
 
The following checklist entitled as “Validation Form” (Table 42) was developed for the e-
government to use in order to evaluate and validate the model: 
  
Table 42: Validation form 
Criteria Description Validity Rate 
Simplicity of 
the model 
The model must be clear to the indented 
users (government departments or 
individuals). The layers of the model 
must be explicit and should make sense 
to a non security or IT expert 
□ Low 
□ Medium 
□ High 
□ Extremely High 
Applicability 
The model must be applicable to any 
organisation which intends to use it for 
its internal or external communication or 
information sharing 
□ Low 
□ Medium 
□ High 
□ Extremely High 
Standards 
Compliance 
The model must comply with the 
security standards in terms of acronyms, 
references, objectives 
□ Low 
□ Medium 
□ High 
□ Extremely High 
Doable 
The model must be doable for the e-
government authority and its 
government affiliates 
□ Low 
□ Medium 
□ High 
□ Extremely High 
Flexible The model must be flexible and can be implemented in phases 
□ Low 
□ Medium 
□ High 
□ Extremely High 
Open 
standards 
The model must address general 
technologies, policies, competencies, 
and operational procedures. It should not 
be biased to any brand, proprietary 
solution, or special procedures 
applicable only to specific vendor or 
forum. 
□ Low 
□ Medium 
□ High 
□ Extremely High 
Renewable 
and 
the model must be easy to update with 
the introduction of new trends in the 
□ Low 
□ Medium 
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Expandable security field and it also can allow 
merge group of security technologies, 
policies, procedures, or competencies 
□ High 
□ Extremely High 
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7.3. Dubai e-government application:  
DEG authority has 26 government departments affiliated with it. The concept of e-
government was implemented in a decentralized model. Each government department has 
the responsibility to convert its government services to e-services. The e-government 
authority has the responsibility to coordinate with the government departments and try to 
find synergic services across all of them. In addition, the e-government authority has its 
own e-services launched to the citizens. The e-services maturity varies from information 
publishing to transactional. Since the model addresses the security aspects for all types of e-
services, it can be implemented in the 26 government departments. Taking into 
consideration that the new Dubai Strategic Plan is consolidating the government 
departments into 4 main buckets, the number of government departments affiliated to the e-
government will definitely be reduced in the future. Dubai e-government Authority (DEG) 
was selected as the only government department and authority to validate the security 
model due to the following reasons: 
• The only non biased government department and responsible body for the overall e-
government initiative in Dubai.  
• Launched key e-services which are used by large population of citizens and other 
government departments.  
• Strong ownership over the integration initiative of all the government departments.   
• The availability of a large number of security practitioners who will participate in 
the validation process of the model.  
 
The validation process of the security model was having 2 dimensions. The first dimension 
was to check the model value and its usability aspects. This was achieved through a 
distribution of a validation form developed in section 7.2 to assist the participant to select 
the rate of validity from different success criteria. The second dimension was to check the 
level of implementation through the second form (Table 43). The second form has each 
layer and its sub layers listed and a rate from 1 to 5 was assigned against each sub layer. 
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The rate goes from 1 (not implemented) to 5 (fully implemented). The participants can 
choose the appropriate rate where it applies.  
209 
Table 43: Implementation rating form 
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211 
 
212 
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The validation process methodology can be applied to any case studies which can be 
considered for the model applicability. The limitation of this research will be due to the 
limited validation process as it was conducted in Dubai only. In addition, since Dubai was 
taken as a case study, conducting the validation process in Dubai was imperative as the 
participants should be part of the e-government system or initiative and should be users of 
the online services of the e-government. 
  
7.4. Results of the validation process  
Based on the completed process the validation rate was acceptable and showed good 
acceptance from the e-government authority. The model will be considered as a reference 
checklist for all the government departments willing to share information freely. It was 
found applicable for designing the security architecture for Dubai e-government authority 
and its affiliates. It shall contribute to the level of trust enhancement for information 
sharing between the government departments.  The key objectives of the research were met 
through the development of the new security model as indicated in Table 44.   
214 
Table 44: Key objectives validation 
Research Key Objective How it was met  
Establish the security 
requirements for Dubai 
e­government 
The recognition of the government departments for the 
need of a common security model which will act as 
government enterprise security architecture was the first 
step of identifying the requirement of security.  
Having the heads of the departments participating in the 
questionnaires and identifying the internal and external 
threats has given the author a holistic view of the security 
needs for the government departments. 
Collate state of the art 
approaches and 
methods for the 
government security. 
Studying the different models developed to meet the CIA 
triad objectives, e-government challenges, and the widely 
practiced security standards, provided the author a solid 
back ground of the government security requirements.   
Develop model for 
evaluation security level 
for inter­government 
information sharing 
The new model can be used in two ways:  
- As a reference architecture of the government 
security infrastructure.  
- As a checklist which government departments 
will need to go through to set up a strong security 
infrastructure enabling the information sharing 
between the different government departments.  
Validate the model in 
Dubai e­government 
The model was sent to DEG authority for verification and 
validation. The model was evaluated by the DEG 
authority security team and consultants and was found to 
be applicable to the current needs of the government 
departments.  The author foresees that the model will be 
implemented in the near future as the common 
government security architecture for all Dubai 
government departments. 
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Chapter eight: Conclusions 
 
8.1. Achievement of the research objectives:  
“Digital or electronic government (e-government) is the use of ICTs in general and e-
technologies in particular, in order to: Promote and motivate a more operationally efficient 
and cost effective government; facilitate more convenient government services to citizens 
and business; enhance economic development; reshape and redefine community and 
government processes, allow greater public access to information; and make government 
more accountable to their citizens.” (Asgarkhani, M. ,2005). 
  
The definition above of the e-government can be considered as a good reference to the 
objectives of an e-government. The objectives of the different e-governments categories 
(G2C, G2B, G2G, and IEEE) are illustrated in the table below (Table 45). Moreover, the 
different categories of e-services apply on all types of e-governments mentioned in Table 
47. The security aspects of the e-services are common as it was proved in the analysis of 
the survey results. 
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Table 45: E-government categories 
E-government 
category 
Business 
metaphor Description Sub-category 
Example 
practice 
Managerial interaction 
Government's 
informational web 
sites Government to 
citizens (G2C) 
Providing 
opportunities for 
greater citizen 
access to and 
interaction with the 
government 
Consultative 
interaction 
E-voting instant 
option poling 
Businesses as 
suppliers of goods or 
services 
Government's e-
procurement 
Government to 
business (G2B) 
Customer 
Relationship 
Management 
(CRM) Seeking to more 
efficiency work 
with business Businesses as regulated economic 
sectors 
Electronic filing 
with various 
government 
agencies 
Vertical integration 
Sharing a 
database among 
agencies within 
the similar 
functional walls 
but across 
different levels of 
government 
Government to 
Government 
(G2G) 
Supply Chain 
Management 
(SCM) 
Enabling 
government 
agencies at 
different levels to 
work more easily 
together 
Horizontal integration 
Sharing a 
database among 
agencies at the 
similar levels of 
government but 
across different 
functions 
Government to 
employee 
web based 
payroll/health 
benefits system Government 
internal 
efficiency and 
effectiveness 
(IEE) 
Enterprise 
Resource 
Planning 
(ERP) 
Focusing on 
internal efficiency 
and effectiveness Integrating internal 
systems 
Implementing 
ERP-like systems 
to integrate 
different 
functions within a 
single agency 
Hardware and 
software 
interoperability 
Public-key 
infrastructure 
interoperability Overarching 
infrastructure 
(Cross-Cutting) 
Enterprise 
Application 
Integration 
(EAI) 
Facilitating the 
interoperability 
across different 
practices Authentication 
e-Authentication 
across different e-
government 
initiatives 
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The challenge of information sharing between the e-government authority and its affiliates 
is not related to the technological challenges only. During the research of this thesis it was 
discovered that the trust element is a key factor to enhance the information sharing and the 
use of e-services over the Internet by citizens or other government departments. In the 
essay on Internet trust, Dutton and Shepherd argue that “ trust in the Internet and related 
information and communication technologies-‘Cyber trust’-could be critical to the 
successful development of ‘e-services’, such as a e-government, e-commerce, e-learning 
and democratic participation in the rapidly expanding online public sphere” (Dutton, W. H. 
and Shepherd, A., 2006). From the definition of the e-government mentioned above, the 
objective of the e-government is to offer e-services over the Internet or a public network for 
its citizens and affiliates. The Internet and the public network will play the role of the 
medium where the e-services will be delivered through. The level of trust will definitely 
impact the level of the e-services usability by citizens or government departments. Dutton 
and Shepherd illustrated in their paper that there are two separate dimensions of cyber trust. 
These dimensions were derived through a factor analysis which was done on the results of 
the survey conducted in the UK.  The first dimension is the ‘Net confidence’ which simply 
means the degree to which users and non users have confidence in the technology and in 
the people they can communicate with on the Internet. The second dimension is ‘Net Risk’ 
which simply means the perception of and exposure to risks while using the Internet. The 
risks of the e-services can only be minimized to an acceptable level if the threats on every 
e-service have a security measure which can mitigate it or make it ineffective. The research 
of this thesis started with four objectives: 
1. Establish the security requirements for Dubai e-government.  
2. Collate state of the art approaches and methods for the e-government security.  
3. Develop model for evaluating security level for inter-government information 
sharing.  
4. Test the model in the Dubai e-government context.  
 
The following table shows the different activities conducted to achieve the objectives of the 
thesis (Table 46):  
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Table 46: Research activities 
Research Activity Objective Results 
Literature review of all 
existing models, e-
government issues, etc 
• To get acquainted with the existing 
models, issues of e-government, 
challenges, and e-services 
• Confirm the need of the information 
security in the e-government model 
and implementation.  
• Relate the lack of the 
information flow to the lack of trust 
in the security level between the 
departments. 
• Establish the security 
requirements for Dubai e-
government.  
 
 
• Was able to understand the issues 
of all the models and their focal 
areas.  
• Identified all weaknesses of each 
model to build the argument for 
the new one.  
• Identified the overlapped areas 
and how each model can 
complement each other.  
• Searched for academic support for 
each layer and sub layer proposed 
in the model.  
• Learn about how academic 
arguments are built from journals 
and publications.  
• Found some journals discussing 
the trust relationship with the lack 
of information sharing.  
Analysis of the Dubai e-
government structure, 
types of e-services 
offered, and issues and 
challenged faced.  
• To prepare for the case study that 
will be applied on DEG authority.  
• Setting a testing bed of the new 
model in the e-government 
authority in Dubai with few 
governmental departments.  
 
• Confirmed the areas of challenges 
the e-government authority is 
facing with its affiliates.  
• Identified the main government 
departments and executives who 
will be participants of the survey 
process. 
Build an academic 
argument on the multi 
threats concept for a 
single e-service 
• To prepare the academic ground for 
the need of a multi layer model 
which will mitigate multi layered 
threats on e-services. 
• Collate state of the art approaches 
and methods for the e-government 
security 
• Proved the point that a single e-
service can have multiple threats 
related to its processes, supporting 
systems, or resources. This led to 
the need of having a model 
addressing different security 
aspects other than technologies.  
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Build the academic 
argument on the need 
of a multi layered 
model.  
• To have a strong academic support 
on each layer and sub layer of the 
model.  
• Through this process, the layers 
and the sub layers were selected 
to come up with the 
representation of the final model.  
Collecting Data on the 
e-government services 
security aspects 
• To prove the sub layers of the model, 
need of each layer and its sub layers, 
identify areas which might need to 
be modified in the model 
• Prove the need of the different 
security layers and not only 
restricted to one. Through this 
prove, the layers needed for the 
model can be theoretically provided 
to construct the new model  
• The content/cells of each layer will 
need to be proven theoretically 
through literature review, surveys, 
and industrial opinions from the 
practitioners.  
• Results of the research to be 
reflected through the analysis 
mechanism conducted  
• Develop model for evaluating 
security level for inter-government 
information sharing.  
• All layers and sub layers were 
confirmed through this process.  
• Management and technical 
professional opinions were 
extracted from the survey 
supporting the proposal of the 
new model.  
 
Validation process 
• To validate the need of each model, 
its usability, and the rate of 
implementation of each sub layers 
currently.  
• Test the model in the Dubai e-
government context. 
• The validation process evaluated 
the model and its usability. It also 
included a form to rate the current 
implementation of the sub layers 
in order to know the level of 
enhancement the model will 
contribute with and the 
appropriate rate of security the 
governments department will 
need to adopt.  
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The objectives of the research were met and a new model is proposed through this thesis 
document.  The new model can be applicable for any governmental department and it can 
be implemented as architecture or an assessment tool. 
 
8.2. Discussion 
An in depth literature review was carried out during this research. The literature review 
assisted the author to identify the different existing security models and theories and 
standards. It also gave a good overview on existing models and their construction and 
challenges, DEG authority and its e-services, and the challenges an e-government might 
face. The literature review analysis was done to support the derivation of the new model. 
Theories addressing technological, policies, human aspects, decisions, and the impact of a 
decision in organisation were studied and analyzed. The literature review was a key step 
towards the development of the new model. It also assisted the author to identify the 
weakness of different models to establish the research gap.  
 
Developing a security model which tackles different aspects of security in addition to the 
technological layer was not a trivial process. Through the research process of this thesis, it 
was noticed that all existing models were developed to address one aspect or a problem in 
the information security field. Well known models such as Bell Lapadula, Biba, non 
interference, Chinese wall, and compartmentation and lattice model were all developed to 
tackle one aspect of security. Some of them were relying heavily on the enforcement of the 
security policies, while others were algorithms and logic based. Other models studied and 
analyzed were taking the quantitative approach such as the network rating model (NRM) 
while others were more qualitative. Through the thorough analysis and research conducted 
for this thesis, no comprehensive model was found which addresses all aspects of security 
for any organisation that offers e-services of the Internet or a public network. Security 
practitioners form different industries were always highlighting the need of a new security 
model which will address other aspects than technologies in order to mitigate risks 
categorized as non-technological risks. This instigated the search of a new method to 
develop a model which contains multilayer representing technologies, policies, 
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competencies, operational procedures, and above all the decision factors which may play a 
major role in enforcing the other layers.  
 
During the extensive research and site visits conducted to e-governments, it was noticed 
that turning into i-government (where "i" stands for information sharing) was a strategic 
objective.  The objective is simple; an integration between the backend systems which will 
ensure the ability of having a single profile for the citizens.  The concept of i-government is 
becoming popular in Dubai and the challenge of integration started to be raised. The 
security aspect of the information sharing was always a concern as information will leave a 
government department through the Internet or a public network with a certain level of 
classification but might be mishandled or declassified for any reason. Maintaining the 
classification of the information, confidentiality, integrity, and availability will require 
more than a policy to be in place, or a technology to be implemented. The reasons of 
mistreating information might be due to technological flaws, weak policies, lack of 
competencies and awareness from the security practitioners or the users, absence or lack of 
operational management, and wrong decisions taken on how to handle governmental 
classified information. Other reasons might be raised or argued but all reasons rotate 
around the fact that multiple threats due to different reasons exist for a single e-service 
launch or information sharing action. Placing the appropriate security measures will assist 
in mitigating the multiple threats of information sharing caused by different reasons. The 
concept of multiple layers of the model addressing different aspects of security is the 
fundamental design of the new model. This new model has high level of flexibility as sub 
layers representing technologies, policies, competencies, procedures or decision factors, 
can be updated with new trends in the security field based on the growth of the need.  
 
During the development of the new model, a case study was needed in order to test the 
validity of the model. The motivations of selecting DEG authority were:  
• Easy access to e-government authority top management.  
• Familiarity on the e-services related to the e-government.  
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• The need of information sharing between the e-government authority and its 
affiliates.  
• The availability of the different type of e-services and different level of maturity.  
• The ability to influence the management of the e-government in testing the model 
and contribute in the validity process.  
 
8.3. Contribution to knowledge 
The model presented herewith this thesis document represents a new approach or 
methodology of assessing the security programme or architecture.  
 
The new model has 5 layers; each layer is important and assists the organisation to achieve 
a milestone within the security field. The top layer of the model represents the most 
common in the security field. Security technologies are always implemented and with the 
proliferation of the Internet access, they became integrated as part of the business support 
systems. The second layer, the security policies, complements the first one. Security 
practitioners develop security policies for their organisations and attempt to place 
technologies in order to tighten the security policies and prevent them from becoming self-
defeated policies. The security competencies are needed for the development of the 
technologies and security policies. Once the organisation establishes the infrastructure, 
setting the right security policies and recruit the competent security staff, the operational 
procedures become the next imperative aspect to have for the security programme. Having 
the proper operational and management procedures is an art and will need to be monitored 
and evaluated periodically. The management decisions to launch an e-service or implement 
a security technology for the organisation impact on all the previous layers. Placing the 
wrong security technology or diluting a security policy is a major threat on the organisation 
which may lead to security breaches and a defeat to the overall security programme.  
 
The model is unique in the comprehensive inclusion of all known security issues in a form 
that can be used by e-government security management. Using the new model will assist 
the government department to achieve the following:  
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• Having a checklist for all the security measures implemented or planned to be 
implemented in the future.  
• Inventory list of all security assets already implemented or which will be 
implemented in the future.  
• A basic and manual rating tool for the level of security in the government 
department. The level of security expected from the government department can be 
agreed and determined by the e-government authority and its affiliates or can be set 
as a standard based on a questionnaire or consensus among all the participants in the 
e-government development and e-services provisioning.  
 
This thesis document provides a good background of all existing security models, strength 
analysis of each model, and a methodology to develop a new model through the research 
process followed to come up with the new model. 
 
8.4.  Wider application 
The approach to develop the new security model reported in this thesis can be used for any 
e-government in the world. The selection of the sub layers has to be performed as per the 
selection criteria recommended in Chapter 4. The new security model can be applicable to 
all e-governments in the GCC as cost is not a limit on the use of the security technologies 
and policies. The factor of competencies’ availability will vary from a country to another 
but it will not have a great impact due to the flexibility of the employment policies of the 
expats from the Middle East countries. Countries in the Middle East with limited 
infrastructures and budgets will not be able to apply the whole model as the decision factor 
will play a major role in limiting some of the technologies and policies. As a result, the 
competencies of the security staff will be limited which might lead to a strong probability 
of being attacked by external and internal intruders.  
In comparison to the Far East or the west, the five layers of the model are appropriate but 
the sub layers will be changed based on the country’s security requirements and perception 
of some of the security policies, competencies, and decision factors. It is expected that 
minor modifications can be performed upon the proposed model to tailor it to the 
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requirements of any e-government in the world. This indeed adds a strong advantage of the 
new model and proves its flexibility as one of the success criteria set in Chapter 7. 
 
8.5. Conclusion and future work  
Information security plays a key role to enable e-services offered by government 
departments or authorities, information sharing inter or intra government departments, and 
above all to improve the trust between authorities and their affiliates. The level of trust or 
the net confidence is directly related to the security confidence of any organisation.  
 
The usability of the e-services over the Internet can increase if the security level is 
enhanced within the service provider and the users’ security awareness is elevated. 
 
Research conducted on security models highlighted some strong ones which tackle specific 
aspects of security. Some of the developed models were successful in resolving issues 
related to the system security, while others were policy oriented addressing either 
confidentiality or integrity of the information. During the literature review phase and 
through all the research conducted, no comprehensive security model was found which 
addresses the different aspects of security. The cycle of developing such a model was based 
on an academic approach starting from the literature review of all models published in 
journals or conference papers. They were analysed on the weaknesses and strengths of each 
model and the approaches to develop the models. The author got acquainted with models 
which are related to e-commerce security, network/ systems risks, confidentiality, integrity, 
and conflict interest prevention models. The development of the new model was based on 
scientific knowledge and a thorough analysis process.  
 
The new model consists of five layers. Each layer represents a dimension of security which 
need to be addressed in order to mitigate threats associated with it. Each layer has one or 
more of sub layer. The number of sub layers will be determined by the number of security 
measures an e-government organisation feels sufficient to provide an acceptable security 
level. In reality, no common accepted rate of security level was found agreed by the e-
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government authority and its affiliates. The new model only reflects the layers and sub 
layers required to provide an acceptable security programme for any e-government 
organisation offering services to public citizens. The research establishes the sub layers 
most required for the security programme to tackle the multiple threats associated with an 
e-service.   
 
The DEG authority was taken as a case study of the model. Two types of survey 
questionnaires were deployed to the e-government programme in Dubai. The objectives of 
the questionnaires were:  
• To identify the types of threats on different e-services.  
• To get a view from management of the government departments on different types 
of threats.  
• To identity the layers required in the model and their sub layers also.  
• To get the security practitioners feedback on the need of technologies, policies, 
competencies, operational management, and decision factors as layers of the new 
model.  
• To rate the importance of the sub layers of the model in order to authenticate the 
need of them or drop the ones scoring low percentage.  
The research process led to the development of a structured security model which will 
assist an e-government organisation to evaluate the security level, identify deficiencies in 
the security system, and put in place the necessary measures to mitigate different threats on 
e-services. The new model consists of five major layers each one of them tackles group of 
threats. Each layer represents a portfolio of sub layers which collectively fit together to 
construct a solid layer of the model.  
 
In the future, the author intends to work on a mathematical representation of the model 
which will assist in defining the best combination of all sub layers in order to come up with 
the highest security score for an organisation which need to launch an e-service or share 
information over the Internet. The mathematical formula can be used in the future for 
finding the combination of sub layers or any IT model subject that the importance of each 
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layer or sub layer is defined, a thorough dependency analysis is conducted, the scenarios 
are well defined and the quantification of the important factors can be achieved.  
 
Another future work can be conducted on the model is to transform it to a security 
framework (K, C. and S, H. , 2006). The security framework can be integrated as part of the 
Open Group Framework (TOGAF) which is the most adopted enterprise architecture in the 
IT industry (TOGAF Forum, 2007). The future research will be carried out by the author as 
part of the post doctorate programme intended to attend in the near future. 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire A 
 
Questionnaire-A 
 
Distinguished government department leader information 
Name:………………………………………. 
Title/Designation:…………………………..   
Department Name:……………………..  Function:…………… 
Number of Staff…………………………   
 
 
 
Purpose: 
 
This questionnaire is intended for management of the e-government authority or the 
governmental departments’ interacting, transacting or exchanging information with the e-
government authority or other departments.  
 
Questionnaire structure  
 
There are three main sections of this questionnaire, General e-Government, Internal and 
External.  
 
 Section 1: General e-government questions 
 
Questions which are related to e-government in general  
 
 Section 2: The internal questions:  
 
Questions which are related to the e-government authority or the governmental department 
interacting with or through the e-government authority.  
 
 
 Section 3: The external questions:  
 
Questions which are related to the expectations, threats, and needs generated from trading 
with other governmental departments or the public. 
 
 References:  
1. e-government Authority (e-gov-auth): The government body which offers e-services to 
other governmental departments and the citizens of the country.  
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2. Governmental departments: government organisations or agencies interacting with the 
e-government authority for e-services or offering e-services to citizens through the e-
government authority 
 
Section 1: General e-government questions     
 
1. What type of services your governmental department is providing 
 
 Information publishing any online available information necessary to start the procedure 
to obtain an e-service or a catalogue of other e-services offered by the e-government. 
 A one way interactive e-service which is a downloadable form from the governmental 
department portal (I-1). 
 Two-Way Interactive e-services which requires both parties to interact through the 
governmental department portal (I-2). 
 A transactional e-service where the users can perform a financial transaction through the 
governmental department portal. These e-services can be referred to as class (T). 
 A combination of all the above 
 
Information security measures are essential part of any e-government infrastructure  in 
order to enable the e-government to provide services to the public, protect the information 
from internal staff, and allow the information flow for interaction, transaction, or 
publishing with other governmental departments.  
 
 Yes, I agree with the above statement   
 No, I don’t agree with the above statement  
 
The current e-government information security programme covers or must cover as an 
assumption the following security practices:  
 
 P1- Information classification policies and procedures  
 P2- Encryption of classified information related to governmental departments. 
 P3- Strong authentication for the staff of the e-government authority to the internal      
network and information resources.  
 P4- Access control to enforce the concepts of separation of duties and need to know.  
 P5- Anti-virus programmes (PC based or gateway) which protect from viruses/worms 
attacks or spread from inside or outside.  
 P6- Security operation management and monitoring.  
 P7- Strong and enforced information security policies and procedures.  
 P8-Network security measures such as firewalls, IDS/IPS, VPN concentrators, etc 
 P9-Others…………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Section 2: Internal security related questions 
 
Internal Threat    
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1. Select from the list below some of the relevant major threats to the e-government 
infrastructure which might be caused internally? 
 
 T1- Disgruntled employees having access to non-authorized information resources.  
 T2- Viruses spread intentionally or unintentionally by e-government staff   
 T3- Loss or corruption of data caused to applications/OS malfunctions, database issues, 
etc.  
 T4- Failure of restoration after a major unplanned shutdown due to weak operational and 
recovery procedures.  
 T5- Exposure of classified data to unauthorized staff due to a failure of encryption 
system. 
 T6- Lack of security and operational competency due to the introduction of new e-
services or new technologies supporting the new services.  
 T7- High mobility of the e-government staff which will increase the threat of 
accessibility 
 T8- Leakage of information or espionage related to the privacy of the citizen or public 
users through electronic transfer, physical leakage through medium handing over, or oral 
information exchange. 
 T9- Data and records alteration related to public users or governmental departments. 
 T10- Attacks on all mission critical systems, and processes from within the 
governmental departments.  
 T11- Industrial spies and governmental espionage conducted by internal terrorist and 
spies working within the governmental departments. 
 T12- Information dealers looking for classified and sensitive information of publish 
users/citizens, or other governmental departments.  
 T13-
Others…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 The impact of any threat becomes severe due to the following reasons:  
 
 Lack of security knowledge in how to handle an incident. 
 Lack of proactive security systems which can reduce the impact and contain the risk.  
 Lack of strong security operational and management systems which assist in the vigilant 
monitoring of the infrastructure.  
 Weak security and IT infrastructure which is vulnerable to any level of attacks or 
security threats.  
 High dependency on the security systems in running the business operation.  
 The direct link between the internal e-government infrastructures to the external parties 
interacting with. 
 
Is there a frequent security assessment programme which runs in the e-government 
authority?  
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 Yes there is     No there isn’t 
 
From your management experience, the security assessment of any e-government authority 
must cover some if not all of the following:  
 
 Technologies used in the e-government  
 Policies enforced and practiced in the e-government  
 Competencies available locally or outsourced by the e-government  
 Security operational procedures enforced and practiced by the e-government 
 Decision factors and matrix on the security operation, technology selection, and change 
management.  
 
Do you feel the current security infrastructure available in the e-government authority is 
capable of protecting all the information resources, allowing customers or other 
governmental departments to interact in security manner with the authority and enabling 
the e-government authority to launch more services in the future?  
 
 Yes I do  With some extend  No I don’t, my improvement is required 
 Can’t tell 
 
How often do you go over or review the security programme available within the e-
government authority?  
 
 Once a month 
 Every Quarter 
 Semi Annual 
 Annual  
 Never  
 Others ……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Is the security programme/system known by all internal e-government staff?  
  Yes  No 
 
Is the security programme linked directly to the business processes of the e-government 
authority and integrated with the services launching processes?  
 
 Yes   No   Will be in the future 
 
Section 2: External Security Related Questions  
 
What is your definition of an e-government authority? 
 
A common gateway for governmental e-services 
A relay and a workflow engine of governmental e-services offered by different departments 
An e-catalogue to all e-services offered by different governmental departments  
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A point of consolidation for shared services of all e-governmental departments 
Nothing but a portal  
Part of the e-initiative of all governmental departments 
 
2. How many individual users do you expect to have per e-service you offer?  
 
 Less than 1,000 users 
 1,000 – 10,000 users 
 10,000 – 100,000 users 
 More than 100,000 users 
 Don’t have an exact number but approximately………….. 
 
3. How many integrated e-services or processes are you part of?  
 
 1-10 e-services  
 More than 10 e-services  
 All e-services offered by the department  
 None of the e-services offered by the department 
 
4. Please select the closest description of the types of users for the e-services offered by 
your department:  
 
 Public users and residents of the country 
 Corporate users or representatives of governmental departments who are dealing directly 
with the department. 
 Mixed of both public and corporate users 
 
5. Do you feel that your e-services will require a certain level of computer literacy beyond 
using the Web in order to be accessed and used:  
 
 Yes to a certain extent. Please 
specify…………………………………………………………………………………. 
 No only knowing how to use the Web 
 At the beginning only 
 Can’t tell 
 
What is the total number of e-services offered directly by your department to all types of 
users:  
 
 Less than 10    Approximate number:…………………….... 
 10-100   Approximate number:……………………… 
 100-1,000  Approximate number:…………………….... 
 More than 1,000 Approximate number:……………………… 
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Kindly fill the following table in order to indicate the number of e-services per each 
category: 
 
e-services 
Categories 
Information 
Publishing 
One-Way  
Interactive  
e-Services 
Two-Way 
Interactive e-
Services 
Transactional 
e-Services 
Total 
Number       
 
External Threats 
 
8. Please select some of the related threats and fear factors from dealing with the external 
customers (governmental or individuals) related to the e-services you offer?  
 
 T1- Declassification and mishandling of information flowed between the e-government 
authority and other departments or individual customers.  
 T2- Man in the middle attacks and interception which may expose the classified 
information from the e-government to the other departments or individual customer.  
 T3- Denial of services due to intentional actions (attacks) or unintentional actions 
(operational problems).  
 T4- Attacks generated from e-government external users whether from other 
departments or citizens interacting, transacting, or exchanging  information with the e-
government authority.  
 T5- Viruses coming from the governmental departments which are not having good anti-
virus infrastructure.  
T6- Rerouted attacks through penetrated e-government departments by external hackers 
or attackers.  
 T7- Financial frauds due to impersonation of authorized users, systems flaws, or non-
repudiation. 
 T8- Miscofiguration of any IT infrastructure element which may lead to leakage of 
information, wrong assignment of e-services, fraud, or corruption of data.  
 T9- Disruption of a complete cycle of an e-service due to latency of the network, low 
bandwidth, or bad integration.  
 T10- Information alteration or unauthorized modification (information integrity breach) 
 T11- Physical security breach which may cause of a total destruction of the IT 
infrastructure. 
 T12-
Others…………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Why do you think the probability of having a threat coming from an external governmental 
department is high?  
 
 Lack of auditing of governmental department security level and systems.  
 Lack of a rule or regulation which enforces the equality in the security level of any 
governmental departments prior to the interaction, transaction, or exchanging of 
information.  
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 Different perception of how security systems/programmes must be built within any 
governmental department or e-government authority.  
 Security is not the main concern of the e-government authority or governmental 
departments.  
 No common security framework or model which can be applied on the e-government 
and its governmental departments and citizens.  
 
What are the key security problems and issues do you think that most if not all 
governmental department may have?  
 
 Security issues related to the Information and security technologies implemented in the 
governmental department.  
 Lack of strong security policies which cover all the critical and sensitive areas related to 
the information handling with other departments/citizens, access of information, and 
protection of the infrastructure supporting key e-services.  
 Lack of having competent and strong security practitioners with the governmental 
department and fully relaying on vendors support, and best efforts from locally available 
staff.  
 No vigilant monitoring and strong security operational procedures within the 
government department.  
 Wrong decisions regarding implementation of security technologies, enforcement of 
security policies, and hiring the right staff for the right security jobs.  
 Security is not being studied carefully and deeply as a business enabler within the 
governmental departments.  
 Other reasons…………………………………………………………………………. 
 
What are you expecting from the other governmental departments before exchanging any 
information:  
 
 A review of the applied security policy  
 A review of the security architecture and infrastructure implemented within the 
governmental department  
 A list of the security practitioners and their professional qualifications  
 A proof of strong security operational procedures within the governmental department. 
 A security certification such as ISO17799 and other security related certifications 
 Copy of the BCP/DRP plan implemented with the government department 
 Others…………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Do you feel comfortable dealing with other governmental departments or citizens without 
knowing the security level applied in their infrastructure?  
 
 Yes   No but can’t do anything about it   Don’t think it is necessary to 
know 
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What do you think is the best way for implementing security measures for the 
citizens/individual users of e-government e-services:  
 
 Installing all security programmes in the citizen PCs 
 Developing an awareness programme for all public users  
 Restrict accessibility of e-government authority or any governmental department except 
from special terminals and kiosks.  
 Apply the third factor of security (biometrics) for all services accessibility 
 Run manual authentication in parallel to all e-services authentication 
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Appendix B: Questionnaire B  
 
Questionnaire-B 
 
Governmental department information technology leaders or 
security practitioners 
 
Name: ………………………………     
Designation:…………………   
Governmental Department:………………………..   
Security Certification:  
 
 CISSP  SAN Level…..  CISA  ICSA  
 Other………………… 
 
Number of Years in the Field of Security:  
 3-5 years   5-10 years    10-15 years  More 
 
Domain Knowledge and Background 
 Programming   Security Policy Developer   Security Architect 
 Ethical Hacking   Vulnerability and Risk Assessment  
 Security Operation   Network Security     Security Education 
 IT Expert and General IT Operation  Security Decision Maker Executive 
 Others………………………………………….. 
 
Purpose: 
 
To ask security practitioners for their opinion on what should be the best security 
model to protect organisations exchange or interact over the Internet.  
 
Questionnaire structure 
Section 1: e-Government Questions 
Section 2: Information Security Technologies  
Section 3: Information Security Policies  
Section 4: Information Security Competencies  
Section 5: Information Security Management and Monitoring 
Section 6: Decision Factors  
Section 7: Correlation Questions 
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Relevance 
Each question of this questionnaire will address a challenge of security at your organisation 
without regard to whether it now exists or it may exist in the future. A box of non-
applicable (N/A) is assigned to each question in order to eliminate the scenarios irrelevant 
to your organisation. Space for comments from the practitioners is also assigned.  
 
Section 1: e-Government related questions  
  
1. Select the challenge an e-government is facing in terms of information flow:  
 
 Trust between the e-government body and the governmental departments  
 No common rule and or standard which controls this flow of information  
 The technical infrastructure challenges  
 No direct relation between the government departments and the e-government except on 
the services the e-government offers.  
No assurance in data classification or declassification 
 
2. Do you think e-governments will need to have a standard assessment model in order to 
synchronize the level of security for intra or inter communication?  
 
 Yes    Not necessarily  
 
3. Can we state that the data classification and the standard security assessment model will 
encourage government departments to freely exchange information between themselves 
and the e-government body?  
 
 Yes    Not really, please state other 
challenges……………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
4. Do you think the fact that cyber crimes occurred for e-governments will force the 
implementation of a standard assessment model in all organisations related to the e-
government?  
 
 Yes    No 
 
5. Do you feel that standardizing the technologies, policies, competencies, security 
operations, and decision factors in e-government will assist the information flow  in 
security manners?  
 
 Yes    No 
 
6. What type of services are your governmental department  providing 
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 Information publishing any online available information necessary to start the 
procedure to obtain an e-service or a catalogue of other e-services offered by the e-
government. 
 A one way interactive e-service which is a downloadable form from the 
governmental department portal (I-1). 
 Two-Way Interactive e-services which requires both parties to interact through the 
governmental department portal (I-2). 
 A transactional e-service where the users can perform a financial transactions 
through the governmental department portal. These e-services can be referred to as 
class (T). 
 A combination of all the above 
 
Internal threats 
 
7. Select from the list below some of the relevant major threats to the e-government 
infrastructure which might be caused internally? 
 
 T1- Disgruntled employees having access to non-authorized information resources.  
 T2- Viruses spread intentionally or unintentionally by e-government staff   
 T3- Loss or corruption of data caused to applications/OS malfunctions, database issues, 
etc.  
 T4- Failure of restoration after a major unplanned shutdown due to weak operational and 
recovery procedures.  
 T5- Exposure of classified data to unauthorized staff due to a failure of encryption 
system. 
 T6- Lack of security and operational competency due to the introduction of new e-
services or new technologies supporting the new services.  
 T7- High mobility of the e-government staff which will increase the threat of 
accessibility 
 T8- Leakage of information or espionage related to the privacy of the citizen or public 
users through electronic transfer, physical leakage through medium handing over, or oral 
information exchange. 
 T9- Data and records alteration related to public users or governmental departments. 
 T10- Attacks on all mission critical systems, and processes from within the 
governmental departments.  
 T11- Industrial spies and governmental espionage conducted by internal terrorist and 
spies working within the governmental departments. 
 T12- Information dealers looking for classified and sensitive information of public 
users/citizens, or other governmental departments.  
 T13- 
Others…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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8. Can you relate the different types of internal threats to the different types of services 
offered by your department by filling the following table?  
 
 
 
External Threats 
 
9. Please select some of the related threats and fear factors from dealing with the external 
customers (governmental or individuals) related to the e-services you offer?  
 
 T1- Declassification and mishandling of information flowing between the e-government 
authority and other departments or individual customers.  
 T2- Man in the middle attacks and interception which may expose the classified 
information from the e-government to the other departments or individual customer.  
 T3- Denial of services due to intentional actions (attacks) or unemotional actions 
(operational problems).  
 T4- Attacks generated from e-government external users whether from other 
departments or citizens interacting, transacting, or exchanging information with the e-
government authority.  
 T5- Viruses coming from the governmental departments which are not having good anti-
virus infrastructure.  
T6- Rerouted attacks through penetrated e-government departments by external hackers 
or attackers.  
 T7- Financial frauds due to impersonation of authorized users, systems flaws, or non-
repudiation. 
 T8- Mis-configuration of any IT infrastructure element which may lead to leakage of 
information, wrong assignment of e-services, fraud, or corruption of data.  
 T9- Disruption of a complete cycle of an e-service due to latency of the network, low 
bandwidth, or bad integration.  
 T10- Information alteration or unauthorized modification (information Integrity breach) 
 T11- Physical security breaches which may cause of a total destruction of the IT 
infrastructure. 
 T12-
Others…………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
e-Service 
Category 
Information 
Publishing 
One-way Interactive e-
Services 
Two-way Interactive 
e-services 
Transactional e-
Services 
Threats 
Associated 
T(_),(_),(_),(_),(_) 
(_),(_),(_),(_),(_) 
T(_),(_),(_),(_),(_) 
(_),(_),(_),(_),(_) 
T(_),(_),(_),(_),(_) 
(_),(_),(_),(_),(_) 
T(_),(_),(_),(_),(_) 
(_),(_),(_),(_),(_) 
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9. Can you relate the different types of External threats to the different types of services 
offered by your department by filling the following table?  
 
 
10. The impact of any threat (internal or external) becomes severe due to the following 
reasons:  
 
 Lack of security knowledge in how to handle an incident. 
 Lack of proactive security systems which can reduce the impact and contain the risk.  
 Lack of strong security operational and management systems which assist in the vigilant 
monitoring of the infrastructure.  
 Weak security and IT infrastructure which is vulnerable to any level of attacks or 
security threats.  
 High dependency on the security systems in running the business operation.  
 The direct link between the internal e-government infrastructures to the external parties 
interacting with. 
 
 
Section 2: Information security technology      
 
1. Are all necessary security technologies implemented in your organisation?  
 
 Yes   No   Some 
 
 
2. The security system includes all necessary components which cover multiple layers and are 
not restricted to technologies or policies only:  
 
 Yes      No 
 
3. The implementation of the security architecture at your organisation includes the following 
technologies if not all:  
 
 Access Control (A1)  Intrusion Detection & Prevention (A2) 
 Anti-Virus & Malicious Codes Scanners (A3)  Authentication & Passwords (A4) 
Files Integrity Checks (A5)   Cryptography (A6) 
VPN (A7)  Vulnerability Scanning Tools (A8) 
 Digital Signature and Digital Certificates (A9) Biometrics (A10) 
 Logical Access Control (Firewalls) (A11)  Security Protocols (A12) 
 Combination of other technologies such 
as……………………….........................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................... 
e-Service 
Category 
Information 
Publishing 
One-way Interactive e-
Services 
Two-way Interactive 
e-services 
Transactional e-
Services 
Threats 
Associated 
T(_),(_),(_),(_),(_) 
(_),(_),(_),(_),(_) 
T(_),(_),(_),(_),(_) 
(_),(_),(_),(_),(_) 
T(_),(_),(_),(_),(_) 
(_),(_),(_),(_),(_) 
T(_),(_),(_),(_),(_) 
(_),(_),(_),(_),(_) 
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4.  Which one of the above technologies do you feel is sufficient enough to provide the 
organisation enough protection against cyber crimes, denial of services (intentional or 
unintentional), or loss of data and confidentiality:  
 
 Access Control (A1)  Intrusion Detection & Prevention (A2) 
 Anti-Virus & Malicious Codes Scanners (A3)  Authentication & Passwords (A4) 
 Files Integrity Checks (A5)   Cryptography (A6) 
 VPN (A7)  Vulnerability Scanning Tools (A8) 
 Digital Signature and Digital Certificates (A9)  Biometrics (A10) 
 Logical Access Control (Firewalls) (A11) Security Protocols (A12) 
 Combination of other technologies such 
as……………………….........................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................... 
 
5.  Which technology do you find  unnecessary when building a security system:  
 
 A1  A2 A3  A4  A5  A6 
 A7  A8  A9  A10  A11  A12 
 
6. Can all security technologies mentioned above coexist in one layer of a model?  
 
 Yes    No 
 
7. Can all above mentioned technologies (A1…A12) construct be part of a risk assessment for 
the security technologies in any organisation?  
 
 Yes    No 
 
If No, please state 
reasons………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
8. Can we rate the technological security level by the number of security technologies available 
in any organisation?  
 
 Yes    No 
 
If No, please state 
reasons………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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9. Please assign the following technologies a percentage for their importance to any e-
organisation:  
 
Access Control (A1)___% Intrusion Detection & Prevention (A2) ___% 
Anti-Virus & Malicious Codes Scanners (A3) ___% Authentication & Passwords (A4) ___% 
Files Integrity Checks (A5) ___% Cryptography (A6) ___% 
VPN (A7) ___% Vulnerability Scanning Tools (A8) ___% 
Digital Signature and Digital Certificates (A9) ___% Biometrics (A10) ___% 
Logical Access Control (Firewalls) (A11) ___% Security Protocols (A12) ___% 
 
10. Considering the scenario of organisation A and B having business information exchange over 
the Internet on a frequent basis, do you feel both organisations must have the same level of 
security technology?  
 
 Yes    No   Not Sure  To a certain level, please state the 
level as percentage____% 
 
11. Can all mentioned technologies, as part of one layer, be the only level of security an 
organisation has?  
 
 Yes   No, state other layers/levels of security an organisation must 
have:_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Please select from the list below some of the challenges related to the technologies 
mentioned on any security technology that can be used in your organisation.  
 
 Lack of competencies related to the technology applied.  
 Lack of security policies 
 No in-depth threat analysis done prior of implementation 
 Lack of management and monitoring  
Decision is always based on commercial aspects not technical/security requirements.  
 Integration with other technologies  
Right technology in wrong place 
 Other reasons…………………………………………………………… 
 
13. As a security expert or technologist, do you agree on the concept of having two entities at 
the same level of security must be a condition for any information flow over the Internet?  
 
 Yes I do  No, I don’t agree, 
reasons………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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14. Have you come across any security model that can be applied to any organisation in order 
to confirm that security level prior exchanging information or assessing the level of security 
based on a checklist?  
 
 Yes, please state the name of the 
model……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 No   Not Sure 
15. As a security expert, or a technologist, do you feel that a model for security level 
assessment or checklist of any organisation that exchanges information, interact with 
customers, or transact over the Internet is a required?  
 
 Yes   No, not necessary, 
Reasons:…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
16.  Please select some of the reasons for the security breaches which may occur due to 
exchange of information between two organisations over the Internet:  
 
 Lack of security level matching (Org A might be higher than Org B in security level) 
 Not enough protection measures applied 
 Declassification of information from one side 
 Due to technical security breaches or flaws 
 Over trusting the Internet by sending information or allowing communication in clear 
text 
 No common security model/system applied in both organisations  
 
Others,……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Section 3: Information security policies        
                                                                               
1.  Please rate the importance of the information security policy in relation to the full 
security system in any organisation:  
 
 Not relevant  Not Important  Important   Very Important 
 
2. Please state the degree of relation between the information security policy and the 
information security technology:  
 
 Not related  Related  Complement each Other  Contradict each other 
 
3. Having the two layers (Technologies and Polices) together in a security model will assist 
in building a robust security system:  
 
 Agree  Disagree 
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4. Which of the following policies do you think is mandatory to have in your organisation? 
Please assign a percentage. 
 
□ Password Management (B1)___%  
 
□ Data Privacy (B6) ___% 
 
□ Administrative Policies (B11) 
___% 
 
□ Login Process (B2) ___% 
 
□ Privilege Control (B7) ___% 
 
□ Encryption Policies (B12) 
___% 
 
□ Logs Handling (B3) ___% □ Data Confidentiality (B8) ___% 
 
□ HR Security Policies (B13) 
___% 
 
□ Computer Viruses (B4) ___% 
 
□ Data Integrity (B9) ___% □ Third Party Policies (B14) 
___% 
 
□ Intellectual Property Rights (B5) 
___%  
 
□ Internet Connectivity (B10) 
__% 
 
□ Physical Security Policies 
(B15) _% 
□ Operation Security Policies (B16) 
__% 
 
□ Others___%  
 
5. Do you think having some, but all policies mentioned above will help the organisation to 
reach a high level of security standard:  
 
Yes  No            If yes, please justify…………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
6. Do you agree that most of the security breaches are related to violation of security 
policies? 
 
 Agree  Don’t Agree 
 
7. If two organisations are interacting with each other over the Internet, they must have 
enough assurance that they have applied the appropriate security policies in order to 
maintain the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information:  
 
 Agree  Don’t Agree 
 
8. Do you think having a checklist for the security policy implemented is a good method to 
assess the level of security for any organisation prior the exchange over the Internet is a 
good model to adopt?  
 
 Yes   No 
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Section 4: Competencies 
 
1. What is the importance of security competencies in any organisation?  
 
 Very important than technical competency   As important as IT 
 More important than IT     Not important at all 
 
2. Do you agree that most of security breaches are happening due to lack of information 
security competencies in the company? 
 
Yes   No 
 
3. Do you follow any standard or method to assist you having the appropriate level of 
competencies developed in your organisation? 
 
Yes, please specify 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 No 
 
4. Have you experienced a security incident due to a lack in a security company? 
 
 Yes   No 
 
5. Do you outsource any security function to a third party due to a lack in a local 
competency?  
 
Yes   No 
 
6. Please select the method of assessing the security competency in your organisation: 
 
 Number of security certifications in the department of security 
 Total number of experience in the security field  
 Number of security training attended  
 Total number of years in IT related field 
 Other methods………………………………………………………………………… 
 
7. Do you agree that the security competency is a good method for assessing the level of 
security in any organisation?  
 
 Yes   No 
If No, please state 
why……………………………………………………………………………… 
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8. Please select from the list below the mandatory security competency to have in any 
organisation:  
 
 Security Operation and Management (C1) 
 
 Cryptography (C6) 
 
 Security Architecture and development (C2)  
 
 Security Programming (C7) 
 
 Ethical Hacking (C3) 
 
 Laws and Regulations (C8) 
 
 Security Policies Development (C4) 
 
 Security implementation and Configuration (C9) 
 
 Computer Forensics (C5) 
 
 Security Analysis (C10) 
 
  Others 
 
 
9. Having a competency layer as part of the security model will enhance the security level 
of the organisation as a complement to other important layers also.  
 
Agree with the statement   
 Don’t agree with the statement 
 
10. Is there a direct link between  security competencies and  technologies policies 
implemented?  
 
 Yes   No 
 
Section 5: Information security management and monitoring                                
                                    
1. Please state the importance of information security management and monitoring in any 
organisation:  
 
 Not Important  Important but not essential   Very important  
 
2. Would you consider information security management and monitoring for all security 
technologies implemented in your organisation?  
 
Yes    Not necessarily 
 
3. Do you see a direct link between strength of the security programme/system in any 
organisation and the strength of the security? 
 
 Yes    No 
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4. Having a good level of security management and monitoring can give a good indication 
of the strength of the security competency, policies, and technologies in the organisation:  
 
 Agree   Don’t agree 
 
5. The strength of the security management and monitoring is measured based on:  
 
Number of incidents handled  
 Existence of the standard security operational procedure 
Infrastructure supporting this function  
 Response time to incidents  
 Correlation of data collected from all security devices  
 Others 
 
6. Having organisations A and B exchanging information over the Internet will stress  the 
need of security management and monitoring: 
 
 True    Not True 
 
7. Which of the following you consider must to have as part of the security management 
and monitoring?  
 
 Operational policies and procedures (D1) 
Management tools (D2)  
 Correlation and data management (D3)  
 Reporting and response (D4) 
 Analysis and human intervention (D5)  
 Others, 
state…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
8. Do you think that having security operation and management as part of the risk 
assessment model is the right thing to do?  
 
 Yes    No  
 
9. What’s the percentage of importance you would give for the security operation and 
management as part of any security programme?  
 
 10-30% 
 31-50% 
 51-70% 
 71-100% 
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10. Have you experienced any security incident in your organisation or other places which 
was due to the lack of security operation and management?  
 
 Yes    No   can’t answer this question  
 
11. Do you have the security operation and management as a local competency within the 
organisation or is it outsourced?  
 
 Available within the organisation  
 Outsourced 
 
Section 6: Decision factor                                                  
 
1. How do you reach your decision for selecting or considering a security technology, 
policy, operational procedure, or hiring a resource with certain security competency?  
 
 Cost factor  
Background on the security subject  
 Need or want 
 Availability of competencies/technologies and ease of implementation 
Others………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
2. What are the factors which may change the decision of  any security technology, policy, 
or implementation?  
 
 Not having enough information on the subject  
 No ROI justification  
 Lack of competencies on the technology within the organisation  
 High cost of implementation, training, and transition  
 Major and core business processes change 
 
3. What’s the impact of any decision on the technology layer of any security system in any 
organisation?  
 
 Deep impact on the competencies, policies, and operations 
 No impact if the decision was carefully studied  
 
4. What’s the impact of  any decision regarding the adaptation of some policies and leaving 
others in any organisation/  
 
 Might defeat the security programme  
 No effect if the security technologies were well architected 
 Slight impact but not major 
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5. Do you feel that decision on security programme of any organisation will affect the 
method of communication and interaction the organisation has with others?  
 
Yes    No 
 
6. Can we consider the decision factor as one of the factors an organisation must be 
assessed on as part of any security assessment programme?  
 
Yes    No 
 
7. Is there a method of making the decision regarding any security technology, policies 
implementation, or having competencies layered so the impact becomes light on the core 
security programme of the organisation?  
 
 Not aware of   Yes, 
state…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
8. If two organisations A and B are communicating /exchanging information with each 
other, can we limit or ask for synchronization in decision making between them once the 
exchange of information starts?  
 
 Yes    No 
 
9.  Have you experienced a security breach in your organisation or in any previous job 
which was due directly or indirectly to a wrong decision made on the security 
programme/system of the organisation?  
 
 Yes    No 
 Section 7: Correlation questions 
 
1. Let a set of a group of security measures which may contain technology, policies, 
competencies, operational procedures, and decision factors be considered a practice 
(P). What is the best practice (P) do you consider applicable, doable, and will give 
the maximum level of security level for any e-government authority or 
governmental department offering e-services. Please assign a total percentage of 
each P, next to it based on your industrial experience in the field of security. 
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Practice  Security Layers combinations 
P1 
(For Information 
Publishing e-Services) 
 
A1   A2   A3  A4   A5  A6  A7  A8  A9 A10 A11 A12  
B1   B2   B3   B4   B5  B6  B7  B8  B9  B10 B11 
B12 B13 B14 B15 B16 
C1   C2   C3   C4   C5  C6  C7  C8  C9 C10 
D1   D2   D3   D4  D5  
E1   E2    E3   E4   E5 
P2 
(One-Way Interactive e-
Services) 
 
A1   A2   A3  A4   A5  A6  A7  A8  A9 A10 A11 A12  
B1   B2   B3   B4   B5  B6  B7  B8  B9  B10 B11 
B12 B13 B14 B15 B16 
C1   C2   C3   C4   C5  C6  C7  C8  C9 C10 
D1   D2   D3   D4  D5  
E1   E2    E3   E4   E5 
P3 
(Two-Way Interactive e-
Services) 
 
A1   A2   A3  A4   A5  A6  A7  A8  A9 A10 A11 A12  
B1   B2   B3   B4   B5  B6  B7  B8  B9  B10 B11 
B12 B13 B14 B15 B16 
C1   C2   C3   C4   C5  C6  C7  C8  C9 C10 
D1   D2   D3   D4  D5  
E1   E2    E3   E4   E5 
P4 
(Transactional e-Services) 
 
 
A1   A2   A3  A4   A5  A6  A7  A8  A9 A10 A11 A12  
B1   B2   B3   B4   B5  B6  B7  B8  B9  B10 B11 
B12 B13 B14 B15 B16 
C1   C2   C3   C4   C5  C6  C7  C8  C9 C10 
D1   D2   D3   D4  D5  
E1   E2    E3   E4   E5 
 
P5 (Combination of all 
e-services types) 
A1   A2   A3  A4   A5  A6  A7  A8  A9 A10 A11 A12  
B1   B2   B3   B4   B5  B6  B7  B8  B9  B10 B11 
B12 B13 B14 B15 B16 
C1   C2   C3   C4   C5  C6  C7  C8  C9 C10 
D1   D2   D3   D4  D5  
E1   E2    E3   E4   E5 
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Selections definitions: 
Security Technologies 
A1   : Access Control  
A2   : Intrusion Detection and Prevention  
A3   : Anti-Virus & Malicious Code 
A4   : Authentication and Passwords 
A5   : Files Integrity Checks 
A6   : Cryptography  
A7   : VPN 
A8   : Vulnerability Scanning Tools 
A9   : Digital Signatures and Certificates  
A10 : Biometrics 
A11 : Logical Access Control (Firewalls) 
A12  : Security Protocols 
 
Security Policies 
B1 : Password Management  
B2     : Log-in Process 
B3   : Logs Handling  
B4  : Computer Viruses 
B5  : Intellectual Property Rights 
B6   : Data Privacy 
B7  : Privilege Control 
B8   : Data Confidentiality 
B9   : Data Integrity 
B10 : Internet Connectivity 
B11 : Administrative Policies 
B12 : Encryption Policies 
B13 : HR Security Policies  
B14 : Third Party Policies 
B15 : Physical Security Policies 
B16 : Operation Security Policies 
 
Security Competencies 
C1   : Security Operation and management 
C2   : Security Architecture and development 
C3   : Ethical Hacking  
C4   : Security policies and development 
C5  : Computer Forensics 
C6  : Cryptography 
C7  : Security Programming  
C8  : Laws and regulations 
C9 : Security implementation and configuration 
C10 : Security Analysis 
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Security Operations and Management 
D1    : Operational Policies and procedures 
D2    : Management Tools 
D3   : Correlation and data mining 
D4   : Reporting and Response 
D5   : Analysis and human intervention 
 
Security Decision Factors 
E1   : Cost 
E2   : Awareness 
E3  : Need 
E4  : Technologies Availability 
E5 : FUD 
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Appendix C: Feedback form (Questionnaire A & B) 
 
Feedback form on questionnaire A or B 
 
Questionnaire  A    B 
Name of reviewer:…Farrukh Khan………………………………………………….. 
Information Security Role or Designation:……Senior Network Security Specialist. 
Other Related Role:………………………………………………………………………. 
Time Spent in Filling the Questionnaire:…1 hr 30 min 
…………………………………… 
 
1. Please comment on the quality of the questions addressed to the Security 
Practitioners or Governmental Department Leaders:  
 
 The questions were long and irrelevant to the subject matter of the Information 
Security or Management of an e-government department.  
 The level of questions were too detailed and boring 
 The language was weak or didn’t reflect the right objective of the question 
 The choices given for each question were not enough to cover all possible answers 
 All the above 
 Other comment…The level of questions are fine covering little on e-government and 
more on information Security Technology 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
2. Please select the appropriate selection related to the length of the questions: 
 
 The length of the questions were long compared to the objective behind the 
questionnaire 
 The time taken to answer the whole questionnaire was long but the questions were so 
interesting which led me to complete all of them 
 The length was suitable and appropriate  
 Can’t tell as each question was different from the others 
 As management, it took too long for me to go through all the questionnaire questions 
 Other comment…The length of some of the questions were too long due to which a 
person who is responding on this questionnaire can lose his 
interest.……………………………………………………….. 
 
3. (For security practitioners only) Do you think that this questionnaire contributes to 
the knowledge body of the Information Security Field:  
 Yes   No 
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4. (For government department it management or department leadership) Do 
you feel the questions related to the management of the e-government department 
were too specific/detailed for management to answer:  
 Yes  No     N/A 
 
5. Out of 100% how do you rate the following criteria related to the questions 
presented in Questionnaire A or B:  
 
• Coverage of most of the security field domains: _40____% 
• Analytical thinking behind each question___20___% 
• Knowledge contribution in each question__20____%  
• Raising or highlighting issues which are related to the security of e-
government__10_% 
• Scientific quality of each question__10____% 
 
6. Please write your comments on any specific question or the whole questionnaire to 
assist the author to enhance or develop better quality questions:  
 
Questionnaire Type  A   B 
 
Specific Comments on Question Number____ 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
Specific Comments on Question Number____ 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
Specific Comments on Question Number____ 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
Specific Comments on Question Number____ 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Overall Questionnaire Comments:  
……The questionnaire covers the details required for implementation of Information 
Security technologies, policies, management and monitoring for any 
organization..……………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Do you recommend this questionnaire to go out to the concerned addressees?  
 
Yes  No, unless major comments are considered and amendments made to it 
 No, the questionnaire will not add value to the researcher 
because……………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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Appendix D: Validation confirmation from DEG authority 
 
Validation Forms Filled by Dubai e‐Government Authority 
 
 
 
A copy from the email of the director of Dubai e‐government authority  
 
Dear Sabri, 
      It  was  nice  talking  to  you  the  other  day  and  learn  more  about  your 
eGovernment  Security  Model.  I  have  reviewed  the  model  and  found  it 
contributing  to  the  assessment  of  the  security  level  of  the  government 
departments; Furthermore, we might consider it for the security architecture 
in the future. 
      Wishing you the very best in your academic and professional endeavour. 
 
Best regards. 
(See attached file: Validation Forms.xls) Salem Khamis Al‐Shair Director, e‐
Services  Dubai  eGovernment  Tel.  +9714  3190333,  Fax.  +9714  3304333,  Dubai, 
UAE, http://www.Dubai.ae 
 
 
This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended 
solely  for  the  use  of  the  individual  or  entity  to  whom  which  they  are 
addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify the system 
manager. Please note that any views or opinions presented in this email are 
solely  those  of  the  author  and  do  not  necessarily  represent  those  of  the 
Dubai  eGovernment.  Finally,  the  recipient  should  check  this  email  and  any 
attachments  for  the  presence  of  viruses.  The  Dubai  eGovernment  accepts  no 
liability for any damage caused by any virus transmitted by this email. 
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A copy from the email of the director of Dubai e-government authority 
Dear Mr. Azazi,  
 
        Kindly find below  my comments on the model; Furthermore, please accept 
this email as an official document since, as you well know, we are driving the 
paperless movement in Dubai:  
 
Name of the Valuator: Mr. Salem Khamis Al-Shair  
 
Designation: Director, eServices  
 
Role and Responsibility in DEG: Director General.  
 
Brief Background on the Valuator:  Mr. Salem Al Shair is the Director of the 
overall Dubai eGovernment initiative. He has led the entire initiative from 
strategic, operational and technology perspectives including strategic progress 
monitoring. He has a strong business and technical background coupled with a 
deep understanding of public management.  
 
Validation Comments: I validate the model since it covers various aspects of 
security from a management point of view. It unifies various areas within the 
security domain and is quite flexible and practical in nature.  
 
What is your overall impression about the new model?  
 
The new model allows one to identify various issues around security and assign 
various weights depending on strategic importance for an organization.  
 
Do you feel that the model can be used as security architecture for Dubai e-gov?  
 
I feel that the model is applicable for designing the security architecture and in 
making operational trade-offs for Dubai eGovernment.  
 
What are your general comments on the model?  
 
The model has several perspectives and is parametric and flexible to adapt to 
different needs of various organizations. It allows one to emphasize certain areas 
in relation to others, reflecting the security related choices of an organization. It is 
quite holistic in nature while preserving its practicality.  
 
Any additional suggestions to the model?  
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The model reflects the high-level security strategy, architecture, operational and 
implementation concerns. It can potentially be extended to include further 
technical implementation details which are technology and / or platform specific, 
if need be. However, usually those issues go beyond the basic security aspects and 
needs of an organization.  
Best regards. 
 
Salem Khamis Al-Shair  
Director, eServices  
 
 
Tel. +971 4 319 0333, Fax. +971 4 330 4333, Dubai, UAE. http://www.dubai.ae  
 
This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the individual or 
entity to whom which they are addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify the system 
manager. Please note that any views or opinions presented in this email are solely those of the author and do 
not necessarily represent those of the Dubai eGovernment. Finally, the recipient should check this email and 
any attachments for the presence of viruses. The Dubai eGovernment accepts no liability for any damage 
caused by any virus transmitted by this email.  
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Criteria Description Validity Rate
Simplicity of the 
model
The model must be clear to the indented users 
(government departments or individuals). The 
layers of the model must be explicit and should 
make sense to a non security or IT expert
  □ High   
Applicability The model must be applicable to any 
organization which intends to use it for its 
internal or external communication or 
information sharing
  □ High   
Standards 
Compliance
The model must comply with the security 
standards in terms of acronyms, references, 
objectives
□ High   
Doable The model must be doable for the e-
government authority and its government 
affiliates
 □ High  
Flexible The model must be flexible and can be 
implemented in phases
   □ High   
Renewable and 
Expandable
the model must be easy to update with the 
introduction of new trends in the security field 
and it also can allow merge group of security 
technologies, policies, procedures, or 
competencies
 □ High   
Open standards The model must address general technologies, 
policies, competencies, and operational 
procedures. It should not be biased to any 
brand, proprietary solution, or special 
procedures applicable only to specific vendor or 
forum.
□ Medium 
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Access Control A1 Intrusion Detection and Prevention A2
Anti Virus and Malicious Code A3 Authentication and Passwords A4
Files and Integrity Check A5 Cryptography A6
VPN A7 Vulnerability Scanning Tools A8
Digital Signatures and Certificates A9 Biometrics A10
Logical Access Control (Firewalls) A11 Security Protocol A12
Password Management B1 Log-in Process B2
Logs Handling B3 Computer Viruses B4
Intellectual Property Rights B5 Data Privacy B6
Privilege Control B7 Data Confidentiality B8
Data Integrity B9 Internet Connectivity B10
Administrative Policies B11 Encryption Policies B12
HR Security Policies B13 Third Party Policies B14
Physical Security Policies B15 Operation Security Policies B16
Security Operation and management C1 Security Architecture and development C2
Ethical Hacking C3 Security Policies and development C4
Computer Forensics C5 Cryptography C6
Security Programming C7 Laws and regulation C8
Security Implementation and Configuration C9 Security Analysis C10
Operational Policies and Procedures D1 Management Tools D2
Correlation and data mining D3 Reporting and Response D4
D5
Cost E1 Awareness E2
Need E3 Technologies Availability E4D
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Category Category
O
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Analysis and Human intervention 
 
 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12
63% 44% 50% 56% 63% 50% 50% 44% 56% 19% 63% 44%
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12 B13 B14 B15 B16
56% 56% 56% 56% 44% 50% 56% 56% 63% 50% 56% 50% 38% 44% 56% 63%
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10
53% 69% 56% 50% 50% 44% 38% 63% 63% 38%
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
56% 56% 56% 63% 44%
E1 E2 E3 E4
50% 44% 63% 69%
Modified Model 
 
